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-rw-r--r--Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt13
-rw-r--r--Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt68
-rw-r--r--Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt6
-rw-r--r--Documentation/x86/x86_64/5level-paging.txt64
-rw-r--r--arch/ia64/include/asm/acpi.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/ia64/kernel/efi.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/Kconfig49
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/pagetable.c7
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h13
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/cmdline.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/dma-mapping.h5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/dmi.h8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/e820/api.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h20
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/init.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/io.h8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h11
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h80
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h25
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h15
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/mpx.h9
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h28
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h58
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h13
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h20
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h12
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/tlb.h14
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h87
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/vga.h14
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c29
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c40
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c43
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/e820.c26
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/espfix_64.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/head64.c95
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S40
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c34
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c28
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c25
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c108
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c11
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c15
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/process.c17
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S14
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/setup.c9
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c30
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c41
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm.c35
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/x86.c3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/lib/cmdline.c105
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c93
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/fault.c26
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/hugetlbpage.c27
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c12
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/init.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c287
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c593
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S149
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/mmap.c12
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/mpx.c33
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c67
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pat.c9
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/tlb.c331
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/pci/common.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c15
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/realmode/init.c12
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S24
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/xen/Kconfig5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c7
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S2
-rw-r--r--drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c2
-rw-r--r--drivers/firmware/dmi-sysfs.c5
-rw-r--r--drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c33
-rw-r--r--drivers/firmware/pcdp.c4
-rw-r--r--drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem.c2
-rw-r--r--drivers/gpu/drm/drm_vm.c4
-rw-r--r--drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo_vm.c7
-rw-r--r--drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_fb.c4
-rw-r--r--drivers/idle/intel_idle.c9
-rw-r--r--drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c30
-rw-r--r--drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c34
-rw-r--r--drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_proto.h10
-rw-r--r--drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_types.h2
-rw-r--r--drivers/sfi/sfi_core.c23
-rw-r--r--drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c12
-rw-r--r--include/asm-generic/early_ioremap.h2
-rw-r--r--include/asm-generic/pgtable.h12
-rw-r--r--include/linux/compiler-gcc.h2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/compiler.h4
-rw-r--r--include/linux/dma-mapping.h13
-rw-r--r--include/linux/efi.h9
-rw-r--r--include/linux/io.h2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/kexec.h8
-rw-r--r--include/linux/mem_encrypt.h48
-rw-r--r--include/linux/mm_inline.h6
-rw-r--r--include/linux/swiotlb.h1
-rw-r--r--init/main.c10
-rw-r--r--kernel/kexec_core.c12
-rw-r--r--kernel/memremap.c20
-rw-r--r--lib/swiotlb.c57
-rw-r--r--mm/early_ioremap.c28
-rw-r--r--mm/memory-failure.c2
120 files changed, 3134 insertions, 470 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 3a99cc96b6b1..dad6fa01af95 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2233,6 +2233,17 @@
memory contents and reserves bad memory
regions that are detected.
+ mem_encrypt= [X86-64] AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) control
+ Valid arguments: on, off
+ Default (depends on kernel configuration option):
+ on (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=y)
+ off (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=n)
+ mem_encrypt=on: Activate SME
+ mem_encrypt=off: Do not activate SME
+
+ Refer to Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt
+ for details on when memory encryption can be activated.
+
mem_sleep_default= [SUSPEND] Default system suspend mode:
s2idle - Suspend-To-Idle
shallow - Power-On Suspend or equivalent (if supported)
@@ -2697,6 +2708,8 @@
nopat [X86] Disable PAT (page attribute table extension of
pagetables) support.
+ nopcid [X86-64] Disable the PCID cpu feature.
+
norandmaps Don't use address space randomization. Equivalent to
echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt b/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f512ab718541
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+Secure Memory Encryption (SME) is a feature found on AMD processors.
+
+SME provides the ability to mark individual pages of memory as encrypted using
+the standard x86 page tables. A page that is marked encrypted will be
+automatically decrypted when read from DRAM and encrypted when written to
+DRAM. SME can therefore be used to protect the contents of DRAM from physical
+attacks on the system.
+
+A page is encrypted when a page table entry has the encryption bit set (see
+below on how to determine its position). The encryption bit can also be
+specified in the cr3 register, allowing the PGD table to be encrypted. Each
+successive level of page tables can also be encrypted by setting the encryption
+bit in the page table entry that points to the next table. This allows the full
+page table hierarchy to be encrypted. Note, this means that just because the
+encryption bit is set in cr3, doesn't imply the full hierarchy is encyrpted.
+Each page table entry in the hierarchy needs to have the encryption bit set to
+achieve that. So, theoretically, you could have the encryption bit set in cr3
+so that the PGD is encrypted, but not set the encryption bit in the PGD entry
+for a PUD which results in the PUD pointed to by that entry to not be
+encrypted.
+
+Support for SME can be determined through the CPUID instruction. The CPUID
+function 0x8000001f reports information related to SME:
+
+ 0x8000001f[eax]:
+ Bit[0] indicates support for SME
+ 0x8000001f[ebx]:
+ Bits[5:0] pagetable bit number used to activate memory
+ encryption
+ Bits[11:6] reduction in physical address space, in bits, when
+ memory encryption is enabled (this only affects
+ system physical addresses, not guest physical
+ addresses)
+
+If support for SME is present, MSR 0xc00100010 (MSR_K8_SYSCFG) can be used to
+determine if SME is enabled and/or to enable memory encryption:
+
+ 0xc0010010:
+ Bit[23] 0 = memory encryption features are disabled
+ 1 = memory encryption features are enabled
+
+Linux relies on BIOS to set this bit if BIOS has determined that the reduction
+in the physical address space as a result of enabling memory encryption (see
+CPUID information above) will not conflict with the address space resource
+requirements for the system. If this bit is not set upon Linux startup then
+Linux itself will not set it and memory encryption will not be possible.
+
+The state of SME in the Linux kernel can be documented as follows:
+ - Supported:
+ The CPU supports SME (determined through CPUID instruction).
+
+ - Enabled:
+ Supported and bit 23 of MSR_K8_SYSCFG is set.
+
+ - Active:
+ Supported, Enabled and the Linux kernel is actively applying
+ the encryption bit to page table entries (the SME mask in the
+ kernel is non-zero).
+
+SME can also be enabled and activated in the BIOS. If SME is enabled and
+activated in the BIOS, then all memory accesses will be encrypted and it will
+not be necessary to activate the Linux memory encryption support. If the BIOS
+merely enables SME (sets bit 23 of the MSR_K8_SYSCFG), then Linux can activate
+memory encryption by default (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=y) or
+by supplying mem_encrypt=on on the kernel command line. However, if BIOS does
+not enable SME, then Linux will not be able to activate memory encryption, even
+if configured to do so by default or the mem_encrypt=on command line parameter
+is specified.
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt b/Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt
index b64304540821..fa46dcb347bc 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt
+++ b/Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ with a key. In this example WRPKRU is wrapped by a C function
called pkey_set().
int real_prot = PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE;
- pkey = pkey_alloc(0, PKEY_DENY_WRITE);
+ pkey = pkey_alloc(0, PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
ptr = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
ret = pkey_mprotect(ptr, PAGE_SIZE, real_prot, pkey);
... application runs here
@@ -42,9 +42,9 @@ called pkey_set().
Now, if the application needs to update the data at 'ptr', it can
gain access, do the update, then remove its write access:
- pkey_set(pkey, 0); // clear PKEY_DENY_WRITE
+ pkey_set(pkey, 0); // clear PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE
*ptr = foo; // assign something
- pkey_set(pkey, PKEY_DENY_WRITE); // set PKEY_DENY_WRITE again
+ pkey_set(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE); // set PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE again
Now when it frees the memory, it will also free the pkey since it
is no longer in use:
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/x86_64/5level-paging.txt b/Documentation/x86/x86_64/5level-paging.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..087251a0d99c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/x86_64/5level-paging.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+== Overview ==
+
+Original x86-64 was limited by 4-level paing to 256 TiB of virtual address
+space and 64 TiB of physical address space. We are already bumping into
+this limit: some vendors offers servers with 64 TiB of memory today.
+
+To overcome the limitation upcoming hardware will introduce support for
+5-level paging. It is a straight-forward extension of the current page
+table structure adding one more layer of translation.
+
+It bumps the limits to 128 PiB of virtual address space and 4 PiB of
+physical address space. This "ought to be enough for anybody" ©.
+
+QEMU 2.9 and later support 5-level paging.
+
+Virtual memory layout for 5-level paging is described in
+Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
+
+== Enabling 5-level paging ==
+
+CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL=y enables the feature.
+
+So far, a kernel compiled with the option enabled will be able to boot
+only on machines that supports the feature -- see for 'la57' flag in
+/proc/cpuinfo.
+
+The plan is to implement boot-time switching between 4- and 5-level paging
+in the future.
+
+== User-space and large virtual address space ==
+
+On x86, 5-level paging enables 56-bit userspace virtual address space.
+Not all user space is ready to handle wide addresses. It's known that
+at least some JIT compilers use higher bits in pointers to encode their
+information. It collides with valid pointers with 5-level paging and
+leads to crashes.
+
+To mitigate this, we are not going to allocate virtual address space
+above 47-bit by default.
+
+But userspace can ask for allocation from full address space by
+specifying hint address (with or without MAP_FIXED) above 47-bits.
+
+If hint address set above 47-bit, but MAP_FIXED is not specified, we try
+to look for unmapped area by specified address. If it's already
+occupied, we look for unmapped area in *full* address space, rather than
+from 47-bit window.
+
+A high hint address would only affect the allocation in question, but not
+any future mmap()s.
+
+Specifying high hint address on older kernel or on machine without 5-level
+paging support is safe. The hint will be ignored and kernel will fall back
+to allocation from 47-bit address space.
+
+This approach helps to easily make application's memory allocator aware
+about large address space without manually tracking allocated virtual
+address space.
+
+One important case we need to handle here is interaction with MPX.
+MPX (without MAWA extension) cannot handle addresses above 47-bit, so we
+need to make sure that MPX cannot be enabled we already have VMA above
+the boundary and forbid creating such VMAs once MPX is enabled.
+
diff --git a/arch/ia64/include/asm/acpi.h b/arch/ia64/include/asm/acpi.h
index a3d0211970e9..c86a947f5368 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/include/asm/acpi.h
+++ b/arch/ia64/include/asm/acpi.h
@@ -112,8 +112,6 @@ static inline void arch_acpi_set_pdc_bits(u32 *buf)
buf[2] |= ACPI_PDC_EST_CAPABILITY_SMP;
}
-#define acpi_unlazy_tlb(x)
-
#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_NUMA
extern cpumask_t early_cpu_possible_map;
#define for_each_possible_early_cpu(cpu) \
diff --git a/arch/ia64/kernel/efi.c b/arch/ia64/kernel/efi.c
index 121295637d0d..81416000c5e0 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/kernel/efi.c
+++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/efi.c
@@ -757,14 +757,14 @@ efi_memmap_intersects (unsigned long phys_addr, unsigned long size)
return 0;
}
-u32
+int
efi_mem_type (unsigned long phys_addr)
{
efi_memory_desc_t *md = efi_memory_descriptor(phys_addr);
if (md)
return md->type;
- return 0;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
u64
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index cce15191e9e9..b4b27ab016f6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ config X86
select HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF if PERF_EVENTS && HAVE_PERF_EVENTS_NMI
select HAVE_PERF_REGS
select HAVE_PERF_USER_STACK_DUMP
+ select HAVE_RCU_TABLE_FREE
select HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API
select HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE if X86_64 && FRAME_POINTER_UNWINDER && STACK_VALIDATION
select HAVE_STACK_VALIDATION if X86_64
@@ -329,6 +330,7 @@ config FIX_EARLYCON_MEM
config PGTABLE_LEVELS
int
+ default 5 if X86_5LEVEL
default 4 if X86_64
default 3 if X86_PAE
default 2
@@ -1399,6 +1401,24 @@ config X86_PAE
has the cost of more pagetable lookup overhead, and also
consumes more pagetable space per process.
+config X86_5LEVEL
+ bool "Enable 5-level page tables support"
+ depends on X86_64
+ ---help---
+ 5-level paging enables access to larger address space:
+ upto 128 PiB of virtual address space and 4 PiB of
+ physical address space.
+
+ It will be supported by future Intel CPUs.
+
+ Note: a kernel with this option enabled can only be booted
+ on machines that support the feature.
+
+ See Documentation/x86/x86_64/5level-paging.txt for more
+ information.
+
+ Say N if unsure.
+
config ARCH_PHYS_ADDR_T_64BIT
def_bool y
depends on X86_64 || X86_PAE
@@ -1416,6 +1436,35 @@ config X86_DIRECT_GBPAGES
supports them), so don't confuse the user by printing
that we have them enabled.
+config ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT
+ def_bool y
+
+config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+ bool "AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support"
+ depends on X86_64 && CPU_SUP_AMD
+ ---help---
+ Say yes to enable support for the encryption of system memory.
+ This requires an AMD processor that supports Secure Memory
+ Encryption (SME).
+
+config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT
+ bool "Activate AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) by default"
+ default y
+ depends on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+ ---help---
+ Say yes to have system memory encrypted by default if running on
+ an AMD processor that supports Secure Memory Encryption (SME).
+
+ If set to Y, then the encryption of system memory can be
+ deactivated with the mem_encrypt=off command line option.
+
+ If set to N, then the encryption of system memory can be
+ activated with the mem_encrypt=on command line option.
+
+config ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT
+ def_bool y
+ depends on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+
# Common NUMA Features
config NUMA
bool "Numa Memory Allocation and Scheduler Support"
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pagetable.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pagetable.c
index 28029be47fbb..f1aa43854bed 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pagetable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pagetable.c
@@ -15,6 +15,13 @@
#define __pa(x) ((unsigned long)(x))
#define __va(x) ((void *)((unsigned long)(x)))
+/*
+ * The pgtable.h and mm/ident_map.c includes make use of the SME related
+ * information which is not used in the compressed image support. Un-define
+ * the SME support to avoid any compile and link errors.
+ */
+#undef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+
#include "misc.h"
/* These actually do the work of building the kernel identity maps. */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h
index 2efc768e4362..72d867f6b518 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h
@@ -150,8 +150,6 @@ static inline void disable_acpi(void) { }
extern int x86_acpi_numa_init(void);
#endif /* CONFIG_ACPI_NUMA */
-#define acpi_unlazy_tlb(x) leave_mm(x)
-
#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_APEI
static inline pgprot_t arch_apei_get_mem_attribute(phys_addr_t addr)
{
@@ -162,12 +160,13 @@ static inline pgprot_t arch_apei_get_mem_attribute(phys_addr_t addr)
* you call efi_mem_attributes() during boot and at runtime,
* you could theoretically see different attributes.
*
- * Since we are yet to see any x86 platforms that require
- * anything other than PAGE_KERNEL (some arm64 platforms
- * require the equivalent of PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE), return that
- * until we know differently.
+ * We are yet to see any x86 platforms that require anything
+ * other than PAGE_KERNEL (some ARM64 platforms require the
+ * equivalent of PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE). Additionally, if SME
+ * is active, the ACPI information will not be encrypted,
+ * so return PAGE_KERNEL_NOENC until we know differently.
*/
- return PAGE_KERNEL;
+ return PAGE_KERNEL_NOENC;
}
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cmdline.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cmdline.h
index e01f7f7ccb0c..84ae170bc3d0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cmdline.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cmdline.h
@@ -2,5 +2,7 @@
#define _ASM_X86_CMDLINE_H
int cmdline_find_option_bool(const char *cmdline_ptr, const char *option);
+int cmdline_find_option(const char *cmdline_ptr, const char *option,
+ char *buffer, int bufsize);
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CMDLINE_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 8ea315a11fe0..42bbbf0f173d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -196,6 +196,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE ( 7*32+ 8) /* AMD HW-PState */
#define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SME ( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT ( 7*32+15) /* Intel Processor Trace */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 5dff775af7cd..c10c9128f54e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -21,11 +21,13 @@
# define DISABLE_K6_MTRR (1<<(X86_FEATURE_K6_MTRR & 31))
# define DISABLE_CYRIX_ARR (1<<(X86_FEATURE_CYRIX_ARR & 31))
# define DISABLE_CENTAUR_MCR (1<<(X86_FEATURE_CENTAUR_MCR & 31))
+# define DISABLE_PCID 0
#else
# define DISABLE_VME 0
# define DISABLE_K6_MTRR 0
# define DISABLE_CYRIX_ARR 0
# define DISABLE_CENTAUR_MCR 0
+# define DISABLE_PCID (1<<(X86_FEATURE_PCID & 31))
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
@@ -49,7 +51,7 @@
#define DISABLED_MASK1 0
#define DISABLED_MASK2 0
#define DISABLED_MASK3 (DISABLE_CYRIX_ARR|DISABLE_CENTAUR_MCR|DISABLE_K6_MTRR)
-#define DISABLED_MASK4 0
+#define DISABLED_MASK4 (DISABLE_PCID)
#define DISABLED_MASK5 0
#define DISABLED_MASK6 0
#define DISABLED_MASK7 0
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/dma-mapping.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/dma-mapping.h
index 398c79889f5c..1387dafdba2d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/dma-mapping.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/dma-mapping.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/swiotlb.h>
#include <linux/dma-contiguous.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_ISA
# define ISA_DMA_BIT_MASK DMA_BIT_MASK(24)
@@ -57,12 +58,12 @@ static inline bool dma_capable(struct device *dev, dma_addr_t addr, size_t size)
static inline dma_addr_t phys_to_dma(struct device *dev, phys_addr_t paddr)
{
- return paddr;
+ return __sme_set(paddr);
}
static inline phys_addr_t dma_to_phys(struct device *dev, dma_addr_t daddr)
{
- return daddr;
+ return __sme_clr(daddr);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_DMA_REMAP */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/dmi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/dmi.h
index 3c69fed215c5..a8e15b04565b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/dmi.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/dmi.h
@@ -13,9 +13,9 @@ static __always_inline __init void *dmi_alloc(unsigned len)
}
/* Use early IO mappings for DMI because it's initialized early */
-#define dmi_early_remap early_ioremap
-#define dmi_early_unmap early_iounmap
-#define dmi_remap ioremap_cache
-#define dmi_unmap iounmap
+#define dmi_early_remap early_memremap
+#define dmi_early_unmap early_memunmap
+#define dmi_remap(_x, _l) memremap(_x, _l, MEMREMAP_WB)
+#define dmi_unmap(_x) memunmap(_x)
#endif /* _ASM_X86_DMI_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/e820/api.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/e820/api.h
index a504adc661a4..cd266d830e49 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/e820/api.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/e820/api.h
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ extern void e820__setup_pci_gap(void);
extern void e820__reallocate_tables(void);
extern void e820__register_nosave_regions(unsigned long limit_pfn);
+extern int e820__get_entry_type(u64 start, u64 end);
+
/*
* Returns true iff the specified range [start,end) is completely contained inside
* the ISA region.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
index bda9f94bcb10..04330c8d9af9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
@@ -305,8 +305,8 @@ static inline int mmap_is_ia32(void)
test_thread_flag(TIF_ADDR32));
}
-extern unsigned long tasksize_32bit(void);
-extern unsigned long tasksize_64bit(void);
+extern unsigned long task_size_32bit(void);
+extern unsigned long task_size_64bit(int full_addr_space);
extern unsigned long get_mmap_base(int is_legacy);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
index b65155cc3760..dcd9fb55e679 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
@@ -157,6 +157,26 @@ static inline void __set_fixmap(enum fixed_addresses idx,
}
#endif
+/*
+ * FIXMAP_PAGE_NOCACHE is used for MMIO. Memory encryption is not
+ * supported for MMIO addresses, so make sure that the memory encryption
+ * mask is not part of the page attributes.
+ */
+#define FIXMAP_PAGE_NOCACHE PAGE_KERNEL_IO_NOCACHE
+
+/*
+ * Early memremap routines used for in-place encryption. The mappings created
+ * by these routines are intended to be used as temporary mappings.
+ */
+void __init *early_memremap_encrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size);
+void __init *early_memremap_encrypted_wp(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size);
+void __init *early_memremap_decrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size);
+void __init *early_memremap_decrypted_wp(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size);
+
#include <asm-generic/fixmap.h>
#define __late_set_fixmap(idx, phys, flags) __set_fixmap(idx, phys, flags)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h
index 474eb8c66fee..05c4aa00cc86 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ struct x86_mapping_info {
unsigned long page_flag; /* page flag for PMD or PUD entry */
unsigned long offset; /* ident mapping offset */
bool direct_gbpages; /* PUD level 1GB page support */
+ unsigned long kernpg_flag; /* kernel pagetable flag override */
};
int kernel_ident_mapping_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *pgd_page,
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
index 1310e1f1cd65..c40a95c33bb8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
@@ -377,4 +377,12 @@ extern void arch_io_free_memtype_wc(resource_size_t start, resource_size_t size)
#define arch_io_reserve_memtype_wc arch_io_reserve_memtype_wc
#endif
+extern bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t offset,
+ unsigned long size,
+ unsigned long flags);
+#define arch_memremap_can_ram_remap arch_memremap_can_ram_remap
+
+extern bool phys_mem_access_encrypted(unsigned long phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size);
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_IO_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h
index 70ef205489f0..942c1f444da8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h
@@ -147,7 +147,8 @@ unsigned long
relocate_kernel(unsigned long indirection_page,
unsigned long page_list,
unsigned long start_address,
- unsigned int preserve_context);
+ unsigned int preserve_context,
+ unsigned int sme_active);
#endif
#define ARCH_HAS_KIMAGE_ARCH
@@ -207,6 +208,14 @@ struct kexec_entry64_regs {
uint64_t r15;
uint64_t rip;
};
+
+extern int arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages,
+ gfp_t gfp);
+#define arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages
+
+extern void arch_kexec_pre_free_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages);
+#define arch_kexec_pre_free_pages arch_kexec_pre_free_pages
+
#endif
typedef void crash_vmclear_fn(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 92c9032502d8..369e41c23f07 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1079,7 +1079,7 @@ void kvm_mmu_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
void kvm_mmu_uninit_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
void kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes(u64 user_mask, u64 accessed_mask,
u64 dirty_mask, u64 nx_mask, u64 x_mask, u64 p_mask,
- u64 acc_track_mask);
+ u64 acc_track_mask, u64 me_mask);
void kvm_mmu_reset_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void kvm_mmu_slot_remove_write_access(struct kvm *kvm,
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8e618fcf1f7c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+/*
+ * AMD Memory Encryption Support
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_H__
+#define __X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_H__
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+
+#include <asm/bootparam.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+
+extern unsigned long sme_me_mask;
+
+void sme_encrypt_execute(unsigned long encrypted_kernel_vaddr,
+ unsigned long decrypted_kernel_vaddr,
+ unsigned long kernel_len,
+ unsigned long encryption_wa,
+ unsigned long encryption_pgd);
+
+void __init sme_early_encrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
+ unsigned long size);
+void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
+ unsigned long size);
+
+void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data);
+void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data);
+
+void __init sme_early_init(void);
+
+void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void);
+void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp);
+
+/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
+void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
+
+void swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(void *vaddr, unsigned long size);
+
+#else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
+
+#define sme_me_mask 0UL
+
+static inline void __init sme_early_encrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
+ unsigned long size) { }
+static inline void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
+ unsigned long size) { }
+
+static inline void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) { }
+static inline void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) { }
+
+static inline void __init sme_early_init(void) { }
+
+static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void) { }
+static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
+
+/*
+ * The __sme_pa() and __sme_pa_nodebug() macros are meant for use when
+ * writing to or comparing values from the cr3 register. Having the
+ * encryption mask set in cr3 enables the PGD entry to be encrypted and
+ * avoid special case handling of PGD allocations.
+ */
+#define __sme_pa(x) (__pa(x) | sme_me_mask)
+#define __sme_pa_nodebug(x) (__pa_nodebug(x) | sme_me_mask)
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#endif /* __X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
index 79b647a7ebd0..bb8c597c2248 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
@@ -3,12 +3,28 @@
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
/*
- * The x86 doesn't have a mmu context, but
- * we put the segment information here.
