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authorAlan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>2014-01-22 23:40:18 -0800
committerAlan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>2014-12-08 18:09:47 -0800
commit6692670fde081bbfe9313f17d84037ae9116702a (patch)
tree4cfe8c4053f1c2ef90c52b83fa1d384437cc64d7 /hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c
parente0e11644622a589129a01e11e5d105dc74a098de (diff)
dri2: integer overflow in ProcDRI2GetBuffers() [CVE-2014-8094]
ProcDRI2GetBuffers() tries to validate a length field (count). There is an integer overflow in the validation. This can cause out of bound reads and memory corruption later on. Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net> Reviewed-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c')
-rw-r--r--hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c3
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c b/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c
index ffd66fad6..221ec530b 100644
--- a/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c
+++ b/hw/xfree86/dri2/dri2ext.c
@@ -270,6 +270,9 @@ ProcDRI2GetBuffers(ClientPtr client)
unsigned int *attachments;
REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xDRI2GetBuffersReq, stuff->count * 4);
+ if (stuff->count > (INT_MAX / 4))
+ return BadLength;
+
if (!validDrawable(client, stuff->drawable, DixReadAccess | DixWriteAccess,
&pDrawable, &status))
return status;