+ * x86 has arch-specific MMU state beyond what lives in mm_struct.
*/
typedef struct {
+ /*
+ * ctx_id uniquely identifies this mm_struct. A ctx_id will never
+ * be reused, and zero is not a valid ctx_id.
+ */
+ u64 ctx_id;
+
+ /*
+ * Any code that needs to do any sort of TLB flushing for this
+ * mm will first make its changes to the page tables, then
+ * increment tlb_gen, then flush. This lets the low-level
+ * flushing code keep track of what needs flushing.
+ *
+ * This is not used on Xen PV.
+ */
+ atomic64_t tlb_gen;
+
#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
struct ldt_struct *ldt;
#endif
@@ -37,6 +53,11 @@ typedef struct {
#endif
} mm_context_t;
+#define INIT_MM_CONTEXT(mm) \
+ .context = { \
+ .ctx_id = 1, \
+ }
+
void leave_mm(int cpu);
#endif /* _ASM_X86_MMU_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index 7a234be7e298..7ae318c340d9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/paravirt.h>
#include <asm/mpx.h>
+
+extern atomic64_t last_mm_ctx_id;
+
#ifndef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
static inline void paravirt_activate_mm(struct mm_struct *prev,
struct mm_struct *next)
@@ -125,13 +128,18 @@ static inline void switch_ldt(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next)
static inline void enter_lazy_tlb(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
- if (this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.state) == TLBSTATE_OK)
- this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.state, TLBSTATE_LAZY);
+ int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+
+ if (cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(mm)))
+ cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(mm));
}
static inline int init_new_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct mm_struct *mm)
{
+ mm->context.ctx_id = atomic64_inc_return(&last_mm_ctx_id);
+ atomic64_set(&mm->context.tlb_gen, 0);
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) {
/* pkey 0 is the default and always allocated */
@@ -290,6 +298,9 @@ static inline unsigned long __get_current_cr3_fast(void)
{
unsigned long cr3 = __pa(this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm)->pgd);
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID))
+ cr3 |= this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid);
+
/* For now, be very restrictive about when this can be called. */
VM_WARN_ON(in_nmi() || preemptible());
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mpx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mpx.h
index a0d662be4c5b..7d7404756bb4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mpx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mpx.h
@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ static inline void mpx_mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm)
}
void mpx_notify_unmap(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long start, unsigned long end);
+
+unsigned long mpx_unmapped_area_check(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
+ unsigned long flags);
#else
static inline siginfo_t *mpx_generate_siginfo(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
@@ -94,6 +97,12 @@ static inline void mpx_notify_unmap(struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
{
}
+
+static inline unsigned long mpx_unmapped_area_check(unsigned long addr,
+ unsigned long len, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ return addr;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MPX */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_MPX_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 5573c75f8e4c..17f5c12e1afd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -356,6 +356,8 @@
#define MSR_K8_TOP_MEM1 0xc001001a
#define MSR_K8_TOP_MEM2 0xc001001d
#define MSR_K8_SYSCFG 0xc0010010
+#define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT 23
+#define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT BIT_ULL(MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT)
#define MSR_K8_INT_PENDING_MSG 0xc0010055
/* C1E active bits in int pending message */
#define K8_INTP_C1E_ACTIVE_MASK 0x18000000
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h
index b4a0d43248cf..b50df06ad251 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h
@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ static inline void clear_page(void *page)
void copy_page(void *to, void *from);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
+#define arch_unmap_kpfn arch_unmap_kpfn
+#endif
+
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h
index 7bd0099384ca..b98ed9d14630 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#include <linux/const.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
/* PAGE_SHIFT determines the page size */
#define PAGE_SHIFT 12
@@ -15,7 +16,7 @@
#define PUD_PAGE_SIZE (_AC(1, UL) << PUD_SHIFT)
#define PUD_PAGE_MASK (~(PUD_PAGE_SIZE-1))
-#define __PHYSICAL_MASK ((phys_addr_t)((1ULL << __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT) - 1))
+#define __PHYSICAL_MASK ((phys_addr_t)(__sme_clr((1ULL << __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT) - 1)))
#define __VIRTUAL_MASK ((1UL << __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT) - 1)
/* Cast *PAGE_MASK to a signed type so that it is sign-extended if
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 77037b6f1caa..bbeae4a2bd01 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
#ifndef _ASM_X86_PGTABLE_H
#define _ASM_X86_PGTABLE_H
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/pgtable_types.h>
@@ -13,9 +14,18 @@
cachemode2protval(_PAGE_CACHE_MODE_UC_MINUS))) \
: (prot))
+/*
+ * Macros to add or remove encryption attribute
+ */
+#define pgprot_encrypted(prot) __pgprot(__sme_set(pgprot_val(prot)))
+#define pgprot_decrypted(prot) __pgprot(__sme_clr(pgprot_val(prot)))
+
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
#include <asm/x86_init.h>
+extern pgd_t early_top_pgt[PTRS_PER_PGD];
+int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address, pmdval_t pmd);
+
void ptdump_walk_pgd_level(struct seq_file *m, pgd_t *pgd);
void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_checkwx(void);
@@ -38,6 +48,8 @@ extern struct list_head pgd_list;
extern struct mm_struct *pgd_page_get_mm(struct page *page);
+extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;
+
#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
#include <asm/paravirt.h>
#else /* !CONFIG_PARAVIRT */
@@ -195,6 +207,11 @@ static inline unsigned long p4d_pfn(p4d_t p4d)
return (p4d_val(p4d) & p4d_pfn_mask(p4d)) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
}
+static inline unsigned long pgd_pfn(pgd_t pgd)
+{
+ return (pgd_val(pgd) & PTE_PFN_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+}
+
static inline int p4d_large(p4d_t p4d)
{
/* No 512 GiB pages yet */
@@ -704,8 +721,7 @@ static inline unsigned long pmd_page_vaddr(pmd_t pmd)
* Currently stuck as a macro due to indirect forward reference to
* linux/mmzone.h's __section_mem_map_addr() definition:
*/
-#define pmd_page(pmd) \
- pfn_to_page((pmd_val(pmd) & pmd_pfn_mask(pmd)) >> PAGE_SHIFT)
+#define pmd_page(pmd) pfn_to_page(pmd_pfn(pmd))
/*
* the pmd page can be thought of an array like this: pmd_t[PTRS_PER_PMD]
@@ -773,8 +789,7 @@ static inline unsigned long pud_page_vaddr(pud_t pud)
* Currently stuck as a macro due to indirect forward reference to
* linux/mmzone.h's __section_mem_map_addr() definition:
*/
-#define pud_page(pud) \
- pfn_to_page((pud_val(pud) & pud_pfn_mask(pud)) >> PAGE_SHIFT)
+#define pud_page(pud) pfn_to_page(pud_pfn(pud))
/* Find an entry in the second-level page table.. */
static inline pmd_t *pmd_offset(pud_t *pud, unsigned long address)
@@ -824,8 +839,7 @@ static inline unsigned long p4d_page_vaddr(p4d_t p4d)
* Currently stuck as a macro due to indirect forward reference to
* linux/mmzone.h's __section_mem_map_addr() definition:
*/
-#define p4d_page(p4d) \
- pfn_to_page((p4d_val(p4d) & p4d_pfn_mask(p4d)) >> PAGE_SHIFT)
+#define p4d_page(p4d) pfn_to_page(p4d_pfn(p4d))
/* Find an entry in the third-level page table.. */
static inline pud_t *pud_offset(p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long address)
@@ -859,7 +873,7 @@ static inline unsigned long pgd_page_vaddr(pgd_t pgd)
* Currently stuck as a macro due to indirect forward reference to
* linux/mmzone.h's __section_mem_map_addr() definition:
*/
-#define pgd_page(pgd) pfn_to_page(pgd_val(pgd) >> PAGE_SHIFT)
+#define pgd_page(pgd) pfn_to_page(pgd_pfn(pgd))
/* to find an entry in a page-table-directory. */
static inline p4d_t *p4d_offset(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long address)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
index bf9638e1ee42..399261ce904c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
#define _ASM_X86_PGTABLE_DEFS_H
#include <linux/const.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+
#include <asm/page_types.h>
#define FIRST_USER_ADDRESS 0UL
@@ -121,10 +123,10 @@
#define _PAGE_PROTNONE (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_PROTNONE)
-#define _PAGE_TABLE (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER | \
- _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY)
-#define _KERNPG_TABLE (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ACCESSED | \
- _PAGE_DIRTY)
+#define _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER |\
+ _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY)
+#define _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | \
+ _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY)
/*
* Set of bits not changed in pte_modify. The pte's
@@ -159,6 +161,7 @@ enum page_cache_mode {
#define _PAGE_CACHE_MASK (_PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PWT)
#define _PAGE_NOCACHE (cachemode2protval(_PAGE_CACHE_MODE_UC))
+#define _PAGE_CACHE_WP (cachemode2protval(_PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP))
#define PAGE_NONE __pgprot(_PAGE_PROTNONE | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
#define PAGE_SHARED __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER | \
@@ -187,22 +190,42 @@ enum page_cache_mode {
#define __PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR (__PAGE_KERNEL_RO | _PAGE_USER)
#define __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE (__PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_PSE)
#define __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC (__PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC | _PAGE_PSE)
+#define __PAGE_KERNEL_WP (__PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_CACHE_WP)
#define __PAGE_KERNEL_IO (__PAGE_KERNEL)
#define __PAGE_KERNEL_IO_NOCACHE (__PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE)
-#define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL)
-#define PAGE_KERNEL_RO __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_RO)
-#define PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC)
-#define PAGE_KERNEL_RX __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_RX)
-#define PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE)
-#define PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE)
-#define PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC)
-#define PAGE_KERNEL_VSYSCALL __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_VSYSCALL)
-#define PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR)
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+#define _PAGE_ENC (_AT(pteval_t, sme_me_mask))
+
+#define _PAGE_TABLE (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER | \
+ _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ENC)
+#define _KERNPG_TABLE (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ACCESSED | \
+ _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ENC)
+
+#define __PAGE_KERNEL_ENC (__PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_ENC)
+#define __PAGE_KERNEL_ENC_WP (__PAGE_KERNEL_WP | _PAGE_ENC)
+
+#define __PAGE_KERNEL_NOENC (__PAGE_KERNEL)
+#define __PAGE_KERNEL_NOENC_WP (__PAGE_KERNEL_WP)
+
+#define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_ENC)
+#define PAGE_KERNEL_NOENC __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL)
+#define PAGE_KERNEL_RO __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_RO | _PAGE_ENC)
+#define PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC | _PAGE_ENC)
+#define PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC_NOENC __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC)
+#define PAGE_KERNEL_RX __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_RX | _PAGE_ENC)
+#define PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE | _PAGE_ENC)
+#define PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE | _PAGE_ENC)
+#define PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC | _PAGE_ENC)
+#define PAGE_KERNEL_VSYSCALL __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_VSYSCALL | _PAGE_ENC)
+#define PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR | _PAGE_ENC)
+
+#define PAGE_KERNEL_IO __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_IO)
+#define PAGE_KERNEL_IO_NOCACHE __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_IO_NOCACHE)
-#define PAGE_KERNEL_IO __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_IO)
-#define PAGE_KERNEL_IO_NOCACHE __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_IO_NOCACHE)
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
/* xwr */
#define __P000 PAGE_NONE
@@ -287,6 +310,11 @@ static inline p4dval_t native_p4d_val(p4d_t p4d)
#else
#include <asm-generic/pgtable-nop4d.h>
+static inline p4d_t native_make_p4d(pudval_t val)
+{
+ return (p4d_t) { .pgd = native_make_pgd((pgdval_t)val) };
+}
+
static inline p4dval_t native_p4d_val(p4d_t p4d)
{
return native_pgd_val(p4d.pgd);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
index 79aa2f98398d..dc723b64acf0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
#define _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_FLAGS_H
#include <uapi/asm/processor-flags.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_VM86
#define X86_VM_MASK X86_EFLAGS_VM
@@ -32,16 +33,18 @@
* CR3_ADDR_MASK is the mask used by read_cr3_pa().
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-/* Mask off the address space ID bits. */
-#define CR3_ADDR_MASK 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFF000ull
-#define CR3_PCID_MASK 0xFFFull
+/* Mask off the address space ID and SME encryption bits. */
+#define CR3_ADDR_MASK __sme_clr(0x7FFFFFFFFFFFF000ull)
+#define CR3_PCID_MASK 0xFFFull
+#define CR3_NOFLUSH BIT_ULL(63)
#else
/*
* CR3_ADDR_MASK needs at least bits 31:5 set on PAE systems, and we save
* a tiny bit of code size by setting all the bits.
*/
-#define CR3_ADDR_MASK 0xFFFFFFFFull
-#define CR3_PCID_MASK 0ull
+#define CR3_ADDR_MASK 0xFFFFFFFFull
+#define CR3_PCID_MASK 0ull
+#define CR3_NOFLUSH 0
#endif
#endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_FLAGS_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index abc99b9c7ffd..3fa26a61eabc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ struct vm86;
#include <linux/math64.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/irqflags.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
/*
* We handle most unaligned accesses in hardware. On the other hand
@@ -240,9 +241,14 @@ static inline unsigned long read_cr3_pa(void)
return __read_cr3() & CR3_ADDR_MASK;
}
+static inline unsigned long native_read_cr3_pa(void)
+{
+ return __native_read_cr3() & CR3_ADDR_MASK;
+}
+
static inline void load_cr3(pgd_t *pgdir)
{
- write_cr3(__pa(pgdir));
+ write_cr3(__sme_pa(pgdir));
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
@@ -805,7 +811,9 @@ static inline void spin_lock_prefetch(const void *x)
*/
#define IA32_PAGE_OFFSET PAGE_OFFSET
#define TASK_SIZE PAGE_OFFSET
+#define TASK_SIZE_LOW TASK_SIZE
#define TASK_SIZE_MAX TASK_SIZE
+#define DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW TASK_SIZE
#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
#define STACK_TOP_MAX STACK_TOP
@@ -845,7 +853,9 @@ static inline void spin_lock_prefetch(const void *x)
* particular problem by preventing anything from being mapped
* at the maximum canonical address.
*/
-#define TASK_SIZE_MAX ((1UL << 47) - PAGE_SIZE)
+#define TASK_SIZE_MAX ((1UL << __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT) - PAGE_SIZE)
+
+#define DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW ((1UL << 47) - PAGE_SIZE)
/* This decides where the kernel will search for a free chunk of vm
* space during mmap's.
@@ -853,12 +863,14 @@ static inline void spin_lock_prefetch(const void *x)
#define IA32_PAGE_OFFSET ((current->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_3GB) ? \
0xc0000000 : 0xFFFFe000)
+#define TASK_SIZE_LOW (test_thread_flag(TIF_ADDR32) ? \
+ IA32_PAGE_OFFSET : DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW)
#define TASK_SIZE (test_thread_flag(TIF_ADDR32) ? \
IA32_PAGE_OFFSET : TASK_SIZE_MAX)
#define TASK_SIZE_OF(child) ((test_tsk_thread_flag(child, TIF_ADDR32)) ? \
IA32_PAGE_OFFSET : TASK_SIZE_MAX)
-#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
+#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE_LOW
#define STACK_TOP_MAX TASK_SIZE_MAX
#define INIT_THREAD { \
@@ -879,7 +891,7 @@ extern void start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long new_ip,
* space during mmap's.
*/
#define __TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE(task_size) (PAGE_ALIGN(task_size / 3))
-#define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE __TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE(TASK_SIZE)
+#define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE __TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE(TASK_SIZE_LOW)
#define KSTK_EIP(task) (task_pt_regs(task)->ip)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
index 230e1903acf0..90d91520c13a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
@@ -1,6 +1,15 @@
#ifndef _ARCH_X86_REALMODE_H
#define _ARCH_X86_REALMODE_H
+/*
+ * Flag bit definitions for use with the flags field of the trampoline header
+ * in the CONFIG_X86_64 variant.
+ */
+#define TH_FLAGS_SME_ACTIVE_BIT 0
+#define TH_FLAGS_SME_ACTIVE BIT(TH_FLAGS_SME_ACTIVE_BIT)
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
@@ -38,6 +47,7 @@ struct trampoline_header {
u64 start;
u64 efer;
u32 cr4;
+ u32 flags;
#endif
};
@@ -69,4 +79,6 @@ static inline size_t real_mode_size_needed(void)
void set_real_mode_mem(phys_addr_t mem, size_t size);
void reserve_real_mode(void);
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
#endif /* _ARCH_X86_REALMODE_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h
index eaec6c364e42..cd71273ec49d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
* Executability : eXeutable, NoteXecutable
* Read/Write : ReadOnly, ReadWrite
* Presence : NotPresent
+ * Encryption : Encrypted, Decrypted
*
* Within a category, the attributes are mutually exclusive.
*
@@ -42,6 +43,8 @@ int set_memory_wt(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
int set_memory_wb(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
int set_memory_np(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
int set_memory_4k(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
+int set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
+int set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
int set_memory_array_uc(unsigned long *addr, int addrinarray);
int set_memory_array_wc(unsigned long *addr, int addrinarray);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlb.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlb.h
index c7797307fc2b..79a4ca6a9606 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlb.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlb.h
@@ -15,4 +15,18 @@
#include <asm-generic/tlb.h>
+/*
+ * While x86 architecture in general requires an IPI to perform TLB
+ * shootdown, enablement code for several hypervisors overrides
+ * .flush_tlb_others hook in pv_mmu_ops and implements it by issuing
+ * a hypercall. To keep software pagetable walkers safe in this case we
+ * switch to RCU based table free (HAVE_RCU_TABLE_FREE). See the comment
+ * below 'ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_RCU_TABLE_FREE' in include/asm-generic/tlb.h
+ * for more details.
+ */
+static inline void __tlb_remove_table(void *table)
+{
+ free_page_and_swap_cache(table);
+}
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_TLB_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
index 50ea3482e1d1..d23e61dc0640 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
@@ -57,6 +57,23 @@ static inline void invpcid_flush_all_nonglobals(void)
__invpcid(0, 0, INVPCID_TYPE_ALL_NON_GLOBAL);
}
+static inline u64 inc_mm_tlb_gen(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ u64 new_tlb_gen;
+
+ /*
+ * Bump the generation count. This also serves as a full barrier
+ * that synchronizes with switch_mm(): callers are required to order
+ * their read of mm_cpumask after their writes to the paging
+ * structures.
+ */
+ smp_mb__before_atomic();
+ new_tlb_gen = atomic64_inc_return(&mm->context.tlb_gen);
+ smp_mb__after_atomic();
+
+ return new_tlb_gen;
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
#include <asm/paravirt.h>
#else
@@ -65,6 +82,17 @@ static inline void invpcid_flush_all_nonglobals(void)
#define __flush_tlb_single(addr) __native_flush_tlb_single(addr)
#endif
+/*
+ * 6 because 6 should be plenty and struct tlb_state will fit in
+ * two cache lines.
+ */
+#define TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS 6
+
+struct tlb_context {
+ u64 ctx_id;
+ u64 tlb_gen;
+};
+
struct tlb_state {
/*
* cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm should match CR3 whenever interrupts
@@ -73,13 +101,35 @@ struct tlb_state {
* mode even if we've already switched back to swapper_pg_dir.
*/
struct mm_struct *loaded_mm;
- int state;
+ u16 loaded_mm_asid;
+ u16 next_asid;
/*
* Access to this CR4 shadow and to H/W CR4 is protected by
* disabling interrupts when modifying either one.
*/
unsigned long cr4;
+
+ /*
+ * This is a list of all contexts that might exist in the TLB.
+ * There is one per ASID that we use, and the ASID (what the
+ * CPU calls PCID) is the index into ctxts.
+ *
+ * For each context, ctx_id indicates which mm the TLB's user
+ * entries came from. As an invariant, the TLB will never
+ * contain entries that are out-of-date as when that mm reached
+ * the tlb_gen in the list.
+ *
+ * To be clear, this means that it's legal for the TLB code to
+ * flush the TLB without updating tlb_gen. This can happen
+ * (for now, at least) due to paravirt remote flushes.
+ *
+ * NB: context 0 is a bit special, since it's also used by
+ * various bits of init code. This is fine -- code that
+ * isn't aware of PCID will end up harmlessly flushing
+ * context 0.
+ */
+ struct tlb_context ctxs[TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS];
};
DECLARE_PER_CPU_SHARED_ALIGNED(struct tlb_state, cpu_tlbstate);
@@ -207,6 +257,14 @@ static inline void __flush_tlb_all(void)
__flush_tlb_global();
else
__flush_tlb();
+
+ /*
+ * Note: if we somehow had PCID but not PGE, then this wouldn't work --
+ * we'd end up flushing kernel translations for the current ASID but
+ * we might fail to flush kernel translations for other cached ASIDs.
+ *
+ * To avoid this issue, we force PCID off if PGE is off.
+ */
}
static inline void __flush_tlb_one(unsigned long addr)
@@ -231,9 +289,26 @@ static inline void __flush_tlb_one(unsigned long addr)
* and page-granular flushes are available only on i486 and up.
*/
struct flush_tlb_info {
- struct mm_struct *mm;
- unsigned long start;
- unsigned long end;
+ /*
+ * We support several kinds of flushes.
+ *
+ * - Fully flush a single mm. .mm will be set, .end will be
+ * TLB_FLUSH_ALL, and .new_tlb_gen will be the tlb_gen to
+ * which the IPI sender is trying to catch us up.
+ *
+ * - Partially flush a single mm. .mm will be set, .start and
+ * .end will indicate the range, and .new_tlb_gen will be set
+ * such that the changes between generation .new_tlb_gen-1 and
+ * .new_tlb_gen are entirely contained in the indicated range.
+ *
+ * - Fully flush all mms whose tlb_gens have been updated. .mm
+ * will be NULL, .end will be TLB_FLUSH_ALL, and .new_tlb_gen
+ * will be zero.
+ */
+ struct mm_struct *mm;
+ unsigned long start;
+ unsigned long end;
+ u64 new_tlb_gen;
};
#define local_flush_tlb() __flush_tlb()
@@ -256,12 +331,10 @@ static inline void flush_tlb_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long a)
void native_flush_tlb_others(const struct cpumask *cpumask,
const struct flush_tlb_info *info);
-#define TLBSTATE_OK 1
-#define TLBSTATE_LAZY 2
-
static inline void arch_tlbbatch_add_mm(struct arch_tlbflush_unmap_batch *batch,
struct mm_struct *mm)
{
+ inc_mm_tlb_gen(mm);
cpumask_or(&batch->cpumask, &batch->cpumask, mm_cpumask(mm));
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vga.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vga.h
index c4b9dc2f67c5..9f42beefc67a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vga.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vga.h
@@ -7,12 +7,24 @@
#ifndef _ASM_X86_VGA_H
#define _ASM_X86_VGA_H
+#include <asm/set_memory.h>
+
/*
* On the PC, we can just recalculate addresses and then
* access the videoram directly without any black magic.
+ * To support memory encryption however, we need to access
+ * the videoram as decrypted memory.
*/
-#define VGA_MAP_MEM(x, s) (unsigned long)phys_to_virt(x)
+#define VGA_MAP_MEM(x, s) \
+({ \
+ unsigned long start = (unsigned long)phys_to_virt(x); \
+ \
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)) \
+ set_memory_decrypted(start, (s) >> PAGE_SHIFT); \
+ \
+ start; \
+})
#define vga_readb(x) (*(x))
#define vga_writeb(x, y) (*(y) = (x))
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
index 7491e73d9253..97bb2caf3428 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static u32 isa_irq_to_gsi[NR_IRQS_LEGACY] __read_mostly = {
#define ACPI_INVALID_GSI INT_MIN
/*
- * This is just a simple wrapper around early_ioremap(),
+ * This is just a simple wrapper around early_memremap(),
* with sanity checks for phys == 0 and size == 0.
*/
char *__init __acpi_map_table(unsigned long phys, unsigned long size)
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ char *__init __acpi_map_table(unsigned long phys, unsigned long size)
if (!phys || !size)
return NULL;
- return early_ioremap(phys, size);
+ return early_memremap(phys, size);
}
void __init __acpi_unmap_table(char *map, unsigned long size)
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ void __init __acpi_unmap_table(char *map, unsigned long size)
if (!map || !size)
return;
- early_iounmap(map, size);
+ early_memunmap(map, size);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index e44338dd62dd..9862e2cd6d93 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -558,8 +558,12 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
+ u32 dummy;
+
early_init_amd_mc(c);
+ rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL, &c->microcode, &dummy);
+
/*
* c->x86_power is 8000_0007 edx. Bit 8 is TSC runs at constant rate
* with P/T states and does not stop in deep C-states
@@ -622,6 +626,27 @@ static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
*/
if (cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_erratum_400))
set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_AMD_E400);
+
+ /*
+ * BIOS support is required for SME. If BIOS has enabled SME then
+ * adjust x86_phys_bits by the SME physical address space reduction
+ * value. If BIOS has not enabled SME then don't advertise the
+ * feature (set in scattered.c). Also, since the SME support requires
+ * long mode, don't advertise the feature under CONFIG_X86_32.
+ */
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SME)) {
+ u64 msr;
+
+ /* Check if SME is enabled */
+ rdmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, msr);
+ if (msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT) {
+ c->x86_phys_bits -= (cpuid_ebx(0x8000001f) >> 6) & 0x3f;
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SME);
+ } else {
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SME);
+ }
+ }
}
static void init_amd_k8(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
@@ -740,8 +765,6 @@ static void init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
- u32 dummy;
-
early_init_amd(c);
/*
@@ -803,8 +826,6 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
if (c->x86 > 0x11)
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ARAT);
- rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL, &c->microcode, &dummy);
-
/* 3DNow or LM implies PREFETCHW */
if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_3DNOWPREFETCH))
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_3DNOW) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_LM))
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 0af86d9242da..db684880d74a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -21,6 +21,14 @@
void __init check_bugs(void)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ /*
+ * Regardless of whether PCID is enumerated, the SDM says
+ * that it can't be enabled in 32-bit mode.
+ */
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PCID);
+#endif
+
identify_boot_cpu();
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index c8b39870f33e..b95cd94ca97b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -168,6 +168,24 @@ static int __init x86_mpx_setup(char *s)
}
__setup("nompx", x86_mpx_setup);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static int __init x86_pcid_setup(char *s)
+{
+ /* require an exact match without trailing characters */
+ if (strlen(s))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* do not emit a message if the feature is not present */
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID))
+ return 1;
+
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PCID);
+ pr_info("nopcid: PCID feature disabled\n");
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("nopcid", x86_pcid_setup);
+#endif
+
static int __init x86_noinvpcid_setup(char *s)
{
/* noinvpcid doesn't accept parameters */
@@ -311,6 +329,25 @@ static __always_inline void setup_smap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
}
}
+static void setup_pcid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_PCID)) {
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_PGE)) {
+ cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_PCIDE);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * flush_tlb_all(), as currently implemented, won't
+ * work if PCID is on but PGE is not. Since that
+ * combination doesn't exist on real hardware, there's
+ * no reason to try to fully support it, but it's
+ * polite to avoid corrupting data if we're on
+ * an improperly configured VM.
+ */
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_PCID);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Protection Keys are not available in 32-bit mode.
*/
@@ -1125,6 +1162,9 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
setup_smep(c);
setup_smap(c);
+ /* Set up PCID */
+ setup_pcid(c);
+
/*
* The vendor-specific functions might have changed features.
* Now we do "generic changes."
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
index 6dde0497efc7..3b413065c613 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
#include <asm/mce.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/reboot.h>
+#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#include "mce-internal.h"
@@ -1051,6 +1052,48 @@ static int do_memory_failure(struct mce *m)
return ret;
}
+#if defined(arch_unmap_kpfn) && defined(CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE)
+
+void arch_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn)
+{
+ unsigned long decoy_addr;
+
+ /*
+ * Unmap this page from the kernel 1:1 mappings to make sure
+ * we don't log more errors because of speculative access to
+ * the page.
+ * We would like to just call:
+ * set_memory_np((unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1);
+ * but doing that would radically increase the odds of a
+ * speculative access to the posion page because we'd have
+ * the virtual address of the kernel 1:1 mapping sitting
+ * around in registers.
+ * Instead we get tricky. We create a non-canonical address
+ * that looks just like the one we want, but has bit 63 flipped.
+ * This relies on set_memory_np() not checking whether we passed
+ * a legal address.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Build time check to see if we have a spare virtual bit. Don't want
+ * to leave this until run time because most developers don't have a
+ * system that can exercise this code path. This will only become a
+ * problem if/when we move beyond 5-level page tables.
+ *
+ * Hard code "9" here because cpp doesn't grok ilog2(PTRS_PER_PGD)
+ */
+#if PGDIR_SHIFT + 9 < 63
+ decoy_addr = (pfn << PAGE_SHIFT) + (PAGE_OFFSET ^ BIT(63));
+#else
+#error "no unused virtual bit available"
+#endif
+
+ if (set_memory_np(decoy_addr, 1))
+ pr_warn("Could not invalidate pfn=0x%lx from 1:1 map\n", pfn);
+
+}
+#endif
+
/*
* The actual machine check handler. This only handles real
* exceptions when something got corrupted coming in through int 18.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
index 23c23508c012..05459ad3db46 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
{ X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE, CPUID_EDX, 7, 0x80000007, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_CPB, CPUID_EDX, 9, 0x80000007, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK, CPUID_EDX, 11, 0x80000007, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_SME, CPUID_EAX, 0, 0x8000001f, 0 },
{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c b/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c
index 532da61d605c..71c11ad5643e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c
@@ -96,7 +96,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(e820__mapped_any);
* Note: this function only works correctly once the E820 table is sorted and
* not-overlapping (at least for the range specified), which is the case normally.
*/
-bool __init e820__mapped_all(u64 start, u64 end, enum e820_type type)
+static struct e820_entry *__e820__mapped_all(u64 start, u64 end,
+ enum e820_type type)
{
int i;
@@ -122,9 +123,28 @@ bool __init e820__mapped_all(u64 start, u64 end, enum e820_type type)
* coverage of the desired range exists:
*/
if (start >= end)
- return 1;
+ return entry;
}
- return 0;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function checks if the entire range <start,end> is mapped with type.
+ */
+bool __init e820__mapped_all(u64 start, u64 end, enum e820_type type)
+{
+ return __e820__mapped_all(start, end, type);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function returns the type associated with the range <start,end>.
+ */
+int e820__get_entry_type(u64 start, u64 end)
+{
+ struct e820_entry *entry = __e820__mapped_all(start, end, 0);
+
+ return entry ? entry->type : -EINVAL;
}
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/espfix_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/espfix_64.c
index 6b91e2eb8d3f..9c4e7ba6870c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/espfix_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/espfix_64.c
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ void init_espfix_ap(int cpu)
pte_p = pte_offset_kernel(&pmd, addr);
stack_page = page_address(alloc_pages_node(node, GFP_KERNEL, 0));
- pte = __pte(__pa(stack_page) | (__PAGE_KERNEL_RO & ptemask));
+ pte = __pte(__pa(stack_page) | ((__PAGE_KERNEL_RO | _PAGE_ENC) & ptemask));
for (n = 0; n < ESPFIX_PTE_CLONES; n++)
set_pte(&pte_p[n*PTE_STRIDE], pte);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index 9ba79543d9ee..6a193b93fd95 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/start_kernel.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/proto.h>
@@ -33,7 +34,6 @@
/*
* Manage page tables very early on.
*/
-extern pgd_t early_top_pgt[PTRS_PER_PGD];
extern pmd_t early_dynamic_pgts[EARLY_DYNAMIC_PAGE_TABLES][PTRS_PER_PMD];
static unsigned int __initdata next_early_pgt;
pmdval_t early_pmd_flags = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE & ~(_PAGE_GLOBAL | _PAGE_NX);
@@ -45,9 +45,11 @@ static void __head *fixup_pointer(void *ptr, unsigned long physaddr)
return ptr - (void *)_text + (void *)physaddr;
}
-void __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr)
+unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr,
+ struct boot_params *bp)
{
unsigned long load_delta, *p;
+ unsigned long pgtable_flags;
pgdval_t *pgd;
p4dval_t *p4d;
pudval_t *pud;
@@ -69,6 +71,12 @@ void __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr)
if (load_delta & ~PMD_PAGE_MASK)
for (;;);
+ /* Activate Secure Memory Encryption (SME) if supported and enabled */
+ sme_enable(bp);
+
+ /* Include the SME encryption mask in the fixup value */
+ load_delta += sme_get_me_mask();
+
/* Fixup the physical addresses in the page table */
pgd = fixup_pointer(&early_top_pgt, physaddr);
@@ -92,31 +100,35 @@ void __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr)
* creates a bunch of nonsense entries but that is fine --
* it avoids problems around wraparound.
*/
+
next_pgt_ptr = fixup_pointer(&next_early_pgt, physaddr);
pud = fixup_pointer(early_dynamic_pgts[(*next_pgt_ptr)++], physaddr);
pmd = fixup_pointer(early_dynamic_pgts[(*next_pgt_ptr)++], physaddr);
+ pgtable_flags = _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC + sme_get_me_mask();
+
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) {
p4d = fixup_pointer(early_dynamic_pgts[next_early_pgt++], physaddr);
i = (physaddr >> PGDIR_SHIFT) % PTRS_PER_PGD;
- pgd[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)p4d + _KERNPG_TABLE;
- pgd[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)p4d + _KERNPG_TABLE;
+ pgd[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)p4d + pgtable_flags;
+ pgd[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)p4d + pgtable_flags;
i = (physaddr >> P4D_SHIFT) % PTRS_PER_P4D;
- p4d[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)pud + _KERNPG_TABLE;
- p4d[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)pud + _KERNPG_TABLE;
+ p4d[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags;
+ p4d[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags;
} else {
i = (physaddr >> PGDIR_SHIFT) % PTRS_PER_PGD;
- pgd[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)pud + _KERNPG_TABLE;
- pgd[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)pud + _KERNPG_TABLE;
+ pgd[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags;
+ pgd[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags;
}
i = (physaddr >> PUD_SHIFT) % PTRS_PER_PUD;
- pud[i + 0] = (pudval_t)pmd + _KERNPG_TABLE;
- pud[i + 1] = (pudval_t)pmd + _KERNPG_TABLE;
+ pud[i + 0] = (pudval_t)pmd + pgtable_flags;
+ pud[i + 1] = (pudval_t)pmd + pgtable_flags;
pmd_entry = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL;
+ pmd_entry += sme_get_me_mask();
pmd_entry += physaddr;
for (i = 0; i < DIV_ROUND_UP(_end - _text, PMD_SIZE); i++) {
@@ -137,9 +149,30 @@ void __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr)
pmd[i] += load_delta;
}
- /* Fixup phys_base */
+ /*
+ * Fixup phys_base - remove the memory encryption mask to obtain
+ * the true physical address.
+ */
p = fixup_pointer(&phys_base, physaddr);
- *p += load_delta;
+ *p += load_delta - sme_get_me_mask();
+
+ /* Encrypt the kernel (if SME is active) */
+ sme_encrypt_kernel();
+
+ /*
+ * Return the SME encryption mask (if SME is active) to be used as a
+ * modifier for the initial pgdir entry programmed into CR3.
+ */
+ return sme_get_me_mask();
+}
+
+unsigned long __startup_secondary_64(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * Return the SME encryption mask (if SME is active) to be used as a
+ * modifier for the initial pgdir entry programmed into CR3.
+ */
+ return sme_get_me_mask();
}
/* Wipe all early page tables except for the kernel symbol map */
@@ -147,17 +180,17 @@ static void __init reset_early_page_tables(void)
{
memset(early_top_pgt, 0, sizeof(pgd_t)*(PTRS_PER_PGD-1));
next_early_pgt = 0;
- write_cr3(__pa_nodebug(early_top_pgt));
+ write_cr3(__sme_pa_nodebug(early_top_pgt));
}
/* Create a new PMD entry */
-int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
+int __init __early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address, pmdval_t pmd)
{
unsigned long physaddr = address - __PAGE_OFFSET;
pgdval_t pgd, *pgd_p;
p4dval_t p4d, *p4d_p;
pudval_t pud, *pud_p;
- pmdval_t pmd, *pmd_p;
+ pmdval_t *pmd_p;
/* Invalid address or early pgt is done ? */
if (physaddr >= MAXMEM || read_cr3_pa() != __pa_nodebug(early_top_pgt))
@@ -216,12 +249,21 @@ again:
memset(pmd_p, 0, sizeof(*pmd_p) * PTRS_PER_PMD);
*pud_p = (pudval_t)pmd_p - __START_KERNEL_map + phys_base + _KERNPG_TABLE;
}
- pmd = (physaddr & PMD_MASK) + early_pmd_flags;
pmd_p[pmd_index(address)] = pmd;
return 0;
}
+int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
+{
+ unsigned long physaddr = address - __PAGE_OFFSET;
+ pmdval_t pmd;
+
+ pmd = (physaddr & PMD_MASK) + early_pmd_flags;
+
+ return __early_make_pgtable(address, pmd);
+}
+
/* Don't add a printk in there. printk relies on the PDA which is not initialized
yet. */
static void __init clear_bss(void)
@@ -244,6 +286,12 @@ static void __init copy_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
char * command_line;
unsigned long cmd_line_ptr;
+ /*
+ * If SME is active, this will create decrypted mappings of the
+ * boot data in advance of the copy operations.
+ */
+ sme_map_bootdata(real_mode_data);
+
memcpy(&boot_params, real_mode_data, sizeof boot_params);
sanitize_boot_params(&boot_params);
cmd_line_ptr = get_cmd_line_ptr();
@@ -251,6 +299,14 @@ static void __init copy_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
command_line = __va(cmd_line_ptr);
memcpy(boot_command_line, command_line, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
}
+
+ /*
+ * The old boot data is no longer needed and won't be reserved,
+ * freeing up that memory for use by the system. If SME is active,
+ * we need to remove the mappings that were created so that the
+ * memory doesn't remain mapped as decrypted.
+ */
+ sme_unmap_bootdata(real_mode_data);
}
asmlinkage __visible void __init x86_64_start_kernel(char * real_mode_data)
@@ -280,6 +336,13 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init x86_64_start_kernel(char * real_mode_data)
clear_page(init_top_pgt);
+ /*
+ * SME support may update early_pmd_flags to include the memory
+ * encryption mask, so it needs to be called before anything
+ * that may generate a page fault.
+ */
+ sme_early_init();
+
kasan_early_init();
for (i = 0; i < NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS; i++)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
index 6225550883df..513cbb012ecc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -73,12 +73,19 @@ startup_64:
/* Sanitize CPU configuration */
call verify_cpu
+ /*
+ * Perform pagetable fixups. Additionally, if SME is active, encrypt
+ * the kernel and retrieve the modifier (SME encryption mask if SME
+ * is active) to be added to the initial pgdir entry that will be
+ * programmed into CR3.
+ */
leaq _text(%rip), %rdi
pushq %rsi
call __startup_64
popq %rsi
- movq $(early_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax
+ /* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */
+ addq $(early_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax
jmp 1f
ENTRY(secondary_startup_64)
/*
@@ -98,7 +105,16 @@ ENTRY(secondary_startup_64)
/* Sanitize CPU configuration */
call verify_cpu
- movq $(init_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax
+ /*
+ * Retrieve the modifier (SME encryption mask if SME is active) to be
+ * added to the initial pgdir entry that will be programmed into CR3.
+ */
+ pushq %rsi
+ call __startup_secondary_64
+ popq %rsi
+
+ /* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */
+ addq $(init_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax
1:
/* Enable PAE mode, PGE and LA57 */
@@ -335,9 +351,9 @@ GLOBAL(name)
NEXT_PAGE(early_top_pgt)
.fill 511,8,0
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
- .quad level4_kernel_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _PAGE_TABLE
+ .quad level4_kernel_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC
#else
- .quad level3_kernel_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _PAGE_TABLE
+ .quad level3_kernel_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC
#endif
NEXT_PAGE(early_dynamic_pgts)
@@ -350,15 +366,15 @@ NEXT_PAGE(init_top_pgt)
.fill 512,8,0
#else
NEXT_PAGE(init_top_pgt)
- .quad level3_ident_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _KERNPG_TABLE
+ .quad level3_ident_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
.org init_top_pgt + PGD_PAGE_OFFSET*8, 0
- .quad level3_ident_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _KERNPG_TABLE
+ .quad level3_ident_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
.org init_top_pgt + PGD_START_KERNEL*8, 0
/* (2^48-(2*1024*1024*1024))/(2^39) = 511 */
- .quad level3_kernel_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _PAGE_TABLE
+ .quad level3_kernel_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC
NEXT_PAGE(level3_ident_pgt)
- .quad level2_ident_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _KERNPG_TABLE
+ .quad level2_ident_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
.fill 511, 8, 0
NEXT_PAGE(level2_ident_pgt)
/* Since I easily can, map the first 1G.
@@ -370,14 +386,14 @@ NEXT_PAGE(level2_ident_pgt)
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
NEXT_PAGE(level4_kernel_pgt)
.fill 511,8,0
- .quad level3_kernel_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _PAGE_TABLE
+ .quad level3_kernel_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC
#endif
NEXT_PAGE(level3_kernel_pgt)
.fill L3_START_KERNEL,8,0
/* (2^48-(2*1024*1024*1024)-((2^39)*511))/(2^30) = 510 */
- .quad level2_kernel_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _KERNPG_TABLE
- .quad level2_fixmap_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _PAGE_TABLE
+ .quad level2_kernel_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
+ .quad level2_fixmap_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC
NEXT_PAGE(level2_kernel_pgt)
/*
@@ -395,7 +411,7 @@ NEXT_PAGE(level2_kernel_pgt)
NEXT_PAGE(level2_fixmap_pgt)
.fill 506,8,0
- .quad level1_fixmap_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _PAGE_TABLE
+ .quad level1_fixmap_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC
/* 8MB reserved for vsyscalls + a 2MB hole = 4 + 1 entries */
.fill 5,8,0
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c
index 38b64587b31b..fd6f8fbbe6f2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ static ssize_t setup_data_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
struct setup_data_node *node = file->private_data;
unsigned long remain;
loff_t pos = *ppos;
- struct page *pg;
void *p;
u64 pa;
@@ -47,18 +46,13 @@ static ssize_t setup_data_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
count = node->len - pos;
pa = node->paddr + sizeof(struct setup_data) + pos;
- pg = pfn_to_page((pa + count - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
- if (PageHighMem(pg)) {
- p = ioremap_cache(pa, count);
- if (!p)
- return -ENXIO;
- } else
- p = __va(pa);
+ p = memremap(pa, count, MEMREMAP_WB);
+ if (!p)
+ return -ENOMEM;
remain = copy_to_user(user_buf, p, count);
- if (PageHighMem(pg))
- iounmap(p);
+ memunmap(p);
if (remain)
return -EFAULT;
@@ -109,7 +103,6 @@ static int __init create_setup_data_nodes(struct dentry *parent)
struct setup_data *data;
int error;
struct dentry *d;
- struct page *pg;
u64 pa_data;
int no = 0;
@@ -126,16 +119,12 @@ static int __init create_setup_data_nodes(struct dentry *parent)
goto err_dir;
}
- pg = pfn_to_page((pa_data+sizeof(*data)-1) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
- if (PageHighMem(pg)) {
- data = ioremap_cache(pa_data, sizeof(*data));
- if (!data) {
- kfree(node);
- error = -ENXIO;
- goto err_dir;
- }
- } else
- data = __va(pa_data);
+ data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
+ if (!data) {
+ kfree(node);
+ error = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err_dir;
+ }
node->paddr = pa_data;
node->type = data->type;
@@ -143,8 +132,7 @@ static int __init create_setup_data_nodes(struct dentry *parent)
error = create_setup_data_node(d, no, node);
pa_data = data->next;
- if (PageHighMem(pg))
- iounmap(data);
+ memunmap(data);
if (error)
goto err_dir;
no++;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c
index 06e1ff5562c0..4b0592ca9e47 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c
@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@
#include <linux/stat.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
-#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
static ssize_t version_show(struct kobject *kobj,
@@ -79,12 +79,12 @@ static int get_setup_data_paddr(int nr, u64 *paddr)
*paddr = pa_data;
return 0;
}
- data = ioremap_cache(pa_data, sizeof(*data));
+ data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
pa_data = data->next;
- iounmap(data);
+ memunmap(data);
i++;
}
return -EINVAL;
@@ -97,17 +97,17 @@ static int __init get_setup_data_size(int nr, size_t *size)
u64 pa_data = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
while (pa_data) {
- data = ioremap_cache(pa_data, sizeof(*data));
+ data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
if (nr == i) {
*size = data->len;
- iounmap(data);
+ memunmap(data);
return 0;
}
pa_data = data->next;
- iounmap(data);
+ memunmap(data);
i++;
}
return -EINVAL;
@@ -127,12 +127,12 @@ static ssize_t type_show(struct kobject *kobj,
ret = get_setup_data_paddr(nr, &paddr);
if (ret)
return ret;
- data = ioremap_cache(paddr, sizeof(*data));
+ data = memremap(paddr, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = sprintf(buf, "0x%x\n", data->type);
- iounmap(data);
+ memunmap(data);
return ret;
}
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ static ssize_t setup_data_data_read(struct file *fp,
ret = get_setup_data_paddr(nr, &paddr);
if (ret)
return ret;
- data = ioremap_cache(paddr, sizeof(*data));
+ data = memremap(paddr, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -170,15 +170,15 @@ static ssize_t setup_data_data_read(struct file *fp,
goto out;
ret = count;
- p = ioremap_cache(paddr + sizeof(*data), data->len);
+ p = memremap(paddr + sizeof(*data), data->len, MEMREMAP_WB);
if (!p) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
memcpy(buf, p + off, count);
- iounmap(p);
+ memunmap(p);
out:
- iounmap(data);
+ memunmap(data);
return ret;
}
@@ -250,13 +250,13 @@ static int __init get_setup_data_total_num(u64 pa_data, int *nr)
*nr = 0;
while (pa_data) {
*nr += 1;
- data = ioremap_cache(pa_data, sizeof(*data));
+ data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
if (!data) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
pa_data = data->next;
- iounmap(data);
+ memunmap(data);
}
out:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
index cb0a30473c23..1f790cf9d38f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ static int init_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image, pgd_t *pgd)
set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(__pa(pte) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
}
pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, vaddr);
- set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC));
+ set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC_NOENC));
return 0;
err:
free_transition_pgtable(image);
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ static int init_pgtable(struct kimage *image, unsigned long start_pgtable)
.alloc_pgt_page = alloc_pgt_page,
.context = image,
.page_flag = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC,
+ .kernpg_flag = _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC,
};
unsigned long mstart, mend;
pgd_t *level4p;
@@ -334,7 +335,8 @@ void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image)
image->start = relocate_kernel((unsigned long)image->head,
(unsigned long)page_list,
image->start,
- image->preserve_context);
+ image->preserve_context,
+ sme_active());
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP
if (image->preserve_context)
@@ -602,3 +604,22 @@ void arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres(void)
{
kexec_mark_crashkres(false);
}
+
+int arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ /*
+ * If SME is active we need to be sure that kexec pages are
+ * not encrypted because when we boot to the new kernel the
+ * pages won't be accessed encrypted (initially).
+ */
+ return set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, pages);
+}
+
+void arch_kexec_pre_free_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages)
+{
+ /*
+ * If SME is active we need to reset the pages back to being
+ * an encrypted mapping before freeing them.
+ */
+ set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, pages);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c b/arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c
index 0d904d759ff1..5cbb3177ed17 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c
@@ -429,16 +429,16 @@ static inline void __init construct_default_ISA_mptable(int mpc_default_type)
}
}
-static struct mpf_intel *mpf_found;
+static unsigned long mpf_base;
static unsigned long __init get_mpc_size(unsigned long physptr)
{
struct mpc_table *mpc;
unsigned long size;
- mpc = early_ioremap(physptr, PAGE_SIZE);
+ mpc = early_memremap(physptr, PAGE_SIZE);
size = mpc->length;
- early_iounmap(mpc, PAGE_SIZE);
+ early_memunmap(mpc, PAGE_SIZE);
apic_printk(APIC_VERBOSE, " mpc: %lx-%lx\n", physptr, physptr + size);
return size;
@@ -450,7 +450,8 @@ static int __init check_physptr(struct mpf_intel *mpf, unsigned int early)
unsigned long size;
size = get_mpc_size(mpf->physptr);
- mpc = early_ioremap(mpf->physptr, size);
+ mpc = early_memremap(mpf->physptr, size);
+
/*
* Read the physical hardware table. Anything here will
* override the defaults.
@@ -461,10 +462,10 @@ static int __init check_physptr(struct mpf_intel *mpf, unsigned int early)
#endif
pr_err("BIOS bug, MP table errors detected!...\n");
pr_cont("... disabling SMP support. (tell your hw vendor)\n");
- early_iounmap(mpc, size);
+ early_memunmap(mpc, size);
return -1;
}
- early_iounmap(mpc, size);
+ early_memunmap(mpc, size);
if (early)
return -1;
@@ -497,12 +498,12 @@ static int __init check_physptr(struct mpf_intel *mpf, unsigned int early)
*/
void __init default_get_smp_config(unsigned int early)
{
- struct mpf_intel *mpf = mpf_found;
+ struct mpf_intel *mpf;
if (!smp_found_config)
return;
- if (!mpf)
+ if (!mpf_base)
return;
if (acpi_lapic && early)
@@ -515,6 +516,12 @@ void __init default_get_smp_config(unsigned int early)
if (acpi_lapic && acpi_ioapic)
return;
+ mpf = early_memremap(mpf_base, sizeof(*mpf));
+ if (!mpf) {
+ pr_err("MPTABLE: error mapping MP table\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
pr_info("Intel MultiProcessor Specification v1.%d\n",
mpf->specification);
#if defined(CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC) && defined(CONFIG_X86_32)
@@ -529,7 +536,7 @@ void __init default_get_smp_config(unsigned int early)
/*
* Now see if we need to read further.
*/
- if (mpf->feature1 != 0) {
+ if (mpf->feature1) {
if (early) {
/*
* local APIC has default address
@@ -542,8 +549,10 @@ void __init default_get_smp_config(unsigned int early)
construct_default_ISA_mptable(mpf->feature1);
} else if (mpf->physptr) {
- if (check_physptr(mpf, early))
+ if (check_physptr(mpf, early)) {
+ early_memunmap(mpf, sizeof(*mpf));
return;
+ }
} else
BUG();
@@ -552,6 +561,8 @@ void __init default_get_smp_config(unsigned int early)
/*
* Only use the first configuration found.
*/
+
+ early_memunmap(mpf, sizeof(*mpf));
}
static void __init smp_reserve_memory(struct mpf_intel *mpf)
@@ -561,15 +572,16 @@ static void __init smp_reserve_memory(struct mpf_intel *mpf)
static int __init smp_scan_config(unsigned long base, unsigned long length)
{
- unsigned int *bp = phys_to_virt(base);
+ unsigned int *bp;
struct mpf_intel *mpf;
- unsigned long mem;
+ int ret = 0;
apic_printk(APIC_VERBOSE, "Scan for SMP in [mem %#010lx-%#010lx]\n",
base, base + length - 1);
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*mpf) != 16);
while (length > 0) {
+ bp = early_memremap(base, length);
mpf = (struct mpf_intel *)bp;
if ((*bp == SMP_MAGIC_IDENT) &&
(mpf->length == 1) &&
@@ -579,24 +591,26 @@ static int __init smp_scan_config(unsigned long base, unsigned long length)
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
smp_found_config = 1;
#endif
- mpf_found = mpf;
+ mpf_base = base;
- pr_info("found SMP MP-table at [mem %#010llx-%#010llx] mapped at [%p]\n",
- (unsigned long long) virt_to_phys(mpf),
- (unsigned long long) virt_to_phys(mpf) +
- sizeof(*mpf) - 1, mpf);
+ pr_info("found SMP MP-table at [mem %#010lx-%#010lx] mapped at [%p]\n",
+ base, base + sizeof(*mpf) - 1, mpf);
- mem = virt_to_phys(mpf);
- memblock_reserve(mem, sizeof(*mpf));
+ memblock_reserve(base, sizeof(*mpf));
if (mpf->physptr)
smp_reserve_memory(mpf);
- return 1;
+ ret = 1;
}
- bp += 4;
+ early_memunmap(bp, length);
+
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+
+ base += 16;
length -= 16;
}
- return 0;
+ return ret;
}
void __init default_find_smp_config(void)
@@ -838,29 +852,40 @@ static int __init update_mp_table(void)
char oem[10];
struct mpf_intel *mpf;
struct mpc_table *mpc, *mpc_new;
+ unsigned long size;
if (!enable_update_mptable)
return 0;
- mpf = mpf_found;
- if (!mpf)
+ if (!mpf_base)
return 0;
+ mpf = early_memremap(mpf_base, sizeof(*mpf));
+ if (!mpf) {
+ pr_err("MPTABLE: mpf early_memremap() failed\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
/*
* Now see if we need to go further.
*/
- if (mpf->feature1 != 0)
- return 0;
+ if (mpf->feature1)
+ goto do_unmap_mpf;
if (!mpf->physptr)
- return 0;
+ goto do_unmap_mpf;
- mpc = phys_to_virt(mpf->physptr);
+ size = get_mpc_size(mpf->physptr);
+ mpc = early_memremap(mpf->physptr, size);
+ if (!mpc) {
+ pr_err("MPTABLE: mpc early_memremap() failed\n");
+ goto do_unmap_mpf;
+ }
if (!smp_check_mpc(mpc, oem, str))
- return 0;
+ goto do_unmap_mpc;
- pr_info("mpf: %llx\n", (u64)virt_to_phys(mpf));
+ pr_info("mpf: %llx\n", (u64)mpf_base);
pr_info("physptr: %x\n", mpf->physptr);
if (mpc_new_phys && mpc->length > mpc_new_length) {
@@ -878,21 +903,32 @@ static int __init update_mp_table(void)
new = mpf_checksum((unsigned char *)mpc, mpc->length);
if (old == new) {
pr_info("mpc is readonly, please try alloc_mptable instead\n");
- return 0;
+ goto do_unmap_mpc;
}
pr_info("use in-position replacing\n");
} else {
+ mpc_new = early_memremap(mpc_new_phys, mpc_new_length);
+ if (!mpc_new) {
+ pr_err("MPTABLE: new mpc early_memremap() failed\n");
+ goto do_unmap_mpc;
+ }
mpf->physptr = mpc_new_phys;
- mpc_new = phys_to_virt(mpc_new_phys);
memcpy(mpc_new, mpc, mpc->length);
+ early_memunmap(mpc, size);
mpc = mpc_new;
+ size = mpc_new_length;
/* check if we can modify that */
if (mpc_new_phys - mpf->physptr) {
struct mpf_intel *mpf_new;
/* steal 16 bytes from [0, 1k) */
+ mpf_new = early_memremap(0x400 - 16, sizeof(*mpf_new));
+ if (!mpf_new) {
+ pr_err("MPTABLE: new mpf early_memremap() failed\n");
+ goto do_unmap_mpc;
+ }
pr_info("mpf new: %x\n", 0x400 - 16);
- mpf_new = phys_to_virt(0x400 - 16);
memcpy(mpf_new, mpf, 16);
+ early_memunmap(mpf, sizeof(*mpf));
mpf = mpf_new;
mpf->physptr = mpc_new_phys;
}
@@ -909,6 +945,12 @@ static int __init update_mp_table(void)
*/
replace_intsrc_all(mpc, mpc_new_phys, mpc_new_length);
+do_unmap_mpc:
+ early_memunmap(mpc, size);
+
+do_unmap_mpf:
+ early_memunmap(mpf, sizeof(*mpf));
+
return 0;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c
index 5e16d3f29594..0accc2404b92 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c
@@ -93,9 +93,12 @@ again:
if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flag)) {
page = dma_alloc_from_contiguous(dev, count, get_order(size),
flag);
- if (page && page_to_phys(page) + size > dma_mask) {
- dma_release_from_contiguous(dev, page, count);
- page = NULL;
+ if (page) {
+ addr = phys_to_dma(dev, page_to_phys(page));
+ if (addr + size > dma_mask) {
+ dma_release_from_contiguous(dev, page, count);
+ page = NULL;
+ }
}
}
/* fallback */
@@ -104,7 +107,7 @@ again:
if (!page)
return NULL;
- addr = page_to_phys(page);
+ addr = phys_to_dma(dev, page_to_phys(page));
if (addr + size > dma_mask) {
__free_pages(page, get_order(size));
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c
index a6d404087fe3..4fc3cb60ea11 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static dma_addr_t nommu_map_page(struct device *dev, struct page *page,
enum dma_data_direction dir,
unsigned long attrs)
{
- dma_addr_t bus = page_to_phys(page) + offset;
+ dma_addr_t bus = phys_to_dma(dev, page_to_phys(page)) + offset;
WARN_ON(size == 0);
if (!check_addr("map_single", dev, bus, size))
return NOMMU_MAPPING_ERROR;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
index 1e23577e17cf..677077510e30 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
@@ -6,12 +6,14 @@
#include <linux/swiotlb.h>
#include <linux/bootmem.h>
#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <asm/iommu.h>
#include <asm/swiotlb.h>
#include <asm/dma.h>
#include <asm/xen/swiotlb-xen.h>
#include <asm/iommu_table.h>
+
int swiotlb __read_mostly;
void *x86_swiotlb_alloc_coherent(struct device *hwdev, size_t size,
@@ -79,8 +81,8 @@ IOMMU_INIT_FINISH(pci_swiotlb_detect_override,
pci_swiotlb_late_init);
/*
- * if 4GB or more detected (and iommu=off not set) return 1
- * and set swiotlb to 1.
+ * If 4GB or more detected (and iommu=off not set) or if SME is active
+ * then set swiotlb to 1 and return 1.
*/
int __init pci_swiotlb_detect_4gb(void)
{
@@ -89,6 +91,15 @@ int __init pci_swiotlb_detect_4gb(void)
if (!no_iommu && max_possible_pfn > MAX_DMA32_PFN)
swiotlb = 1;
#endif
+
+ /*
+ * If SME is active then swiotlb will be set to 1 so that bounce
+ * buffers are allocated and used for devices that do not support
+ * the addressing range required for the encryption mask.
+ */
+ if (sme_active())
+ swiotlb = 1;
+
return swiotlb;
}
IOMMU_INIT(pci_swiotlb_detect_4gb,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index 3ca198080ea9..bd6b85fac666 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -355,6 +355,7 @@ bool xen_set_default_idle(void)
return ret;
}
#endif
+
void stop_this_cpu(void *dummy)
{
local_irq_disable();
@@ -365,8 +366,20 @@ void stop_this_cpu(void *dummy)
disable_local_APIC();
mcheck_cpu_clear(this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_info));
- for (;;)
- halt();
+ for (;;) {
+ /*
+ * Use wbinvd followed by hlt to stop the processor. This
+ * provides support for kexec on a processor that supports
+ * SME. With kexec, going from SME inactive to SME active
+ * requires clearing cache entries so that addresses without
+ * the encryption bit set don't corrupt the same physical
+ * address that has the encryption bit set when caches are
+ * flushed. To achieve this a wbinvd is performed followed by
+ * a hlt. Even if the processor is not in the kexec/SME
+ * scenario this only adds a wbinvd to a halting processor.
+ */
+ asm volatile("wbinvd; hlt" : : : "memory");
+ }
}
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
index 98111b38ebfd..307d3bac5f04 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ relocate_kernel:
* %rsi page_list
* %rdx start address
* %rcx preserve_context
+ * %r8 sme_active
*/
/* Save the CPU context, used for jumping back */
@@ -71,6 +72,9 @@ relocate_kernel:
pushq $0
popfq
+ /* Save SME active flag */
+ movq %r8, %r12
+
/*
* get physical address of control page now
* this is impossible after page table switch
@@ -132,6 +136,16 @@ identity_mapped:
/* Flush the TLB (needed?) */
movq %r9, %cr3
+ /*
+ * If SME is active, there could be old encrypted cache line
+ * entries that will conflict with the now unencrypted memory
+ * used by kexec. Flush the caches before copying the kernel.
+ */
+ testq %r12, %r12
+ jz 1f
+ wbinvd
+1:
+
movq %rcx, %r11
call swap_pages
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index ecab32282f0f..022ebddb3734 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
#include <linux/crash_dump.h>
#include <linux/tboot.h>
#include <linux/jiffies.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <linux/usb/xhci-dbgp.h>
#include <video/edid.h>
@@ -375,6 +376,14 @@ static void __init reserve_initrd(void)
!ramdisk_image || !ramdisk_size)
return; /* No initrd provided by bootloader */
+ /*
+ * If SME is active, this memory will be marked encrypted by the
+ * kernel when it is accessed (including relocation). However, the
+ * ramdisk image was loaded decrypted by the bootloader, so make
+ * sure that it is encrypted before accessing it.
+ */
+ sme_early_encrypt(ramdisk_image, ramdisk_end - ramdisk_image);
+
initrd_start = 0;
mapped_size = memblock_mem_size(max_pfn_mapped);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c
index 213ddf3e937d..73e4d28112f8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include <asm/compat.h>
#include <asm/ia32.h>
#include <asm/syscalls.h>
+#include <asm/mpx.h>
/*
* Align a virtual address to avoid aliasing in the I$ on AMD F15h.
@@ -100,8 +101,8 @@ out:
return error;
}
-static void find_start_end(unsigned long flags, unsigned long *begin,
- unsigned long *end)
+static void find_start_end(unsigned long addr, unsigned long flags,
+ unsigned long *begin, unsigned long *end)
{
if (!in_compat_syscall() && (flags & MAP_32BIT)) {
/* This is usually used needed to map code in small
@@ -120,7 +121,10 @@ static void find_start_end(unsigned long flags, unsigned long *begin,
}
*begin = get_mmap_base(1);
- *end = in_compat_syscall() ? tasksize_32bit() : tasksize_64bit();
+ if (in_compat_syscall())
+ *end = task_size_32bit();
+ else
+ *end = task_size_64bit(addr > DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW);
}
unsigned long
@@ -132,10 +136,14 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp, unsigned long addr,
struct vm_unmapped_area_info info;
unsigned long begin, end;
+ addr = mpx_unmapped_area_check(addr, len, flags);
+ if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
+ return addr;
+
if (flags & MAP_FIXED)
return addr;
- find_start_end(flags, &begin, &end);
+ find_start_end(addr, flags, &begin, &end);
if (len > end)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -171,6 +179,10 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *filp, const unsigned long addr0,
unsigned long addr = addr0;
struct vm_unmapped_area_info info;
+ addr = mpx_unmapped_area_check(addr, len, flags);
+ if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
+ return addr;
+
/* requested length too big for entire address space */
if (len > TASK_SIZE)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -195,6 +207,16 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *filp, const unsigned long addr0,
info.length = len;
info.low_limit = PAGE_SIZE;
info.high_limit = get_mmap_base(0);
+
+ /*
+ * If hint address is above DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW, look for unmapped area
+ * in the full address space.
+ *
+ * !in_compat_syscall() check to avoid high addresses for x32.
+ */
+ if (addr > DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW && !in_compat_syscall())
+ info.high_limit += TASK_SIZE_MAX - DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW;
+
info.align_mask = 0;
info.align_offset = pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
if (filp) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
index 9b1dd114956a..04d750813c9d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ module_param(dbg, bool, 0644);
(((address) >> PT32_LEVEL_SHIFT(level)) & ((1 << PT32_LEVEL_BITS) - 1))
-#define PT64_BASE_ADDR_MASK (((1ULL << 52) - 1) & ~(u64)(PAGE_SIZE-1))
+#define PT64_BASE_ADDR_MASK __sme_clr((((1ULL << 52) - 1) & ~(u64)(PAGE_SIZE-1)))
#define PT64_DIR_BASE_ADDR_MASK \
(PT64_BASE_ADDR_MASK & ~((1ULL << (PAGE_SHIFT + PT64_LEVEL_BITS)) - 1))
#define PT64_LVL_ADDR_MASK(level) \
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ module_param(dbg, bool, 0644);
* PT32_LEVEL_BITS))) - 1))
#define PT64_PERM_MASK (PT_PRESENT_MASK | PT_WRITABLE_MASK | shadow_user_mask \
- | shadow_x_mask | shadow_nx_mask)
+ | shadow_x_mask | shadow_nx_mask | shadow_me_mask)
#define ACC_EXEC_MASK 1
#define ACC_WRITE_MASK PT_WRITABLE_MASK
@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ static u64 __read_mostly shadow_dirty_mask;
static u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_mask;
static u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_value;
static u64 __read_mostly shadow_present_mask;
+static u64 __read_mostly shadow_me_mask;
/*
* SPTEs used by MMUs without A/D bits are marked with shadow_acc_track_value.
@@ -349,7 +350,7 @@ static bool check_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 spte)
*/
void kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes(u64 user_mask, u64 accessed_mask,
u64 dirty_mask, u64 nx_mask, u64 x_mask, u64 p_mask,
- u64 acc_track_mask)
+ u64 acc_track_mask, u64 me_mask)
{
BUG_ON(!dirty_mask != !accessed_mask);
BUG_ON(!accessed_mask && !acc_track_mask);
@@ -362,6 +363,7 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes(u64 user_mask, u64 accessed_mask,
shadow_x_mask = x_mask;
shadow_present_mask = p_mask;
shadow_acc_track_mask = acc_track_mask;
+ shadow_me_mask = me_mask;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes);
@@ -2433,7 +2435,7 @@ static void link_shadow_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep,
BUILD_BUG_ON(VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK != PT_WRITABLE_MASK);
spte = __pa(sp->spt) | shadow_present_mask | PT_WRITABLE_MASK |
- shadow_user_mask | shadow_x_mask;
+ shadow_user_mask | shadow_x_mask | shadow_me_mask;
if (sp_ad_disabled(sp))
spte |= shadow_acc_track_value;
@@ -2745,6 +2747,7 @@ static int set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep,
pte_access &= ~ACC_WRITE_MASK;
spte |= (u64)pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ spte |= shadow_me_mask;
if (pte_access & ACC_WRITE_MASK) {
@@ -4106,16 +4109,28 @@ void
reset_shadow_zero_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *context)
{
bool uses_nx = context->nx || context->base_role.smep_andnot_wp;
+ struct rsvd_bits_validate *shadow_zero_check;
+ int i;
/*
* Passing "true" to the last argument is okay; it adds a check
* on bit 8 of the SPTEs which KVM doesn't use anyway.
*/
- __reset_rsvds_bits_mask(vcpu, &context->shadow_zero_check,
+ shadow_zero_check = &context->shadow_zero_check;
+ __reset_rsvds_bits_mask(vcpu, shadow_zero_check,
boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits,
context->shadow_root_level, uses_nx,
guest_cpuid_has_gbpages(vcpu), is_pse(vcpu),
true);
+
+ if (!shadow_me_mask)
+ return;
+
+ for (i = context->shadow_root_level; --i >= 0;) {
+ shadow_zero_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][i] &= ~shadow_me_mask;
+ shadow_zero_check->rsvd_bits_mask[1][i] &= ~shadow_me_mask;
+ }
+
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(reset_shadow_zero_bits_mask);
@@ -4133,17 +4148,29 @@ static void
reset_tdp_shadow_zero_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_mmu *context)
{
+ struct rsvd_bits_validate *shadow_zero_check;
+ int i;
+
+ shadow_zero_check = &context->shadow_zero_check;
+
if (boot_cpu_is_amd())
- __reset_rsvds_bits_mask(vcpu, &context->shadow_zero_check,
+ __reset_rsvds_bits_mask(vcpu, shadow_zero_check,
boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits,
context->shadow_root_level, false,
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES),
true, true);
else
- __reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(&context->shadow_zero_check,
+ __reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(shadow_zero_check,
boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits,
false);
+ if (!shadow_me_mask)
+ return;
+
+ for (i = context->shadow_root_level; --i >= 0;) {
+ shadow_zero_check->rsvd_bits_mask[0][i] &= ~shadow_me_mask;
+ shadow_zero_check->rsvd_bits_mask[1][i] &= ~shadow_me_mask;
+ }
}
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index af256b786a70..8dbd8dbc83eb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -1167,9 +1167,9 @@ static void avic_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
struct kvm_arch *vm_data = &svm->vcpu.kvm->arch;
- phys_addr_t bpa = page_to_phys(svm->avic_backing_page);
- phys_addr_t lpa = page_to_phys(vm_data->avic_logical_id_table_page);
- phys_addr_t ppa = page_to_phys(vm_data->avic_physical_id_table_page);
+ phys_addr_t bpa = __sme_set(page_to_phys(svm->avic_backing_page));
+ phys_addr_t lpa = __sme_set(page_to_phys(vm_data->avic_logical_id_table_page));
+ phys_addr_t ppa = __sme_set(page_to_phys(vm_data->avic_physical_id_table_page));
vmcb->control.avic_backing_page = bpa & AVIC_HPA_MASK;
vmcb->control.avic_logical_id = lpa & AVIC_HPA_MASK;
@@ -1232,8 +1232,8 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MWAIT);
}
- control->iopm_base_pa = iopm_base;
- control->msrpm_base_pa = __pa(svm->msrpm);
+ control->iopm_base_pa = __sme_set(iopm_base);
+ control->msrpm_base_pa = __sme_set(__pa(svm->msrpm));
control->int_ctl = V_INTR_MASKING_MASK;
init_seg(&save->es);
@@ -1377,9 +1377,9 @@ static int avic_init_backing_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return -EINVAL;
new_entry = READ_ONCE(*entry);
- new_entry = (page_to_phys(svm->avic_backing_page) &
- AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_BACKING_PAGE_MASK) |
- AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_VALID_MASK;
+ new_entry = __sme_set((page_to_phys(svm->avic_backing_page) &
+ AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_BACKING_PAGE_MASK) |
+ AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_VALID_MASK);
WRITE_ONCE(*entry, new_entry);
svm->avic_physical_id_cache = entry;
@@ -1647,7 +1647,7 @@ static struct kvm_vcpu *svm_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id)
svm->vmcb = page_address(page);
clear_page(svm->vmcb);
- svm->vmcb_pa = page_to_pfn(page) << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ svm->vmcb_pa = __sme_set(page_to_pfn(page) << PAGE_SHIFT);
svm->asid_generation = 0;
init_vmcb(svm);
@@ -1675,7 +1675,7 @@ static void svm_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
- __free_page(pfn_to_page(svm->vmcb_pa >> PAGE_SHIFT));
+ __free_page(pfn_to_page(__sme_clr(svm->vmcb_pa) >> PAGE_SHIFT));
__free_pages(virt_to_page(svm->msrpm), MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER);
__free_page(virt_to_page(svm->nested.hsave));
__free_pages(virt_to_page(svm->nested.msrpm), MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER);
@@ -2330,7 +2330,7 @@ static u64 nested_svm_get_tdp_pdptr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int index)
u64 pdpte;
int ret;
- ret = kvm_vcpu_read_guest_page(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(cr3), &pdpte,
+ ret = kvm_vcpu_read_guest_page(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(__sme_clr(cr3)), &pdpte,
offset_in_page(cr3) + index * 8, 8);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -2342,7 +2342,7 @@ static void nested_svm_set_tdp_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
- svm->vmcb->control.nested_cr3 = root;
+ svm->vmcb->control.nested_cr3 = __sme_set(root);
mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_NPT);
svm_flush_tlb(vcpu);
}
@@ -2873,7 +2873,7 @@ static bool nested_svm_vmrun_msrpm(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
svm->nested.msrpm[p] = svm->msrpm[p] | value;
}
- svm->vmcb->control.msrpm_base_pa = __pa(svm->nested.msrpm);
+ svm->vmcb->control.msrpm_base_pa = __sme_set(__pa(svm->nested.msrpm));
return true;
}
@@ -4506,7 +4506,7 @@ get_pi_vcpu_info(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *e,
pr_debug("SVM: %s: use GA mode for irq %u\n", __func__,
irq.vector);
*svm = to_svm(vcpu);
- vcpu_info->pi_desc_addr = page_to_phys((*svm)->avic_backing_page);
+ vcpu_info->pi_desc_addr = __sme_set(page_to_phys((*svm)->avic_backing_page));
vcpu_info->vector = irq.vector;
return 0;
@@ -4557,7 +4557,8 @@ static int svm_update_pi_irte(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int host_irq,
struct amd_iommu_pi_data pi;
/* Try to enable guest_mode in IRTE */
- pi.base = page_to_phys(svm->avic_backing_page) & AVIC_HPA_MASK;
+ pi.base = __sme_set(page_to_phys(svm->avic_backing_page) &
+ AVIC_HPA_MASK);
pi.ga_tag = AVIC_GATAG(kvm->arch.avic_vm_id,
svm->vcpu.vcpu_id);
pi.is_guest_mode = true;
@@ -5006,7 +5007,7 @@ static void svm_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long root)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
- svm->vmcb->save.cr3 = root;
+ svm->vmcb->save.cr3 = __sme_set(root);
mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
svm_flush_tlb(vcpu);
}
@@ -5015,7 +5016,7 @@ static void set_tdp_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long root)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
- svm->vmcb->control.nested_cr3 = root;
+ svm->vmcb->control.nested_cr3 = __sme_set(root);
mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_NPT);
/* Also sync guest cr3 here in case we live migrate */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index c6ef2940119b..d40900914a72 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -6556,7 +6556,7 @@ void vmx_enable_tdp(void)
enable_ept_ad_bits ? VMX_EPT_DIRTY_BIT : 0ull,
0ull, VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK,
cpu_has_vmx_ept_execute_only() ? 0ull : VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK,
- VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK);
+ VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK, 0ull);
ept_set_mmio_spte_mask();
kvm_enable_tdp();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 272320eb328c..ef5102f80497 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
#include <linux/kvm_irqfd.h>
#include <linux/irqbypass.h>
#include <linux/sched/stat.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <trace/events/kvm.h>
@@ -6125,7 +6126,7 @@ int kvm_arch_init(void *opaque)
kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes(PT_USER_MASK, PT_ACCESSED_MASK,
PT_DIRTY_MASK, PT64_NX_MASK, 0,
- PT_PRESENT_MASK, 0);
+ PT_PRESENT_MASK, 0, sme_me_mask);
kvm_timer_init();
perf_register_guest_info_callbacks(&kvm_guest_cbs);
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/cmdline.c b/arch/x86/lib/cmdline.c
index 5cc78bf57232..3261abb21ef4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/cmdline.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/cmdline.c
@@ -104,7 +104,112 @@ __cmdline_find_option_bool(const char *cmdline, int max_cmdline_size,
return 0; /* Buffer overrun */
}
+/*
+ * Find a non-boolean option (i.e. option=argument). In accordance with
+ * standard Linux practice, if this option is repeated, this returns the
+ * last instance on the command line.
+ *
+ * @cmdline: the cmdline string
+ * @max_cmdline_size: the maximum size of cmdline
+ * @option: option string to look for
+ * @buffer: memory buffer to return the option argument
+ * @bufsize: size of the supplied memory buffer
+ *
+ * Returns the length of the argument (regardless of if it was
+ * truncated to fit in the buffer), or -1 on not found.
+ */
+static int
+__cmdline_find_option(const char *cmdline, int max_cmdline_size,
+ const char *option, char *buffer, int bufsize)
+{
+ char c;
+ int pos = 0, len = -1;
+ const char *opptr = NULL;
+ char *bufptr = buffer;
+ enum {
+ st_wordstart = 0, /* Start of word/after whitespace */
+ st_wordcmp, /* Comparing this word */
+ st_wordskip, /* Miscompare, skip */
+ st_bufcpy, /* Copying this to buffer */
+ } state = st_wordstart;
+
+ if (!cmdline)
+ return -1; /* No command line */
+
+ /*
+ * This 'pos' check ensures we do not overrun
+ * a non-NULL-terminated 'cmdline'
+ */
+ while (pos++ < max_cmdline_size) {
+ c = *(char *)cmdline++;
+ if (!c)
+ break;
+
+ switch (state) {
+ case st_wordstart:
+ if (myisspace(c))
+ break;
+
+ state = st_wordcmp;
+ opptr = option;
+ /* fall through */
+
+ case st_wordcmp:
+ if ((c == '=') && !*opptr) {
+ /*
+ * We matched all the way to the end of the
+ * option we were looking for, prepare to
+ * copy the argument.
+ */
+ len = 0;
+ bufptr = buffer;
+ state = st_bufcpy;
+ break;
+ } else if (c == *opptr++) {
+ /*
+ * We are currently matching, so continue
+ * to the next character on the cmdline.
+ */
+ break;
+ }
+ state = st_wordskip;
+ /* fall through */
+
+ case st_wordskip:
+ if (myisspace(c))
+ state = st_wordstart;
+ break;
+
+ case st_bufcpy:
+ if (myisspace(c)) {
+ state = st_wordstart;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Increment len, but don't overrun the
+ * supplied buffer and leave room for the
+ * NULL terminator.
+ */
+ if (++len < bufsize)
+ *bufptr++ = c;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (bufsize)
+ *bufptr = '\0';
+
+ return len;
+}
+
int cmdline_find_option_bool(const char *cmdline, const char *option)
{
return __cmdline_find_option_bool(cmdline, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE, option);
}
+
+int cmdline_find_option(const char *cmdline, const char *option, char *buffer,
+ int bufsize)
+{
+ return __cmdline_find_option(cmdline, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE, option,
+ buffer, bufsize);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
index 0fbdcb64f9f8..72bf8c01c6e3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
@@ -39,3 +39,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MPX) += mpx.o
obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) += pkeys.o
obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY) += kaslr.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_boot.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c b/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c
index 0470826d2bdc..5e3ac6fe6c9e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c
@@ -13,12 +13,12 @@
*/
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
+#include <linux/kasan.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
-#include <asm/kasan.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
/*
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static void printk_prot(struct seq_file *m, pgprot_t prot, int level, bool dmsg)
{
pgprotval_t pr = pgprot_val(prot);
static const char * const level_name[] =
- { "cr3", "pgd", "pud", "pmd", "pte" };
+ { "cr3", "pgd", "p4d", "pud", "pmd", "pte" };
if (!pgprot_val(prot)) {
/* Not present */
@@ -162,12 +162,12 @@ static void printk_prot(struct seq_file *m, pgprot_t prot, int level, bool dmsg)
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, " ");
/* Bit 7 has a different meaning on level 3 vs 4 */
- if (level <= 3 && pr & _PAGE_PSE)
+ if (level <= 4 && pr & _PAGE_PSE)
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, "PSE ");
else
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, " ");
- if ((level == 4 && pr & _PAGE_PAT) ||
- ((level == 3 || level == 2) && pr & _PAGE_PAT_LARGE))
+ if ((level == 5 && pr & _PAGE_PAT) ||
+ ((level == 4 || level == 3) && pr & _PAGE_PAT_LARGE))
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, "PAT ");
else
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, " ");
@@ -188,11 +188,12 @@ static void printk_prot(struct seq_file *m, pgprot_t prot, int level, bool dmsg)
*/
static unsigned long normalize_addr(unsigned long u)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- return (signed long)(u << 16) >> 16;
-#else
- return u;
-#endif
+ int shift;
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
+ return u;
+
+ shift = 64 - (__VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT + 1);
+ return (signed long)(u << shift) >> shift;
}
/*
@@ -297,32 +298,62 @@ static void walk_pte_level(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st, pmd_t addr,
for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PTE; i++) {
prot = pte_flags(*start);
st->current_address = normalize_addr(P + i * PTE_LEVEL_MULT);
- note_page(m, st, __pgprot(prot), 4);
+ note_page(m, st, __pgprot(prot), 5);
start++;
}
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+
+/*
+ * This is an optimization for KASAN=y case. Since all kasan page tables
+ * eventually point to the kasan_zero_page we could call note_page()
+ * right away without walking through lower level page tables. This saves
+ * us dozens of seconds (minutes for 5-level config) while checking for
+ * W+X mapping or reading kernel_page_tables debugfs file.
+ */
+static inline bool kasan_page_table(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st,
+ void *pt)
+{
+ if (__pa(pt) == __pa(kasan_zero_pmd) ||
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
+ __pa(pt) == __pa(kasan_zero_p4d) ||
+#endif
+ __pa(pt) == __pa(kasan_zero_pud)) {
+ pgprotval_t prot = pte_flags(kasan_zero_pte[0]);
+ note_page(m, st, __pgprot(prot), 5);
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+#else
+static inline bool kasan_page_table(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st,
+ void *pt)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+#endif
#if PTRS_PER_PMD > 1
static void walk_pmd_level(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st, pud_t addr, unsigned long P)
{
int i;
- pmd_t *start;
+ pmd_t *start, *pmd_start;
pgprotval_t prot;
- start = (pmd_t *)pud_page_vaddr(addr);
+ pmd_start = start = (pmd_t *)pud_page_vaddr(addr);
for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PMD; i++) {
st->current_address = normalize_addr(P + i * PMD_LEVEL_MULT);
if (!pmd_none(*start)) {
if (pmd_large(*start) || !pmd_present(*start)) {
prot = pmd_flags(*start);
- note_page(m, st, __pgprot(prot), 3);
- } else {
+ note_page(m, st, __pgprot(prot), 4);
+ } else if (!kasan_page_table(m, st, pmd_start)) {
walk_pte_level(m, st, *start,
P + i * PMD_LEVEL_MULT);
}
} else
- note_page(m, st, __pgprot(0), 3);
+ note_page(m, st, __pgprot(0), 4);
start++;
}
}
@@ -335,39 +366,27 @@ static void walk_pmd_level(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st, pud_t addr,
#if PTRS_PER_PUD > 1
-/*
- * This is an optimization for CONFIG_DEBUG_WX=y + CONFIG_KASAN=y
- * KASAN fills page tables with the same values. Since there is no
- * point in checking page table more than once we just skip repeated
- * entries. This saves us dozens of seconds during boot.
- */
-static bool pud_already_checked(pud_t *prev_pud, pud_t *pud, bool checkwx)
-{
- return checkwx && prev_pud && (pud_val(*prev_pud) == pud_val(*pud));
-}
-
static void walk_pud_level(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st, p4d_t addr, unsigned long P)
{
int i;
- pud_t *start;
+ pud_t *start, *pud_start;
pgprotval_t prot;
pud_t *prev_pud = NULL;
- start = (pud_t *)p4d_page_vaddr(addr);
+ pud_start = start = (pud_t *)p4d_page_vaddr(addr);
for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PUD; i++) {
st->current_address = normalize_addr(P + i * PUD_LEVEL_MULT);
- if (!pud_none(*start) &&
- !pud_already_checked(prev_pud, start, st->check_wx)) {
+ if (!pud_none(*start)) {
if (pud_large(*start) || !pud_present(*start)) {
prot = pud_flags(*start);
- note_page(m, st, __pgprot(prot), 2);
- } else {
+ note_page(m, st, __pgprot(prot), 3);
+ } else if (!kasan_page_table(m, st, pud_start)) {
walk_pmd_level(m, st, *start,
P + i * PUD_LEVEL_MULT);
}
} else
- note_page(m, st, __pgprot(0), 2);
+ note_page(m, st, __pgprot(0), 3);
prev_pud = start;
start++;
@@ -385,10 +404,10 @@ static void walk_pud_level(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st, p4d_t addr,
static void walk_p4d_level(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st, pgd_t addr, unsigned long P)
{
int i;
- p4d_t *start;
+ p4d_t *start, *p4d_start;
pgprotval_t prot;
- start = (p4d_t *)pgd_page_vaddr(addr);
+ p4d_start = start = (p4d_t *)pgd_page_vaddr(addr);
for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_P4D; i++) {
st->current_address = normalize_addr(P + i * P4D_LEVEL_MULT);
@@ -396,7 +415,7 @@ static void walk_p4d_level(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st, pgd_t addr,
if (p4d_large(*start) || !p4d_present(*start)) {
prot = p4d_flags(*start);
note_page(m, st, __pgprot(prot), 2);
- } else {
+ } else if (!kasan_page_table(m, st, p4d_start)) {
walk_pud_level(m, st, *start,
P + i * P4D_LEVEL_MULT);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 2a1fa10c6a98..0cdf14cf3270 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -396,14 +396,18 @@ static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long address)
pte_t *pte;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
- printk("*pdpt = %016Lx ", pgd_val(*pgd));
+ pr_info("*pdpt = %016Lx ", pgd_val(*pgd));
if (!low_pfn(pgd_val(*pgd) >> PAGE_SHIFT) || !pgd_present(*pgd))
goto out;
+#define pr_pde pr_cont
+#else
+#define pr_pde pr_info
#endif
p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, address);
pud = pud_offset(p4d, address);
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
- printk(KERN_CONT "*pde = %0*Lx ", sizeof(*pmd) * 2, (u64)pmd_val(*pmd));
+ pr_pde("*pde = %0*Lx ", sizeof(*pmd) * 2, (u64)pmd_val(*pmd));
+#undef pr_pde
/*
* We must not directly access the pte in the highpte
@@ -415,9 +419,9 @@ static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long address)
goto out;
pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address);
- printk("*pte = %0*Lx ", sizeof(*pte) * 2, (u64)pte_val(*pte));
+ pr_cont("*pte = %0*Lx ", sizeof(*pte) * 2, (u64)pte_val(*pte));
out:
- printk("\n");
+ pr_cont("\n");
}
#else /* CONFIG_X86_64: */
@@ -565,7 +569,7 @@ static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long address)
if (bad_address(pgd))
goto bad;
- printk("PGD %lx ", pgd_val(*pgd));
+ pr_info("PGD %lx ", pgd_val(*pgd));
if (!pgd_present(*pgd))
goto out;
@@ -574,7 +578,7 @@ static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long address)
if (bad_address(p4d))
goto bad;
- printk("P4D %lx ", p4d_val(*p4d));
+ pr_cont("P4D %lx ", p4d_val(*p4d));
if (!p4d_present(*p4d) || p4d_large(*p4d))
goto out;
@@ -582,7 +586,7 @@ static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long address)
if (bad_address(pud))
goto bad;
- printk("PUD %lx ", pud_val(*pud));
+ pr_cont("PUD %lx ", pud_val(*pud));
if (!pud_present(*pud) || pud_large(*pud))
goto out;
@@ -590,7 +594,7 @@ static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long address)
if (bad_address(pmd))
goto bad;
- printk("PMD %lx ", pmd_val(*pmd));
+ pr_cont("PMD %lx ", pmd_val(*pmd));
if (!pmd_present(*pmd) || pmd_large(*pmd))
goto out;
@@ -598,12 +602,12 @@ static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long address)
if (bad_address(pte))
goto bad;
- printk("PTE %lx", pte_val(*pte));
+ pr_cont("PTE %lx", pte_val(*pte));
out:
- printk("\n");
+ pr_cont("\n");
return;
bad:
- printk("BAD\n");
+ pr_info("BAD\n");
}
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/hugetlbpage.c b/arch/x86/mm/hugetlbpage.c
index 2824607df108..6d06cf33e3de 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/hugetlbpage.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/hugetlbpage.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
#include <asm/elf.h>
+#include <asm/mpx.h>
#if 0 /* This is just for testing */
struct page *
@@ -85,25 +86,38 @@ static unsigned long hugetlb_get_unmapped_area_bottomup(struct file *file,
info.flags = 0;
info.length = len;
info.low_limit = get_mmap_base(1);
+
+ /*
+ * If hint address is above DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW, look for unmapped area
+ * in the full address space.
+ */
info.high_limit = in_compat_syscall() ?
- tasksize_32bit() : tasksize_64bit();
+ task_size_32bit() : task_size_64bit(addr > DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW);
+
info.align_mask = PAGE_MASK & ~huge_page_mask(h);
info.align_offset = 0;
return vm_unmapped_area(&info);
}
static unsigned long hugetlb_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *file,
- unsigned long addr0, unsigned long len,
+ unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags)
{
struct hstate *h = hstate_file(file);
struct vm_unmapped_area_info info;
- unsigned long addr;
info.flags = VM_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN;
info.length = len;
info.low_limit = PAGE_SIZE;
info.high_limit = get_mmap_base(0);
+
+ /*
+ * If hint address is above DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW, look for unmapped area
+ * in the full address space.
+ */
+ if (addr > DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW && !in_compat_syscall())
+ info.high_limit += TASK_SIZE_MAX - DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW;
+
info.align_mask = PAGE_MASK & ~huge_page_mask(h);
info.align_offset = 0;
addr = vm_unmapped_area(&info);
@@ -118,7 +132,7 @@ static unsigned long hugetlb_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *file,
VM_BUG_ON(addr != -ENOMEM);
info.flags = 0;
info.low_limit = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
- info.high_limit = TASK_SIZE;
+ info.high_limit = TASK_SIZE_LOW;
addr = vm_unmapped_area(&info);
}
@@ -135,6 +149,11 @@ hugetlb_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
if (len & ~huge_page_mask(h))
return -EINVAL;
+
+ addr = mpx_unmapped_area_check(addr, len, flags);
+ if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
+ return addr;
+
if (len > TASK_SIZE)
return -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c
index adab1595f4bd..31cea988fa36 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static int ident_pud_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pud_t *pud_page,
if (!pmd)
return -ENOMEM;
ident_pmd_init(info, pmd, addr, next);
- set_pud(pud, __pud(__pa(pmd) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
+ set_pud(pud, __pud(__pa(pmd) | info->kernpg_flag));
}
return 0;
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static int ident_p4d_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, p4d_t *p4d_page,
if (!pud)
return -ENOMEM;
ident_pud_init(info, pud, addr, next);
- set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(__pa(pud) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
+ set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(__pa(pud) | info->kernpg_flag));
}
return 0;
@@ -93,6 +93,10 @@ int kernel_ident_mapping_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *pgd_page,
unsigned long next;
int result;
+ /* Set the default pagetable flags if not supplied */
+ if (!info->kernpg_flag)
+ info->kernpg_flag = _KERNPG_TABLE;
+
for (; addr < end; addr = next) {
pgd_t *pgd = pgd_page + pgd_index(addr);
p4d_t *p4d;
@@ -116,14 +120,14 @@ int kernel_ident_mapping_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *pgd_page,
if (result)
return result;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) {
- set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(__pa(p4d) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
+ set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(__pa(p4d) | info->kernpg_flag));
} else {
/*
* With p4d folded, pgd is equal to p4d.
* The pgd entry has to point to the pud page table in this case.
*/
pud_t *pud = pud_offset(p4d, 0);
- set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(__pa(pud) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
+ set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(__pa(pud) | info->kernpg_flag));
}
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init.c b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
index bf3f1065d6ad..7777ccc0e9f9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
@@ -815,7 +815,7 @@ void __init zone_sizes_init(void)
DEFINE_PER_CPU_SHARED_ALIGNED(struct tlb_state, cpu_tlbstate) = {
.loaded_mm = &init_mm,
- .state = 0,
+ .next_asid = 1,
.cr4 = ~0UL, /* fail hard if we screw up cr4 shadow initialization */
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_tlbstate);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 4c1b5fd0c7ad..34f0e1847dd6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/mmiotrace.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#include <asm/e820/api.h>
@@ -21,6 +23,7 @@
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
#include <asm/pat.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
#include "physaddr.h"
@@ -106,12 +109,6 @@ static void __iomem *__ioremap_caller(resource_size_t phys_addr,
}
/*
- * Don't remap the low PCI/ISA area, it's always mapped..
- */
- if (is_ISA_range(phys_addr, last_addr))
- return (__force void __iomem *)phys_to_virt(phys_addr);
-
- /*
* Don't allow anybody to remap normal RAM that we're using..
*/
pfn = phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
@@ -340,13 +337,17 @@ void iounmap(volatile void __iomem *addr)
return;
/*
- * __ioremap special-cases the PCI/ISA range by not instantiating a
- * vm_area and by simply returning an address into the kernel mapping
- * of ISA space. So handle that here.
+ * The PCI/ISA range special-casing was removed from __ioremap()
+ * so this check, in theory, can be removed. However, there are
+ * cases where iounmap() is called for addresses not obtained via
+ * ioremap() (vga16fb for example). Add a warning so that these
+ * cases can be caught and fixed.
*/
if ((void __force *)addr >= phys_to_virt(ISA_START_ADDRESS) &&
- (void __force *)addr < phys_to_virt(ISA_END_ADDRESS))
+ (void __force *)addr < phys_to_virt(ISA_END_ADDRESS)) {
+ WARN(1, "iounmap() called for ISA range not obtained using ioremap()\n");
return;
+ }
addr = (volatile void __iomem *)
(PAGE_MASK & (unsigned long __force)addr);
@@ -399,12 +400,10 @@ void *xlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys)
unsigned long offset = phys & ~PAGE_MASK;
void *vaddr;
- /* If page is RAM, we can use __va. Otherwise ioremap and unmap. */
- if (page_is_ram(start >> PAGE_SHIFT))
- return __va(phys);
+ /* memremap() maps if RAM, otherwise falls back to ioremap() */
+ vaddr = memremap(start, PAGE_SIZE, MEMREMAP_WB);
- vaddr = ioremap_cache(start, PAGE_SIZE);
- /* Only add the offset on success and return NULL if the ioremap() failed: */
+ /* Only add the offset on success and return NULL if memremap() failed */
if (vaddr)
vaddr += offset;
@@ -413,11 +412,263 @@ void *xlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys)
void unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys, void *addr)
{
- if (page_is_ram(phys >> PAGE_SHIFT))
- return;
+ memunmap((void *)((unsigned long)addr & PAGE_MASK));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Examine the physical address to determine if it is an area of memory
+ * that should be mapped decrypted. If the memory is not part of the
+ * kernel usable area it was accessed and created decrypted, so these
+ * areas should be mapped decrypted. And since the encryption key can
+ * change across reboots, persistent memory should also be mapped
+ * decrypted.
+ */
+static bool memremap_should_map_decrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size)
+{
+ int is_pmem;
+
+ /*
+ * Check if the address is part of a persistent memory region.
+ * This check covers areas added by E820, EFI and ACPI.
+ */
+ is_pmem = region_intersects(phys_addr, size, IORESOURCE_MEM,
+ IORES_DESC_PERSISTENT_MEMORY);
+ if (is_pmem != REGION_DISJOINT)
+ return true;
+
+ /*
+ * Check if the non-volatile attribute is set for an EFI
+ * reserved area.
+ */
+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
+ switch (efi_mem_type(phys_addr)) {
+ case EFI_RESERVED_TYPE:
+ if (efi_mem_attributes(phys_addr) & EFI_MEMORY_NV)
+ return true;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check if the address is outside kernel usable area */
+ switch (e820__get_entry_type(phys_addr, phys_addr + size - 1)) {
+ case E820_TYPE_RESERVED:
+ case E820_TYPE_ACPI:
+ case E820_TYPE_NVS:
+ case E820_TYPE_UNUSABLE:
+ case E820_TYPE_PRAM:
+ return true;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Examine the physical address to determine if it is EFI data. Check
+ * it against the boot params structure and EFI tables and memory types.
+ */
+static bool memremap_is_efi_data(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size)
+{
+ u64 paddr;
+
+ /* Check if the address is part of EFI boot/runtime data */
+ if (!efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
+ return false;
+
+ paddr = boot_params.efi_info.efi_memmap_hi;
+ paddr <<= 32;
+ paddr |= boot_params.efi_info.efi_memmap;
+ if (phys_addr == paddr)
+ return true;
+
+ paddr = boot_params.efi_info.efi_systab_hi;
+ paddr <<= 32;
+ paddr |= boot_params.efi_info.efi_systab;
+ if (phys_addr == paddr)
+ return true;
+
+ if (efi_is_table_address(phys_addr))
+ return true;
+
+ switch (efi_mem_type(phys_addr)) {
+ case EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA:
+ case EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA:
+ return true;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Examine the physical address to determine if it is boot data by checking
+ * it against the boot params setup_data chain.
+ */
+static bool memremap_is_setup_data(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size)
+{
+ struct setup_data *data;
+ u64 paddr, paddr_next;
+
+ paddr = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
+ while (paddr) {
+ unsigned int len;
+
+ if (phys_addr == paddr)
+ return true;
+
+ data = memremap(paddr, sizeof(*data),
+ MEMREMAP_WB | MEMREMAP_DEC);
+
+ paddr_next = data->next;
+ len = data->len;
+
+ memunmap(data);
+
+ if ((phys_addr > paddr) && (phys_addr < (paddr + len)))
+ return true;
+
+ paddr = paddr_next;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Examine the physical address to determine if it is boot data by checking
+ * it against the boot params setup_data chain (early boot version).
+ */
+static bool __init early_memremap_is_setup_data(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size)
+{
+ struct setup_data *data;
+ u64 paddr, paddr_next;
+
+ paddr = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
+ while (paddr) {
+ unsigned int len;
+
+ if (phys_addr == paddr)
+ return true;
+
+ data = early_memremap_decrypted(paddr, sizeof(*data));
+
+ paddr_next = data->next;
+ len = data->len;
+
+ early_memunmap(data, sizeof(*data));
+
+ if ((phys_addr > paddr) && (phys_addr < (paddr + len)))
+ return true;
+
+ paddr = paddr_next;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Architecture function to determine if RAM remap is allowed. By default, a
+ * RAM remap will map the data as encrypted. Determine if a RAM remap should
+ * not be done so that the data will be mapped decrypted.
+ */
+bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ if (!sme_active())
+ return true;
+
+ if (flags & MEMREMAP_ENC)
+ return true;
+
+ if (flags & MEMREMAP_DEC)
+ return false;
+
+ if (memremap_is_setup_data(phys_addr, size) ||
+ memremap_is_efi_data(phys_addr, size) ||
+ memremap_should_map_decrypted(phys_addr, size))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Architecture override of __weak function to adjust the protection attributes
+ * used when remapping memory. By default, early_memremap() will map the data
+ * as encrypted. Determine if an encrypted mapping should not be done and set
+ * the appropriate protection attributes.
+ */
+pgprot_t __init early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size,
+ pgprot_t prot)
+{
+ if (!sme_active())
+ return prot;
+
+ if (early_memremap_is_setup_data(phys_addr, size) ||
+ memremap_is_efi_data(phys_addr, size) ||
+ memremap_should_map_decrypted(phys_addr, size))
+ prot = pgprot_decrypted(prot);
+ else
+ prot = pgprot_encrypted(prot);
+
+ return prot;
+}
+
+bool phys_mem_access_encrypted(unsigned long phys_addr, unsigned long size)
+{
+ return arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(phys_addr, size, 0);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT
+/* Remap memory with encryption */
+void __init *early_memremap_encrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size)
+{
+ return early_memremap_prot(phys_addr, size, __PAGE_KERNEL_ENC);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Remap memory with encryption and write-protected - cannot be called
+ * before pat_init() is called
+ */
+void __init *early_memremap_encrypted_wp(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size)
+{
+ /* Be sure the write-protect PAT entry is set for write-protect */
+ if (__pte2cachemode_tbl[_PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP] != _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return early_memremap_prot(phys_addr, size, __PAGE_KERNEL_ENC_WP);
+}
+
+/* Remap memory without encryption */
+void __init *early_memremap_decrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size)
+{
+ return early_memremap_prot(phys_addr, size, __PAGE_KERNEL_NOENC);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Remap memory without encryption and write-protected - cannot be called
+ * before pat_init() is called
+ */
+void __init *early_memremap_decrypted_wp(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size)
+{
+ /* Be sure the write-protect PAT entry is set for write-protect */
+ if (__pte2cachemode_tbl[_PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP] != _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP)
+ return NULL;
- iounmap((void __iomem *)((unsigned long)addr & PAGE_MASK));
+ return early_memremap_prot(phys_addr, size, __PAGE_KERNEL_NOENC_WP);
}
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT */
static pte_t bm_pte[PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(pte_t)] __page_aligned_bss;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
index 02c9d7553409..bc84b73684b7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@
#include <asm/e820/types.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
+#include <asm/pgtable.h>
-extern pgd_t early_top_pgt[PTRS_PER_PGD];
extern struct range pfn_mapped[E820_MAX_ENTRIES];
static int __init map_range(struct range *range)
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ static struct notifier_block kasan_die_notifier = {
void __init kasan_early_init(void)
{
int i;
- pteval_t pte_val = __pa_nodebug(kasan_zero_page) | __PAGE_KERNEL;
+ pteval_t pte_val = __pa_nodebug(kasan_zero_page) | __PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_ENC;
pmdval_t pmd_val = __pa_nodebug(kasan_zero_pte) | _KERNPG_TABLE;
pudval_t pud_val = __pa_nodebug(kasan_zero_pmd) | _KERNPG_TABLE;
p4dval_t p4d_val = __pa_nodebug(kasan_zero_pud) | _KERNPG_TABLE;
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ void __init kasan_init(void)
*/
memset(kasan_zero_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PTE; i++) {
- pte_t pte = __pte(__pa(kasan_zero_page) | __PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
+ pte_t pte = __pte(__pa(kasan_zero_page) | __PAGE_KERNEL_RO | _PAGE_ENC);
set_pte(&kasan_zero_pte[i], pte);
}
/* Flush TLBs again to be sure that write protection applied. */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0fbd09269757
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,593 @@
+/*
+ * AMD Memory Encryption Support
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
+#include <linux/swiotlb.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+
+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+#include <asm/fixmap.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
+#include <asm/bootparam.h>
+#include <asm/set_memory.h>
+#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
+#include <asm/sections.h>
+#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
+
+static char sme_cmdline_arg[] __initdata = "mem_encrypt";
+static char sme_cmdline_on[] __initdata = "on";
+static char sme_cmdline_off[] __initdata = "off";
+
+/*
+ * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must
+ * reside in the .data section so as not to be zeroed out when the .bss
+ * section is later cleared.
+ */
+unsigned long sme_me_mask __section(.data) = 0;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_me_mask);
+
+/* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */
+static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
+
+/*
+ * This routine does not change the underlying encryption setting of the
+ * page(s) that map this memory. It assumes that eventually the memory is
+ * meant to be accessed as either encrypted or decrypted but the contents
+ * are currently not in the desired state.
+ *
+ * This routine follows the steps outlined in the AMD64 Architecture
+ * Programmer's Manual Volume 2, Section 7.10.8 Encrypt-in-Place.
+ */
+static void __init __sme_early_enc_dec(resource_size_t paddr,
+ unsigned long size, bool enc)
+{
+ void *src, *dst;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (!sme_me_mask)
+ return;
+
+ local_flush_tlb();
+ wbinvd();
+
+ /*
+ * There are limited number of early mapping slots, so map (at most)
+ * one page at time.
+ */
+ while (size) {
+ len = min_t(size_t, sizeof(sme_early_buffer), size);
+
+ /*
+ * Create mappings for the current and desired format of
+ * the memory. Use a write-protected mapping for the source.
+ */
+ src = enc ? early_memremap_decrypted_wp(paddr, len) :
+ early_memremap_encrypted_wp(paddr, len);
+
+ dst = enc ? early_memremap_encrypted(paddr, len) :
+ early_memremap_decrypted(paddr, len);
+
+ /*
+ * If a mapping can't be obtained to perform the operation,
+ * then eventual access of that area in the desired mode
+ * will cause a crash.
+ */
+ BUG_ON(!src || !dst);
+
+ /*
+ * Use a temporary buffer, of cache-line multiple size, to
+ * avoid data corruption as documented in the APM.
+ */
+ memcpy(sme_early_buffer, src, len);
+ memcpy(dst, sme_early_buffer, len);
+
+ early_memunmap(dst, len);
+ early_memunmap(src, len);
+
+ paddr += len;
+ size -= len;
+ }
+}
+
+void __init sme_early_encrypt(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
+{
+ __sme_early_enc_dec(paddr, size, true);
+}
+
+void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
+{
+ __sme_early_enc_dec(paddr, size, false);
+}
+
+static void __init __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(void *vaddr, unsigned long size,
+ bool map)
+{
+ unsigned long paddr = (unsigned long)vaddr - __PAGE_OFFSET;
+ pmdval_t pmd_flags, pmd;
+
+ /* Use early_pmd_flags but remove the encryption mask */
+ pmd_flags = __sme_clr(early_pmd_flags);
+
+ do {
+ pmd = map ? (paddr & PMD_MASK) + pmd_flags : 0;
+ __early_make_pgtable((unsigned long)vaddr, pmd);
+
+ vaddr += PMD_SIZE;
+ paddr += PMD_SIZE;
+ size = (size <= PMD_SIZE) ? 0 : size - PMD_SIZE;
+ } while (size);
+
+ __native_flush_tlb();
+}
+
+void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
+{
+ struct boot_params *boot_data;
+ unsigned long cmdline_paddr;
+
+ if (!sme_active())
+ return;
+
+ /* Get the command line address before unmapping the real_mode_data */
+ boot_data = (struct boot_params *)real_mode_data;
+ cmdline_paddr = boot_data->hdr.cmd_line_ptr | ((u64)boot_data->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32);
+
+ __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(real_mode_data, sizeof(boot_params), false);
+
+ if (!cmdline_paddr)
+ return;
+
+ __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(__va(cmdline_paddr), COMMAND_LINE_SIZE, false);
+}
+
+void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
+{
+ struct boot_params *boot_data;
+ unsigned long cmdline_paddr;
+
+ if (!sme_active())
+ return;
+
+ __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(real_mode_data, sizeof(boot_params), true);
+
+ /* Get the command line address after mapping the real_mode_data */
+ boot_data = (struct boot_params *)real_mode_data;
+ cmdline_paddr = boot_data->hdr.cmd_line_ptr | ((u64)boot_data->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32);
+
+ if (!cmdline_paddr)
+ return;
+
+ __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(__va(cmdline_paddr), COMMAND_LINE_SIZE, true);
+}
+
+void __init sme_early_init(void)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ if (!sme_me_mask)
+ return;
+
+ early_pmd_flags = __sme_set(early_pmd_flags);
+
+ __supported_pte_mask = __sme_set(__supported_pte_mask);
+
+ /* Update the protection map with memory encryption mask */
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(protection_map); i++)
+ protection_map[i] = pgprot_encrypted(protection_map[i]);
+}
+
+/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
+void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
+{
+ if (!sme_me_mask)
+ return;
+
+ /* Call into SWIOTLB to update the SWIOTLB DMA buffers */
+ swiotlb_update_mem_attributes();
+
+ pr_info("AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) active\n");
+}
+
+void swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(void *vaddr, unsigned long size)
+{
+ WARN(PAGE_ALIGN(size) != size,
+ "size is not page-aligned (%#lx)\n", size);
+
+ /* Make the SWIOTLB buffer area decrypted */
+ set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+}
+
+static void __init sme_clear_pgd(pgd_t *pgd_base, unsigned long start,
+ unsigned long end)
+{
+ unsigned long pgd_start, pgd_end, pgd_size;
+ pgd_t *pgd_p;
+
+ pgd_start = start & PGDIR_MASK;
+ pgd_end = end & PGDIR_MASK;
+
+ pgd_size = (((pgd_end - pgd_start) / PGDIR_SIZE) + 1);
+ pgd_size *= sizeof(pgd_t);
+
+ pgd_p = pgd_base + pgd_index(start);
+
+ memset(pgd_p, 0, pgd_size);
+}
+
+#define PGD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
+#define P4D_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
+#define PUD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
+#define PMD_FLAGS (__PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL)
+
+static void __init *sme_populate_pgd(pgd_t *pgd_base, void *pgtable_area,
+ unsigned long vaddr, pmdval_t pmd_val)
+{
+ pgd_t *pgd_p;
+ p4d_t *p4d_p;
+ pud_t *pud_p;
+ pmd_t *pmd_p;
+
+ pgd_p = pgd_base + pgd_index(vaddr);
+ if (native_pgd_val(*pgd_p)) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL))
+ p4d_p = (p4d_t *)(native_pgd_val(*pgd_p) & ~PTE_FLAGS_MASK);
+ else
+ pud_p = (pud_t *)(native_pgd_val(*pgd_p) & ~PTE_FLAGS_MASK);
+ } else {
+ pgd_t pgd;
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) {
+ p4d_p = pgtable_area;
+ memset(p4d_p, 0, sizeof(*p4d_p) * PTRS_PER_P4D);
+ pgtable_area += sizeof(*p4d_p) * PTRS_PER_P4D;
+
+ pgd = native_make_pgd((pgdval_t)p4d_p + PGD_FLAGS);
+ } else {
+ pud_p = pgtable_area;
+ memset(pud_p, 0, sizeof(*pud_p) * PTRS_PER_PUD);
+ pgtable_area += sizeof(*pud_p) * PTRS_PER_PUD;
+
+ pgd = native_make_pgd((pgdval_t)pud_p + PGD_FLAGS);
+ }
+ native_set_pgd(pgd_p, pgd);
+ }
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) {
+ p4d_p += p4d_index(vaddr);
+ if (native_p4d_val(*p4d_p)) {
+ pud_p = (pud_t *)(native_p4d_val(*p4d_p) & ~PTE_FLAGS_MASK);
+ } else {
+ p4d_t p4d;
+
+ pud_p = pgtable_area;
+ memset(pud_p, 0, sizeof(*pud_p) * PTRS_PER_PUD);
+ pgtable_area += sizeof(*pud_p) * PTRS_PER_PUD;
+
+ p4d = native_make_p4d((pudval_t)pud_p + P4D_FLAGS);
+ native_set_p4d(p4d_p, p4d);
+ }
+ }
+
+ pud_p += pud_index(vaddr);
+ if (native_pud_val(*pud_p)) {
+ if (native_pud_val(*pud_p) & _PAGE_PSE)
+ goto out;
+
+ pmd_p = (pmd_t *)(native_pud_val(*pud_p) & ~PTE_FLAGS_MASK);
+ } else {
+ pud_t pud;
+
+ pmd_p = pgtable_area;
+ memset(pmd_p, 0, sizeof(*pmd_p) * PTRS_PER_PMD);
+ pgtable_area += sizeof(*pmd_p) * PTRS_PER_PMD;
+
+ pud = native_make_pud((pmdval_t)pmd_p + PUD_FLAGS);
+ native_set_pud(pud_p, pud);
+ }
+
+ pmd_p += pmd_index(vaddr);
+ if (!native_pmd_val(*pmd_p) || !(native_pmd_val(*pmd_p) & _PAGE_PSE))
+ native_set_pmd(pmd_p, native_make_pmd(pmd_val));
+
+out:
+ return pgtable_area;
+}
+
+static unsigned long __init sme_pgtable_calc(unsigned long len)
+{
+ unsigned long p4d_size, pud_size, pmd_size;
+ unsigned long total;
+
+ /*
+ * Perform a relatively simplistic calculation of the pagetable
+ * entries that are needed. That mappings will be covered by 2MB
+ * PMD entries so we can conservatively calculate the required
+ * number of P4D, PUD and PMD structures needed to perform the
+ * mappings. Incrementing the count for each covers the case where
+ * the addresses cross entries.
+ */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) {
+ p4d_size = (ALIGN(len, PGDIR_SIZE) / PGDIR_SIZE) + 1;
+ p4d_size *= sizeof(p4d_t) * PTRS_PER_P4D;
+ pud_size = (ALIGN(len, P4D_SIZE) / P4D_SIZE) + 1;
+ pud_size *= sizeof(pud_t) * PTRS_PER_PUD;
+ } else {
+ p4d_size = 0;
+ pud_size = (ALIGN(len, PGDIR_SIZE) / PGDIR_SIZE) + 1;
+ pud_size *= sizeof(pud_t) * PTRS_PER_PUD;
+ }
+ pmd_size = (ALIGN(len, PUD_SIZE) / PUD_SIZE) + 1;
+ pmd_size *= sizeof(pmd_t) * PTRS_PER_PMD;
+
+ total = p4d_size + pud_size + pmd_size;
+
+ /*
+ * Now calculate the added pagetable structures needed to populate
+ * the new pagetables.
+ */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) {
+ p4d_size = ALIGN(total, PGDIR_SIZE) / PGDIR_SIZE;
+ p4d_size *= sizeof(p4d_t) * PTRS_PER_P4D;
+ pud_size = ALIGN(total, P4D_SIZE) / P4D_SIZE;
+ pud_size *= sizeof(pud_t) * PTRS_PER_PUD;
+ } else {
+ p4d_size = 0;
+ pud_size = ALIGN(total, PGDIR_SIZE) / PGDIR_SIZE;
+ pud_size *= sizeof(pud_t) * PTRS_PER_PUD;
+ }
+ pmd_size = ALIGN(total, PUD_SIZE) / PUD_SIZE;
+ pmd_size *= sizeof(pmd_t) * PTRS_PER_PMD;
+
+ total += p4d_size + pud_size + pmd_size;
+
+ return total;
+}
+
+void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)
+{
+ unsigned long workarea_start, workarea_end, workarea_len;
+ unsigned long execute_start, execute_end, execute_len;
+ unsigned long kernel_start, kernel_end, kernel_len;
+ unsigned long pgtable_area_len;
+ unsigned long paddr, pmd_flags;
+ unsigned long decrypted_base;
+ void *pgtable_area;
+ pgd_t *pgd;
+
+ if (!sme_active())
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Prepare for encrypting the kernel by building new pagetables with
+ * the necessary attributes needed to encrypt the kernel in place.
+ *
+ * One range of virtual addresses will map the memory occupied
+ * by the kernel as encrypted.
+ *
+ * Another range of virtual addresses will map the memory occupied
+ * by the kernel as decrypted and write-protected.
+ *
+ * The use of write-protect attribute will prevent any of the
+ * memory from being cached.
+ */
+
+ /* Physical addresses gives us the identity mapped virtual addresses */
+ kernel_start = __pa_symbol(_text);
+ kernel_end = ALIGN(__pa_symbol(_end), PMD_PAGE_SIZE);
+ kernel_len = kernel_end - kernel_start;
+
+ /* Set the encryption workarea to be immediately after the kernel */
+ workarea_start = kernel_end;
+
+ /*
+ * Calculate required number of workarea bytes needed:
+ * executable encryption area size:
+ * stack page (PAGE_SIZE)
+ * encryption routine page (PAGE_SIZE)
+ * intermediate copy buffer (PMD_PAGE_SIZE)
+ * pagetable structures for the encryption of the kernel
+ * pagetable structures for workarea (in case not currently mapped)
+ */
+ execute_start = workarea_start;
+ execute_end = execute_start + (PAGE_SIZE * 2) + PMD_PAGE_SIZE;
+ execute_len = execute_end - execute_start;
+
+ /*
+ * One PGD for both encrypted and decrypted mappings and a set of
+ * PUDs and PMDs for each of the encrypted and decrypted mappings.
+ */
+ pgtable_area_len = sizeof(pgd_t) * PTRS_PER_PGD;
+ pgtable_area_len += sme_pgtable_calc(execute_end - kernel_start) * 2;
+
+ /* PUDs and PMDs needed in the current pagetables for the workarea */
+ pgtable_area_len += sme_pgtable_calc(execute_len + pgtable_area_len);
+
+ /*
+ * The total workarea includes the executable encryption area and
+ * the pagetable area.
+ */
+ workarea_len = execute_len + pgtable_area_len;
+ workarea_end = workarea_start + workarea_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Set the address to the start of where newly created pagetable
+ * structures (PGDs, PUDs and PMDs) will be allocated. New pagetable
+ * structures are created when the workarea is added to the current
+ * pagetables and when the new encrypted and decrypted kernel
+ * mappings are populated.
+ */
+ pgtable_area = (void *)execute_end;
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure the current pagetable structure has entries for
+ * addressing the workarea.
+ */
+ pgd = (pgd_t *)native_read_cr3_pa();
+ paddr = workarea_start;
+ while (paddr < workarea_end) {
+ pgtable_area = sme_populate_pgd(pgd, pgtable_area,
+ paddr,
+ paddr + PMD_FLAGS);
+
+ paddr += PMD_PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ /* Flush the TLB - no globals so cr3 is enough */
+ native_write_cr3(__native_read_cr3());
+
+ /*
+ * A new pagetable structure is being built to allow for the kernel
+ * to be encrypted. It starts with an empty PGD that will then be
+ * populated with new PUDs and PMDs as the encrypted and decrypted
+ * kernel mappings are created.
+ */
+ pgd = pgtable_area;
+ memset(pgd, 0, sizeof(*pgd) * PTRS_PER_PGD);
+ pgtable_area += sizeof(*pgd) * PTRS_PER_PGD;
+
+ /* Add encrypted kernel (identity) mappings */
+ pmd_flags = PMD_FLAGS | _PAGE_ENC;
+ paddr = kernel_start;
+ while (paddr < kernel_end) {
+ pgtable_area = sme_populate_pgd(pgd, pgtable_area,
+ paddr,
+ paddr + pmd_flags);
+
+ paddr += PMD_PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * A different PGD index/entry must be used to get different
+ * pagetable entries for the decrypted mapping. Choose the next
+ * PGD index and convert it to a virtual address to be used as
+ * the base of the mapping.
+ */
+ decrypted_base = (pgd_index(workarea_end) + 1) & (PTRS_PER_PGD - 1);
+ decrypted_base <<= PGDIR_SHIFT;
+
+ /* Add decrypted, write-protected kernel (non-identity) mappings */
+ pmd_flags = (PMD_FLAGS & ~_PAGE_CACHE_MASK) | (_PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PWT);
+ paddr = kernel_start;
+ while (paddr < kernel_end) {
+ pgtable_area = sme_populate_pgd(pgd, pgtable_area,
+ paddr + decrypted_base,
+ paddr + pmd_flags);
+
+ paddr += PMD_PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ /* Add decrypted workarea mappings to both kernel mappings */
+ paddr = workarea_start;
+ while (paddr < workarea_end) {
+ pgtable_area = sme_populate_pgd(pgd, pgtable_area,
+ paddr,
+ paddr + PMD_FLAGS);
+
+ pgtable_area = sme_populate_pgd(pgd, pgtable_area,
+ paddr + decrypted_base,
+ paddr + PMD_FLAGS);
+
+ paddr += PMD_PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ /* Perform the encryption */
+ sme_encrypt_execute(kernel_start, kernel_start + decrypted_base,
+ kernel_len, workarea_start, (unsigned long)pgd);
+
+ /*
+ * At this point we are running encrypted. Remove the mappings for
+ * the decrypted areas - all that is needed for this is to remove
+ * the PGD entry/entries.
+ */
+ sme_clear_pgd(pgd, kernel_start + decrypted_base,
+ kernel_end + decrypted_base);
+
+ sme_clear_pgd(pgd, workarea_start + decrypted_base,
+ workarea_end + decrypted_base);
+
+ /* Flush the TLB - no globals so cr3 is enough */
+ native_write_cr3(__native_read_cr3());
+}
+
+void __init __nostackprotector sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
+{
+ const char *cmdline_ptr, *cmdline_arg, *cmdline_on, *cmdline_off;
+ unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+ bool active_by_default;
+ unsigned long me_mask;
+ char buffer[16];
+ u64 msr;
+
+ /* Check for the SME support leaf */
+ eax = 0x80000000;
+ ecx = 0;
+ native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ if (eax < 0x8000001f)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Check for the SME feature:
+ * CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX] - Bit 0
+ * Secure Memory Encryption support
+ * CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] - Bits 5:0
+ * Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption
+ */
+ eax = 0x8000001f;
+ ecx = 0;
+ native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ if (!(eax & 1))
+ return;
+
+ me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);
+
+ /* Check if SME is enabled */
+ msr = __rdmsr(MSR_K8_SYSCFG);
+ if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Fixups have not been applied to phys_base yet and we're running
+ * identity mapped, so we must obtain the address to the SME command
+ * line argument data using rip-relative addressing.
+ */
+ asm ("lea sme_cmdline_arg(%%rip), %0"
+ : "=r" (cmdline_arg)
+ : "p" (sme_cmdline_arg));
+ asm ("lea sme_cmdline_on(%%rip), %0"
+ : "=r" (cmdline_on)
+ : "p" (sme_cmdline_on));
+ asm ("lea sme_cmdline_off(%%rip), %0"
+ : "=r" (cmdline_off)
+ : "p" (sme_cmdline_off));
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT))
+ active_by_default = true;
+ else
+ active_by_default = false;
+
+ cmdline_ptr = (const char *)((u64)bp->hdr.cmd_line_ptr |
+ ((u64)bp->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32));
+
+ cmdline_find_option(cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+
+ if (!strncmp(buffer, cmdline_on, sizeof(buffer)))
+ sme_me_mask = me_mask;
+ else if (!strncmp(buffer, cmdline_off, sizeof(buffer)))
+ sme_me_mask = 0;
+ else
+ sme_me_mask = active_by_default ? me_mask : 0;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..730e6d541df1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+/*
+ * AMD Memory Encryption Support
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/pgtable.h>
+#include <asm/page.h>
+#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
+#include <asm/msr-index.h>
+
+ .text
+ .code64
+ENTRY(sme_encrypt_execute)
+
+ /*
+ * Entry parameters:
+ * RDI - virtual address for the encrypted kernel mapping
+ * RSI - virtual address for the decrypted kernel mapping
+ * RDX - length of kernel
+ * RCX - virtual address of the encryption workarea, including:
+ * - stack page (PAGE_SIZE)
+ * - encryption routine page (PAGE_SIZE)
+ * - intermediate copy buffer (PMD_PAGE_SIZE)
+ * R8 - physcial address of the pagetables to use for encryption
+ */
+
+ push %rbp
+ movq %rsp, %rbp /* RBP now has original stack pointer */
+
+ /* Set up a one page stack in the non-encrypted memory area */
+ movq %rcx, %rax /* Workarea stack page */
+ leaq PAGE_SIZE(%rax), %rsp /* Set new stack pointer */
+ addq $PAGE_SIZE, %rax /* Workarea encryption routine */
+
+ push %r12
+ movq %rdi, %r10 /* Encrypted kernel */
+ movq %rsi, %r11 /* Decrypted kernel */
+ movq %rdx, %r12 /* Kernel length */
+
+ /* Copy encryption routine into the workarea */
+ movq %rax, %rdi /* Workarea encryption routine */
+ leaq __enc_copy(%rip), %rsi /* Encryption routine */
+ movq $(.L__enc_copy_end - __enc_copy), %rcx /* Encryption routine length */
+ rep movsb
+
+ /* Setup registers for call */
+ movq %r10, %rdi /* Encrypted kernel */
+ movq %r11, %rsi /* Decrypted kernel */
+ movq %r8, %rdx /* Pagetables used for encryption */
+ movq %r12, %rcx /* Kernel length */
+ movq %rax, %r8 /* Workarea encryption routine */
+ addq $PAGE_SIZE, %r8 /* Workarea intermediate copy buffer */
+
+ call *%rax /* Call the encryption routine */
+
+ pop %r12
+
+ movq %rbp, %rsp /* Restore original stack pointer */
+ pop %rbp
+
+ ret
+ENDPROC(sme_encrypt_execute)
+
+ENTRY(__enc_copy)
+/*
+ * Routine used to encrypt kernel.
+ * This routine must be run outside of the kernel proper since
+ * the kernel will be encrypted during the process. So this
+ * routine is defined here and then copied to an area outside
+ * of the kernel where it will remain and run decrypted
+ * during execution.
+ *
+ * On entry the registers must be:
+ * RDI - virtual address for the encrypted kernel mapping
+ * RSI - virtual address for the decrypted kernel mapping
+ * RDX - address of the pagetables to use for encryption
+ * RCX - length of kernel
+ * R8 - intermediate copy buffer
+ *
+ * RAX - points to this routine
+ *
+ * The kernel will be encrypted by copying from the non-encrypted
+ * kernel space to an intermediate buffer and then copying from the
+ * intermediate buffer back to the encrypted kernel space. The physical
+ * addresses of the two kernel space mappings are the same which
+ * results in the kernel being encrypted "in place".
+ */
+ /* Enable the new page tables */
+ mov %rdx, %cr3
+
+ /* Flush any global TLBs */
+ mov %cr4, %rdx
+ andq $~X86_CR4_PGE, %rdx
+ mov %rdx, %cr4
+ orq $X86_CR4_PGE, %rdx
+ mov %rdx, %cr4
+
+ /* Set the PAT register PA5 entry to write-protect */
+ push %rcx
+ movl $MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, %ecx
+ rdmsr
+ push %rdx /* Save original PAT value */
+ andl $0xffff00ff, %edx /* Clear PA5 */
+ orl $0x00000500, %edx /* Set PA5 to WP */
+ wrmsr
+ pop %rdx /* RDX contains original PAT value */
+ pop %rcx
+
+ movq %rcx, %r9 /* Save kernel length */
+ movq %rdi, %r10 /* Save encrypted kernel address */
+ movq %rsi, %r11 /* Save decrypted kernel address */
+
+ wbinvd /* Invalidate any cache entries */
+
+ /* Copy/encrypt 2MB at a time */
+1:
+ movq %r11, %rsi /* Source - decrypted kernel */
+ movq %r8, %rdi /* Dest - intermediate copy buffer */
+ movq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %rcx /* 2MB length */
+ rep movsb
+
+ movq %r8, %rsi /* Source - intermediate copy buffer */
+ movq %r10, %rdi /* Dest - encrypted kernel */
+ movq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %rcx /* 2MB length */
+ rep movsb
+
+ addq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %r11
+ addq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %r10
+ subq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %r9 /* Kernel length decrement */
+ jnz 1b /* Kernel length not zero? */
+
+ /* Restore PAT register */
+ push %rdx /* Save original PAT value */
+ movl $MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, %ecx
+ rdmsr
+ pop %rdx /* Restore original PAT value */
+ wrmsr
+
+ ret
+.L__enc_copy_end:
+ENDPROC(__enc_copy)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
index a88cfbfbd078..a99679826846 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
@@ -37,21 +37,21 @@ struct va_alignment __read_mostly va_align = {
.flags = -1,
};
-unsigned long tasksize_32bit(void)
+unsigned long task_size_32bit(void)
{
return IA32_PAGE_OFFSET;
}
-unsigned long tasksize_64bit(void)
+unsigned long task_size_64bit(int full_addr_space)
{
- return TASK_SIZE_MAX;
+ return full_addr_space ? TASK_SIZE_MAX : DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW;
}
static unsigned long stack_maxrandom_size(unsigned long task_size)
{
unsigned long max = 0;
if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) {
- max = (-1UL) & __STACK_RND_MASK(task_size == tasksize_32bit());
+ max = (-1UL) & __STACK_RND_MASK(task_size == task_size_32bit());
max <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
arch_pick_mmap_base(&mm->mmap_base, &mm->mmap_legacy_base,
- arch_rnd(mmap64_rnd_bits), tasksize_64bit());
+ arch_rnd(mmap64_rnd_bits), task_size_64bit(0));
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_COMPAT_MMAP_BASES
/*
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
* mmap_base, the compat syscall uses mmap_compat_base.
*/
arch_pick_mmap_base(&mm->mmap_compat_base, &mm->mmap_compat_legacy_base,
- arch_rnd(mmap32_rnd_bits), tasksize_32bit());
+ arch_rnd(mmap32_rnd_bits), task_size_32bit());
#endif
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mpx.c b/arch/x86/mm/mpx.c
index 1c34b767c84c..9ceaa955d2ba 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mpx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mpx.c
@@ -355,10 +355,19 @@ int mpx_enable_management(void)
*/
bd_base = mpx_get_bounds_dir();
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+
+ /* MPX doesn't support addresses above 47 bits yet. */
+ if (find_vma(mm, DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW)) {
+ pr_warn_once("%s (%d): MPX cannot handle addresses "
+ "above 47-bits. Disabling.",
+ current->comm, current->pid);
+ ret = -ENXIO;
+ goto out;
+ }
mm->context.bd_addr = bd_base;
if (mm->context.bd_addr == MPX_INVALID_BOUNDS_DIR)
ret = -ENXIO;
-
+out:
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
return ret;
}
@@ -1030,3 +1039,25 @@ void mpx_notify_unmap(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
if (ret)
force_sig(SIGSEGV, current);
}
+
+/* MPX cannot handle addresses above 47 bits yet. */
+unsigned long mpx_unmapped_area_check(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ if (!kernel_managing_mpx_tables(current->mm))
+ return addr;
+ if (addr + len <= DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW)
+ return addr;
+ if (flags & MAP_FIXED)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /*
+ * Requested len is larger than the whole area we're allowed to map in.
+ * Resetting hinting address wouldn't do much good -- fail early.
+ */
+ if (len > DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* Look for unmap area within DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW */
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
index 757b0bcdf712..dfb7d657cf43 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
@@ -1775,6 +1775,70 @@ int set_memory_4k(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
__pgprot(0), 1, 0, NULL);
}
+static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
+{
+ struct cpa_data cpa;
+ unsigned long start;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Nothing to do if the SME is not active */
+ if (!sme_active())
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Should not be working on unaligned addresses */
+ if (WARN_ONCE(addr & ~PAGE_MASK, "misaligned address: %#lx\n", addr))
+ addr &= PAGE_MASK;
+
+ start = addr;
+
+ memset(&cpa, 0, sizeof(cpa));
+ cpa.vaddr = &addr;
+ cpa.numpages = numpages;
+ cpa.mask_set = enc ? __pgprot(_PAGE_ENC) : __pgprot(0);
+ cpa.mask_clr = enc ? __pgprot(0) : __pgprot(_PAGE_ENC);
+ cpa.pgd = init_mm.pgd;
+
+ /* Must avoid aliasing mappings in the highmem code */
+ kmap_flush_unused();
+ vm_unmap_aliases();
+
+ /*
+ * Before changing the encryption attribute, we need to flush caches.
+ */
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSH))
+ cpa_flush_range(start, numpages, 1);
+ else
+ cpa_flush_all(1);
+
+ ret = __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 1);
+
+ /*
+ * After changing the encryption attribute, we need to flush TLBs
+ * again in case any speculative TLB caching occurred (but no need
+ * to flush caches again). We could just use cpa_flush_all(), but
+ * in case TLB flushing gets optimized in the cpa_flush_range()
+ * path use the same logic as above.
+ */
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSH))
+ cpa_flush_range(start, numpages, 0);
+ else
+ cpa_flush_all(0);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
+{
+ return __set_memory_enc_dec(addr, numpages, true);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(set_memory_encrypted);
+
+int set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
+{
+ return __set_memory_enc_dec(addr, numpages, false);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(set_memory_decrypted);
+
int set_pages_uc(struct page *page, int numpages)
{
unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page);
@@ -2020,6 +2084,9 @@ int kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd_t *pgd, u64 pfn, unsigned long address,
if (!(page_flags & _PAGE_RW))
cpa.mask_clr = __pgprot(_PAGE_RW);
+ if (!(page_flags & _PAGE_ENC))
+ cpa.mask_clr = pgprot_encrypted(cpa.mask_clr);
+
cpa.mask_set = __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | page_flags);
retval = __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 0);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat.c
index 45979502f64b..fe7d57a8fb60 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat.c
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ void init_cache_modes(void)
* pat_init - Initialize PAT MSR and PAT table
*
* This function initializes PAT MSR and PAT table with an OS-defined value
- * to enable additional cache attributes, WC and WT.
+ * to enable additional cache attributes, WC, WT and WP.
*
* This function must be called on all CPUs using the specific sequence of
* operations defined in Intel SDM. mtrr_rendezvous_handler() provides this
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ void pat_init(void)
* 010 2 UC-: _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_UC_MINUS
* 011 3 UC : _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_UC
* 100 4 WB : Reserved
- * 101 5 WC : Reserved
+ * 101 5 WP : _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP
* 110 6 UC-: Reserved
* 111 7 WT : _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WT
*
@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ void pat_init(void)
* corresponding types in the presence of PAT errata.
*/
pat = PAT(0, WB) | PAT(1, WC) | PAT(2, UC_MINUS) | PAT(3, UC) |
- PAT(4, WB) | PAT(5, WC) | PAT(6, UC_MINUS) | PAT(7, WT);
+ PAT(4, WB) | PAT(5, WP) | PAT(6, UC_MINUS) | PAT(7, WT);
}
if (!boot_cpu_done) {
@@ -744,6 +744,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(arch_io_free_memtype_wc);
pgprot_t phys_mem_access_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long pfn,
unsigned long size, pgprot_t vma_prot)
{
+ if (!phys_mem_access_encrypted(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT, size))
+ vma_prot = pgprot_decrypted(vma_prot);
+
return vma_prot;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index 508a708eb9a6..218834a3e9ad 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ void ___pte_free_tlb(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct page *pte)
{
pgtable_page_dtor(pte);
paravirt_release_pte(page_to_pfn(pte));
- tlb_remove_page(tlb, pte);
+ tlb_remove_table(tlb, pte);
}
#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 2
@@ -72,21 +72,21 @@ void ___pmd_free_tlb(struct mmu_gather *tlb, pmd_t *pmd)
tlb->need_flush_all = 1;
#endif
pgtable_pmd_page_dtor(page);
- tlb_remove_page(tlb, page);
+ tlb_remove_table(tlb, page);
}
#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 3
void ___pud_free_tlb(struct mmu_gather *tlb, pud_t *pud)
{
paravirt_release_pud(__pa(pud) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
- tlb_remove_page(tlb, virt_to_page(pud));
+ tlb_remove_table(tlb, virt_to_page(pud));
}
#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 4
void ___p4d_free_tlb(struct mmu_gather *tlb, p4d_t *p4d)
{
paravirt_release_p4d(__pa(p4d) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
- tlb_remove_page(tlb, virt_to_page(p4d));
+ tlb_remove_table(tlb, virt_to_page(p4d));
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 4 */
#endif /* CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 3 */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
index 014d07a80053..ce104b962a17 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
@@ -28,6 +28,42 @@
* Implement flush IPI by CALL_FUNCTION_VECTOR, Alex Shi
*/
+atomic64_t last_mm_ctx_id = ATOMIC64_INIT(1);
+
+static void choose_new_asid(struct mm_struct *next, u64 next_tlb_gen,
+ u16 *new_asid, bool *need_flush)
+{
+ u16 asid;
+
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID)) {
+ *new_asid = 0;
+ *need_flush = true;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ for (asid = 0; asid < TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS; asid++) {
+ if (this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[asid].ctx_id) !=
+ next->context.ctx_id)
+ continue;
+
+ *new_asid = asid;
+ *need_flush = (this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[asid].tlb_gen) <
+ next_tlb_gen);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We don't currently own an ASID slot on this CPU.
+ * Allocate a slot.
+ */
+ *new_asid = this_cpu_add_return(cpu_tlbstate.next_asid, 1) - 1;
+ if (*new_asid >= TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS) {
+ *new_asid = 0;
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.next_asid, 1);
+ }
+ *need_flush = true;
+}
+
void leave_mm(int cpu)
{
struct mm_struct *loaded_mm = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm);
@@ -43,12 +79,11 @@ void leave_mm(int cpu)
if (loaded_mm == &init_mm)
return;
- if (this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.state) == TLBSTATE_OK)
- BUG();
+ /* Warn if we're not lazy. */
+ WARN_ON(cpumask_test_cpu(smp_processor_id(), mm_cpumask(loaded_mm)));
switch_mm(NULL, &init_mm, NULL);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(leave_mm);
void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
struct task_struct *tsk)
@@ -63,115 +98,219 @@ void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
struct task_struct *tsk)
{
- unsigned cpu = smp_processor_id();
struct mm_struct *real_prev = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm);
+ u16 prev_asid = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid);
+ unsigned cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ u64 next_tlb_gen;
/*
- * NB: The scheduler will call us with prev == next when
- * switching from lazy TLB mode to normal mode if active_mm
- * isn't changing. When this happens, there is no guarantee
- * that CR3 (and hence cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm) matches next.
+ * NB: The scheduler will call us with prev == next when switching
+ * from lazy TLB mode to normal mode if active_mm isn't changing.
+ * When this happens, we don't assume that CR3 (and hence
+ * cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm) matches next.
*
* NB: leave_mm() calls us with prev == NULL and tsk == NULL.
*/
- this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.state, TLBSTATE_OK);
+ /* We don't want flush_tlb_func_* to run concurrently with us. */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING))
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!irqs_disabled());
+
+ /*
+ * Verify that CR3 is what we think it is. This will catch
+ * hypothetical buggy code that directly switches to swapper_pg_dir
+ * without going through leave_mm() / switch_mm_irqs_off() or that
+ * does something like write_cr3(read_cr3_pa()).
+ */
+ VM_BUG_ON(__read_cr3() != (__sme_pa(real_prev->pgd) | prev_asid));
if (real_prev == next) {
- /*
- * There's nothing to do: we always keep the per-mm control
- * regs in sync with cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm. Just
- * sanity-check mm_cpumask.
- */
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next))))
- cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next));
- return;
- }
+ VM_BUG_ON(this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[prev_asid].ctx_id) !=
+ next->context.ctx_id);
+
+ if (cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next))) {
+ /*
+ * There's nothing to do: we weren't lazy, and we
+ * aren't changing our mm. We don't need to flush
+ * anything, nor do we need to update CR3, CR4, or
+ * LDTR.
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Resume remote flushes and then read tlb_gen. */
+ cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next));
+ next_tlb_gen = atomic64_read(&next->context.tlb_gen);
+
+ if (this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[prev_asid].tlb_gen) <
+ next_tlb_gen) {
+ /*
+ * Ideally, we'd have a flush_tlb() variant that
+ * takes the known CR3 value as input. This would
+ * be faster on Xen PV and on hypothetical CPUs
+ * on which INVPCID is fast.
+ */
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[prev_asid].tlb_gen,
+ next_tlb_gen);
+ write_cr3(__sme_pa(next->pgd) | prev_asid);
+ trace_tlb_flush(TLB_FLUSH_ON_TASK_SWITCH,
+ TLB_FLUSH_ALL);
+ }
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) {
/*
- * If our current stack is in vmalloc space and isn't
- * mapped in the new pgd, we'll double-fault. Forcibly
- * map it.
+ * We just exited lazy mode, which means that CR4 and/or LDTR
+ * may be stale. (Changes to the required CR4 and LDTR states
+ * are not reflected in tlb_gen.)
*/
- unsigned int stack_pgd_index = pgd_index(current_stack_pointer());
-
- pgd_t *pgd = next->pgd + stack_pgd_index;
-
- if (unlikely(pgd_none(*pgd)))
- set_pgd(pgd, init_mm.pgd[stack_pgd_index]);
- }
+ } else {
+ u16 new_asid;
+ bool need_flush;
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) {
+ /*
+ * If our current stack is in vmalloc space and isn't
+ * mapped in the new pgd, we'll double-fault. Forcibly
+ * map it.
+ */
+ unsigned int index = pgd_index(current_stack_pointer());
+ pgd_t *pgd = next->pgd + index;
+
+ if (unlikely(pgd_none(*pgd)))
+ set_pgd(pgd, init_mm.pgd[index]);
+ }
- this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm, next);
+ /* Stop remote flushes for the previous mm */
+ if (cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(real_prev)))
+ cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(real_prev));
- WARN_ON_ONCE(cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next)));
- cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next));
+ VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next)));
- /*
- * Re-load page tables.
- *
- * This logic has an ordering constraint:
- *
- * CPU 0: Write to a PTE for 'next'
- * CPU 0: load bit 1 in mm_cpumask. if nonzero, send IPI.
- * CPU 1: set bit 1 in next's mm_cpumask
- * CPU 1: load from the PTE that CPU 0 writes (implicit)
- *
- * We need to prevent an outcome in which CPU 1 observes
- * the new PTE value and CPU 0 observes bit 1 clear in
- * mm_cpumask. (If that occurs, then the IPI will never
- * be sent, and CPU 0's TLB will contain a stale entry.)
- *
- * The bad outcome can occur if either CPU's load is
- * reordered before that CPU's store, so both CPUs must
- * execute full barriers to prevent this from happening.
- *
- * Thus, switch_mm needs a full barrier between the
- * store to mm_cpumask and any operation that could load
- * from next->pgd. TLB fills are special and can happen
- * due to instruction fetches or for no reason at all,
- * and neither LOCK nor MFENCE orders them.
- * Fortunately, load_cr3() is serializing and gives the
- * ordering guarantee we need.
- */
- load_cr3(next->pgd);
-
- /*
- * This gets called via leave_mm() in the idle path where RCU
- * functions differently. Tracing normally uses RCU, so we have to
- * call the tracepoint specially here.
- */
- trace_tlb_flush_rcuidle(TLB_FLUSH_ON_TASK_SWITCH, TLB_FLUSH_ALL);
+ /*
+ * Start remote flushes and then read tlb_gen.
+ */
+ cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next));
+ next_tlb_gen = atomic64_read(&next->context.tlb_gen);
+
+ choose_new_asid(next, next_tlb_gen, &new_asid, &need_flush);
+
+ if (need_flush) {
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[new_asid].ctx_id, next->context.ctx_id);
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[new_asid].tlb_gen, next_tlb_gen);
+ write_cr3(__sme_pa(next->pgd) | new_asid);
+ trace_tlb_flush(TLB_FLUSH_ON_TASK_SWITCH,
+ TLB_FLUSH_ALL);
+ } else {
+ /* The new ASID is already up to date. */
+ write_cr3(__sme_pa(next->pgd) | new_asid | CR3_NOFLUSH);
+ trace_tlb_flush(TLB_FLUSH_ON_TASK_SWITCH, 0);
+ }
- /* Stop flush ipis for the previous mm */
- WARN_ON_ONCE(!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(real_prev)) &&
- real_prev != &init_mm);
- cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(real_prev));
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm, next);
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid, new_asid);
+ }
- /* Load per-mm CR4 and LDTR state */
load_mm_cr4(next);
switch_ldt(real_prev, next);
}
+/*
+ * flush_tlb_func_common()'s memory ordering requirement is that any
+ * TLB fills that happen after we flush the TLB are ordered after we
+ * read active_mm's tlb_gen. We don't need any explicit barriers
+ * because all x86 flush operations are serializing and the
+ * atomic64_read operation won't be reordered by the compiler.
+ */
static void flush_tlb_func_common(const struct flush_tlb_info *f,
bool local, enum tlb_flush_reason reason)
{
+ /*
+ * We have three different tlb_gen values in here. They are:
+ *
+ * - mm_tlb_gen: the latest generation.
+ * - local_tlb_gen: the generation that this CPU has already caught
+ * up to.
+ * - f->new_tlb_gen: the generation that the requester of the flush
+ * wants us to catch up to.
+ */
+ struct mm_struct *loaded_mm = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm);
+ u32 loaded_mm_asid = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid);
+ u64 mm_tlb_gen = atomic64_read(&loaded_mm->context.tlb_gen);
+ u64 local_tlb_gen = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[loaded_mm_asid].tlb_gen);
+
/* This code cannot presently handle being reentered. */
VM_WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
- if (this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.state) != TLBSTATE_OK) {
- leave_mm(smp_processor_id());
+ VM_WARN_ON(this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[loaded_mm_asid].ctx_id) !=
+ loaded_mm->context.ctx_id);
+
+ if (!cpumask_test_cpu(smp_processor_id(), mm_cpumask(loaded_mm))) {
+ /*
+ * We're in lazy mode -- don't flush. We can get here on
+ * remote flushes due to races and on local flushes if a
+ * kernel thread coincidentally flushes the mm it's lazily
+ * still using.
+ */
return;
}
- if (f->end == TLB_FLUSH_ALL) {
- local_flush_tlb();
- if (local)
- count_vm_tlb_event(NR_TLB_LOCAL_FLUSH_ALL);
- trace_tlb_flush(reason, TLB_FLUSH_ALL);
- } else {
+ if (unlikely(local_tlb_gen == mm_tlb_gen)) {
+ /*
+ * There's nothing to do: we're already up to date. This can
+ * happen if two concurrent flushes happen -- the first flush to
+ * be handled can catch us all the way up, leaving no work for
+ * the second flush.
+ */
+ trace_tlb_flush(reason, 0);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(local_tlb_gen > mm_tlb_gen);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(f->new_tlb_gen > mm_tlb_gen);
+
+ /*
+ * If we get to this point, we know that our TLB is out of date.
+ * This does not strictly imply that we need to flush (it's
+ * possible that f->new_tlb_gen <= local_tlb_gen), but we're
+ * going to need to flush in the very near future, so we might
+ * as well get it over with.
+ *
+ * The only question is whether to do a full or partial flush.
+ *
+ * We do a partial flush if requested and two extra conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. f->new_tlb_gen == local_tlb_gen + 1. We have an invariant that
+ * we've always done all needed flushes to catch up to
+ * local_tlb_gen. If, for example, local_tlb_gen == 2 and
+ * f->new_tlb_gen == 3, then we know that the flush needed to bring
+ * us up to date for tlb_gen 3 is the partial flush we're
+ * processing.
+ *
+ * As an example of why this check is needed, suppose that there
+ * are two concurrent flushes. The first is a full flush that
+ * changes context.tlb_gen from 1 to 2. The second is a partial
+ * flush that changes context.tlb_gen from 2 to 3. If they get
+ * processed on this CPU in reverse order, we'll see
+ * local_tlb_gen == 1, mm_tlb_gen == 3, and end != TLB_FLUSH_ALL.
+ * If we were to use __flush_tlb_single() and set local_tlb_gen to
+ * 3, we'd be break the invariant: we'd update local_tlb_gen above
+ * 1 without the full flush that's needed for tlb_gen 2.
+ *
+ * 2. f->new_tlb_gen == mm_tlb_gen. This is purely an optimiation.
+ * Partial TLB flushes are not all that much cheaper than full TLB
+ * flushes, so it seems unlikely that it would be a performance win
+ * to do a partial flush if that won't bring our TLB fully up to
+ * date. By doing a full flush instead, we can increase
+ * local_tlb_gen all the way to mm_tlb_gen and we can probably
+ * avoid another flush in the very near future.
+ */
+ if (f->end != TLB_FLUSH_ALL &&
+ f->new_tlb_gen == local_tlb_gen + 1 &&
+ f->new_tlb_gen == mm_tlb_gen) {
+ /* Partial flush */
unsigned long addr;
unsigned long nr_pages = (f->end - f->start) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+
addr = f->start;
while (addr < f->end) {
__flush_tlb_single(addr);
@@ -180,7 +319,16 @@ static void flush_tlb_func_common(const struct flush_tlb_info *f,
if (local)
count_vm_tlb_events(NR_TLB_LOCAL_FLUSH_ONE, nr_pages);
trace_tlb_flush(reason, nr_pages);
+ } else {
+ /* Full flush. */
+ local_flush_tlb();
+ if (local)
+ count_vm_tlb_event(NR_TLB_LOCAL_FLUSH_ALL);
+ trace_tlb_flush(reason, TLB_FLUSH_ALL);
}
+
+ /* Both paths above update our state to mm_tlb_gen. */
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[loaded_mm_asid].tlb_gen, mm_tlb_gen);
}
static void flush_tlb_func_local(void *info, enum tlb_flush_reason reason)
@@ -214,6 +362,21 @@ void native_flush_tlb_others(const struct cpumask *cpumask,
(info->end - info->start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
if (is_uv_system()) {
+ /*
+ * This whole special case is confused. UV has a "Broadcast
+ * Assist Unit", which seems to be a fancy way to send IPIs.
+ * Back when x86 used an explicit TLB flush IPI, UV was
+ * optimized to use its own mechanism. These days, x86 uses
+ * smp_call_function_many(), but UV still uses a manual IPI,
+ * and that IPI's action is out of date -- it does a manual
+ * flush instead of calling flush_tlb_func_remote(). This
+ * means that the percpu tlb_gen variables won't be updated
+ * and we'll do pointless flushes on future context switches.
+ *
+ * Rather than hooking native_flush_tlb_others() here, I think
+ * that UV should be updated so that smp_call_function_many(),
+ * etc, are optimal on UV.
+ */
unsigned int cpu;
cpu = smp_processor_id();
@@ -250,8 +413,8 @@ void flush_tlb_mm_range(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start,
cpu = get_cpu();
- /* Synchronize with switch_mm. */
- smp_mb();
+ /* This is also a barrier that synchronizes with switch_mm(). */
+ info.new_tlb_gen = inc_mm_tlb_gen(mm);
/* Should we flush just the requested range? */
if ((end != TLB_FLUSH_ALL) &&
@@ -273,6 +436,7 @@ void flush_tlb_mm_range(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start,
if (cpumask_any_but(mm_cpumask(mm), cpu) < nr_cpu_ids)
flush_tlb_others(mm_cpumask(mm), &info);
+
put_cpu();
}
@@ -281,8 +445,6 @@ static void do_flush_tlb_all(void *info)
{
count_vm_tlb_event(NR_TLB_REMOTE_FLUSH_RECEIVED);
__flush_tlb_all();
- if (this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.state) == TLBSTATE_LAZY)
- leave_mm(smp_processor_id());
}
void flush_tlb_all(void)
@@ -335,6 +497,7 @@ void arch_tlbbatch_flush(struct arch_tlbflush_unmap_batch *batch)
if (cpumask_any_but(&batch->cpumask, cpu) < nr_cpu_ids)
flush_tlb_others(&batch->cpumask, &info);
+
cpumask_clear(&batch->cpumask);
put_cpu();
diff --git a/arch/x86/pci/common.c b/arch/x86/pci/common.c
index dbe2132b0ed4..7a5350d08cef 100644
--- a/arch/x86/pci/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/pci/common.c
@@ -674,7 +674,7 @@ int pcibios_add_device(struct pci_dev *dev)
pa_data = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
while (pa_data) {
- data = ioremap(pa_data, sizeof(*rom));
+ data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*rom), MEMREMAP_WB);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -693,7 +693,7 @@ int pcibios_add_device(struct pci_dev *dev)
}
}
pa_data = data->next;
- iounmap(data);
+ memunmap(data);
}
set_dma_domain_ops(dev);
set_dev_domain_options(dev);
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
index f084d8718ac4..6217b23e85f6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
@@ -1035,12 +1035,12 @@ void __init efi_enter_virtual_mode(void)
/*
* Convenience functions to obtain memory types and attributes
*/
-u32 efi_mem_type(unsigned long phys_addr)
+int efi_mem_type(unsigned long phys_addr)
{
efi_memory_desc_t *md;
if (!efi_enabled(EFI_MEMMAP))
- return 0;
+ return -ENOTSUPP;
for_each_efi_memory_desc(md) {
if ((md->phys_addr <= phys_addr) &&
@@ -1048,7 +1048,7 @@ u32 efi_mem_type(unsigned long phys_addr)
(md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT))))
return md->type;
}
- return 0;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
static int __init arch_parse_efi_cmdline(char *str)
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
index 9bf72f5bfedb..12e83888e5b9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ virt_to_phys_or_null_size(void *va, unsigned long size)
int __init efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages)
{
- unsigned long pfn, text;
+ unsigned long pfn, text, pf;
struct page *page;
unsigned npages;
pgd_t *pgd;
@@ -335,7 +335,12 @@ int __init efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages)
if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP))
return 0;
- efi_scratch.efi_pgt = (pgd_t *)__pa(efi_pgd);
+ /*
+ * Since the PGD is encrypted, set the encryption mask so that when
+ * this value is loaded into cr3 the PGD will be decrypted during
+ * the pagetable walk.
+ */
+ efi_scratch.efi_pgt = (pgd_t *)__sme_pa(efi_pgd);
pgd = efi_pgd;
/*
@@ -345,7 +350,8 @@ int __init efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages)
* phys_efi_set_virtual_address_map().
*/
pfn = pa_memmap >> PAGE_SHIFT;
- if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, pa_memmap, num_pages, _PAGE_NX | _PAGE_RW)) {
+ pf = _PAGE_NX | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ENC;
+ if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, pa_memmap, num_pages, pf)) {
pr_err("Error ident-mapping new memmap (0x%lx)!\n", pa_memmap);
return 1;
}
@@ -388,7 +394,8 @@ int __init efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages)
text = __pa(_text);
pfn = text >> PAGE_SHIFT;
- if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, text, npages, _PAGE_RW)) {
+ pf = _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ENC;
+ if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, text, npages, pf)) {
pr_err("Failed to map kernel text 1:1\n");
return 1;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
index cd4be19c36dc..1f71980fc5e0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
@@ -59,6 +60,13 @@ static void __init setup_real_mode(void)
base = (unsigned char *)real_mode_header;
+ /*
+ * If SME is active, the trampoline area will need to be in
+ * decrypted memory in order to bring up other processors
+ * successfully.
+ */
+ set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)base, size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+
memcpy(base, real_mode_blob, size);
phys_base = __pa(base);
@@ -100,6 +108,10 @@ static void __init setup_real_mode(void)
trampoline_cr4_features = &trampoline_header->cr4;
*trampoline_cr4_features = mmu_cr4_features;
+ trampoline_header->flags = 0;
+ if (sme_active())
+ trampoline_header->flags |= TH_FLAGS_SME_ACTIVE;
+
trampoline_pgd = (u64 *) __va(real_mode_header->trampoline_pgd);
trampoline_pgd[0] = trampoline_pgd_entry.pgd;
trampoline_pgd[511] = init_top_pgt[511].pgd;
diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
index dac7b20d2f9d..614fd7064d0a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/segment.h>
#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
+#include <asm/realmode.h>
#include "realmode.h"
.text
@@ -92,6 +93,28 @@ ENTRY(startup_32)
movl %edx, %fs
movl %edx, %gs
+ /*
+ * Check for memory encryption support. This is a safety net in
+ * case BIOS hasn't done the necessary step of setting the bit in
+ * the MSR for this AP. If SME is active and we've gotten this far
+ * then it is safe for us to set the MSR bit and continue. If we
+ * don't we'll eventually crash trying to execute encrypted
+ * instructions.
+ */
+ bt $TH_FLAGS_SME_ACTIVE_BIT, pa_tr_flags
+ jnc .Ldone
+ movl $MSR_K8_SYSCFG, %ecx
+ rdmsr
+ bts $MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT, %eax
+ jc .Ldone
+
+ /*
+ * Memory encryption is enabled but the SME enable bit for this
+ * CPU has has not been set. It is safe to set it, so do so.
+ */
+ wrmsr
+.Ldone:
+
movl pa_tr_cr4, %eax
movl %eax, %cr4 # Enable PAE mode
@@ -147,6 +170,7 @@ GLOBAL(trampoline_header)
tr_start: .space 8
GLOBAL(tr_efer) .space 8
GLOBAL(tr_cr4) .space 4
+ GLOBAL(tr_flags) .space 4
END(trampoline_header)
#include "trampoline_common.S"
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/Kconfig b/arch/x86/xen/Kconfig
index 027987638e98..1ecd419811a2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/Kconfig
@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ config XEN_PV
bool "Xen PV guest support"
default y
depends on XEN
+ # XEN_PV is not ready to work with 5-level paging.
+ # Changes to hypervisor are also required.
+ depends on !X86_5LEVEL
select XEN_HAVE_PVMMU
select XEN_HAVE_VPMU
help
@@ -75,4 +78,6 @@ config XEN_DEBUG_FS
config XEN_PVH
bool "Support for running as a PVH guest"
depends on XEN && XEN_PVHVM && ACPI
+ # Pre-built page tables are not ready to handle 5-level paging.
+ depends on !X86_5LEVEL
def_bool n
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
index 98491521bb43..6c279c8f0a0e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
@@ -263,6 +263,13 @@ static void __init xen_init_capabilities(void)
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_MTRR);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ACC);
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_X2APIC);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SME);
+
+ /*
+ * Xen PV would need some work to support PCID: CR3 handling as well
+ * as xen_flush_tlb_others() would need updating.
+ */
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PCID);
if (!xen_initial_domain())
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ACPI);
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c
index cab28cf2cffb..e437714750f8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c
@@ -1005,14 +1005,12 @@ static void xen_drop_mm_ref(struct mm_struct *mm)
/* Get the "official" set of cpus referring to our pagetable. */
if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&mask, GFP_ATOMIC)) {
for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
- if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(mm))
- && per_cpu(xen_current_cr3, cpu) != __pa(mm->pgd))
+ if (per_cpu(xen_current_cr3, cpu) != __pa(mm->pgd))
continue;
smp_call_function_single(cpu, drop_mm_ref_this_cpu, mm, 1);
}
return;
}
- cpumask_copy(mask, mm_cpumask(mm));
/*
* It's possible that a vcpu may have a stale reference to our
@@ -1021,6 +1019,7 @@ static void xen_drop_mm_ref(struct mm_struct *mm)
* look at its actual current cr3 value, and force it to flush
* if needed.
*/
+ cpumask_clear(mask);
for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
if (per_cpu(xen_current_cr3, cpu) == __pa(mm->pgd))
cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, mask);
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S
index 72a8e6adebe6..a7525e95d53f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ ENTRY(hypercall_page)
#else
ELFNOTE(Xen, XEN_ELFNOTE_VIRT_BASE, _ASM_PTR __START_KERNEL_map)
/* Map the p2m table to a 512GB-aligned user address. */
- ELFNOTE(Xen, XEN_ELFNOTE_INIT_P2M, .quad PGDIR_SIZE)
+ ELFNOTE(Xen, XEN_ELFNOTE_INIT_P2M, .quad (PUD_SIZE * PTRS_PER_PUD))
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
ELFNOTE(Xen, XEN_ELFNOTE_ENTRY, _ASM_PTR startup_xen)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c b/drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c
index 5c8aa9cf62d7..fe3d2a40f311 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c
@@ -708,8 +708,6 @@ static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(c3_lock);
static void acpi_idle_enter_bm(struct acpi_processor *pr,
struct acpi_processor_cx *cx, bool timer_bc)
{
- acpi_unlazy_tlb(smp_processor_id());
-
/*
* Must be done before busmaster disable as we might need to
* access HPET !
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/dmi-sysfs.c b/drivers/firmware/dmi-sysfs.c
index ef76e5eecf0b..d5de6ee8466d 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/dmi-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/dmi-sysfs.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <asm/dmi.h>
#define MAX_ENTRY_TYPE 255 /* Most of these aren't used, but we consider
the top entry type is only 8 bits */
@@ -380,7 +381,7 @@ static ssize_t dmi_sel_raw_read_phys32(struct dmi_sysfs_entry *entry,
u8 __iomem *mapped;
ssize_t wrote = 0;
- mapped = ioremap(sel->access_method_address, sel->area_length);
+ mapped = dmi_remap(sel->access_method_address, sel->area_length);
if (!mapped)
return -EIO;
@@ -390,7 +391,7 @@ static ssize_t dmi_sel_raw_read_phys32(struct dmi_sysfs_entry *entry,
wrote++;
}
- iounmap(mapped);
+ dmi_unmap(mapped);
return wrote;
}
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
index 045d6d311bde..69d4d130e055 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
@@ -55,6 +55,25 @@ struct efi __read_mostly efi = {
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL(efi);
+static unsigned long *efi_tables[] = {
+ &efi.mps,
+ &efi.acpi,
+ &efi.acpi20,
+ &efi.smbios,
+ &efi.smbios3,
+ &efi.sal_systab,
+ &efi.boot_info,
+ &efi.hcdp,
+ &efi.uga,
+ &efi.uv_systab,
+ &efi.fw_vendor,
+ &efi.runtime,
+ &efi.config_table,
+ &efi.esrt,
+ &efi.properties_table,
+ &efi.mem_attr_table,
+};
+
static bool disable_runtime;
static int __init setup_noefi(char *arg)
{
@@ -855,6 +874,20 @@ int efi_status_to_err(efi_status_t status)
return err;
}
+bool efi_is_table_address(unsigned long phys_addr)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ if (phys_addr == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR)
+ return false;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(efi_tables); i++)
+ if (*(efi_tables[i]) == phys_addr)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC
static int update_efi_random_seed(struct notifier_block *nb,
unsigned long code, void *unused)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/pcdp.c b/drivers/firmware/pcdp.c
index 75273a251603..e83d6aec0c13 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/pcdp.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/pcdp.c
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *cmdline)
if (efi.hcdp == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR)
return -ENODEV;
- pcdp = early_ioremap(efi.hcdp, 4096);
+ pcdp = early_memremap(efi.hcdp, 4096);
printk(KERN_INFO "PCDP: v%d at 0x%lx\n", pcdp->rev, efi.hcdp);
if (strstr(cmdline, "console=hcdp")) {
@@ -131,6 +131,6 @@ efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *cmdline)
}
out:
- early_iounmap(pcdp, 4096);
+ early_memunmap(pcdp, 4096);
return rc;
}
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem.c
index 88c6d78ee2d5..c55f338e380b 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
#include <linux/dma-buf.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <drm/drmP.h>
#include <drm/drm_vma_manager.h>
#include <drm/drm_gem.h>
@@ -965,6 +966,7 @@ int drm_gem_mmap_obj(struct drm_gem_object *obj, unsigned long obj_size,
vma->vm_ops = dev->driver->gem_vm_ops;
vma->vm_private_data = obj;
vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_writecombine(vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags));
+ vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_decrypted(vma->vm_page_prot);
/* Take a ref for this mapping of the object, so that the fault
* handler can dereference the mmap offset's pointer to the object.
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_vm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_vm.c
index 13a59ed2afbc..2660543ad86a 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_vm.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_vm.c
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#endif
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include "drm_internal.h"
#include "drm_legacy.h"
@@ -58,6 +59,9 @@ static pgprot_t drm_io_prot(struct drm_local_map *map,
{
pgprot_t tmp = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags);
+ /* We don't want graphics memory to be mapped encrypted */
+ tmp = pgprot_decrypted(tmp);
+
#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__powerpc__)
if (map->type == _DRM_REGISTERS && !(map->flags & _DRM_WRITE_COMBINING))
tmp = pgprot_noncached(tmp);
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo_vm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo_vm.c
index a01e5c90fd87..c8ebb757e36b 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo_vm.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo_vm.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
#include <linux/rbtree.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#define TTM_BO_VM_NUM_PREFAULT 16
@@ -230,9 +231,11 @@ static int ttm_bo_vm_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
* first page.
*/
for (i = 0; i < TTM_BO_VM_NUM_PREFAULT; ++i) {
- if (bo->mem.bus.is_iomem)
+ if (bo->mem.bus.is_iomem) {
+ /* Iomem should not be marked encrypted */
+ cvma.vm_page_prot = pgprot_decrypted(cvma.vm_page_prot);
pfn = bdev->driver->io_mem_pfn(bo, page_offset);
- else {
+ } else {
page = ttm->pages[page_offset];
if (unlikely(!page && i == 0)) {
retval = VM_FAULT_OOM;
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_fb.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_fb.c
index b7ca90db4e80..b5b335c9b2bb 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_fb.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_fb.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/fb.h>
#include <linux/dma-buf.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <drm/drmP.h>
#include <drm/drm_crtc.h>
@@ -169,6 +170,9 @@ static int udl_fb_mmap(struct fb_info *info, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
pr_notice("mmap() framebuffer addr:%lu size:%lu\n",
pos, size);
+ /* We don't want the framebuffer to be mapped encrypted */
+ vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_decrypted(vma->vm_page_prot);
+
while (size > 0) {
page = vmalloc_to_pfn((void *)pos);
if (remap_pfn_range(vma, start, page, PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SHARED))
diff --git a/drivers/idle/intel_idle.c b/drivers/idle/intel_idle.c
index c2ae819a871c..e87ffb3c31a9 100644
--- a/drivers/idle/intel_idle.c
+++ b/drivers/idle/intel_idle.c
@@ -913,16 +913,15 @@ static __cpuidle int intel_idle(struct cpuidle_device *dev,
struct cpuidle_state *state = &drv->states[index];
unsigned long eax = flg2MWAIT(state->flags);
unsigned int cstate;
- int cpu = smp_processor_id();
cstate = (((eax) >> MWAIT_SUBSTATE_SIZE) & MWAIT_CSTATE_MASK) + 1;
/*
- * leave_mm() to avoid costly and often unnecessary wakeups
- * for flushing the user TLB's associated with the active mm.
+ * NB: if CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED is set, this idle transition
+ * will probably flush the TLB. It's not guaranteed to flush
+ * the TLB, though, so it's not clear that we can do anything
+ * useful with this knowledge.
*/
- if (state->flags & CPUIDLE_FLAG_TLB_FLUSHED)
- leave_mm(cpu);
if (!(lapic_timer_reliable_states & (1 << (cstate))))
tick_broadcast_enter();
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c
index 354cbd6392cd..4ad7e5e31943 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c
@@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ static void dump_dte_entry(u16 devid)
static void dump_command(unsigned long phys_addr)
{
- struct iommu_cmd *cmd = phys_to_virt(phys_addr);
+ struct iommu_cmd *cmd = iommu_phys_to_virt(phys_addr);
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i)
@@ -919,11 +919,13 @@ static void copy_cmd_to_buffer(struct amd_iommu *iommu,
static void build_completion_wait(struct iommu_cmd *cmd, u64 address)
{
+ u64 paddr = iommu_virt_to_phys((void *)address);
+
WARN_ON(address & 0x7ULL);
memset(cmd, 0, sizeof(*cmd));
- cmd->data[0] = lower_32_bits(__pa(address)) | CMD_COMPL_WAIT_STORE_MASK;
- cmd->data[1] = upper_32_bits(__pa(address));
+ cmd->data[0] = lower_32_bits(paddr) | CMD_COMPL_WAIT_STORE_MASK;
+ cmd->data[1] = upper_32_bits(paddr);
cmd->data[2] = 1;
CMD_SET_TYPE(cmd, CMD_COMPL_WAIT);
}
@@ -1383,7 +1385,7 @@ static bool increase_address_space(struct protection_domain *domain,
return false;
*pte = PM_LEVEL_PDE(domain->mode,
- virt_to_phys(domain->pt_root));
+ iommu_virt_to_phys(domain->pt_root));
domain->pt_root = pte;
domain->mode += 1;
domain->updated = true;
@@ -1420,7 +1422,7 @@ static u64 *alloc_pte(struct protection_domain *domain,
if (!page)
return NULL;
- __npte = PM_LEVEL_PDE(level, virt_to_phys(page));
+ __npte = PM_LEVEL_PDE(level, iommu_virt_to_phys(page));
/* pte could have been changed somewhere. */
if (cmpxchg64(pte, __pte, __npte) != __pte) {
@@ -1536,10 +1538,10 @@ static int iommu_map_page(struct protection_domain *dom,
return -EBUSY;
if (count > 1) {
- __pte = PAGE_SIZE_PTE(phys_addr, page_size);
+ __pte = PAGE_SIZE_PTE(__sme_set(phys_addr), page_size);
__pte |= PM_LEVEL_ENC(7) | IOMMU_PTE_P | IOMMU_PTE_FC;
} else
- __pte = phys_addr | IOMMU_PTE_P | IOMMU_PTE_FC;
+ __pte = __sme_set(phys_addr) | IOMMU_PTE_P | IOMMU_PTE_FC;
if (prot & IOMMU_PROT_IR)
__pte |= IOMMU_PTE_IR;
@@ -1755,7 +1757,7 @@ static void free_gcr3_tbl_level1(u64 *tbl)
if (!(tbl[i] & GCR3_VALID))
continue;
- ptr = __va(tbl[i] & PAGE_MASK);
+ ptr = iommu_phys_to_virt(tbl[i] & PAGE_MASK);
free_page((unsigned long)ptr);
}
@@ -1770,7 +1772,7 @@ static void free_gcr3_tbl_level2(u64 *tbl)
if (!(tbl[i] & GCR3_VALID))
continue;
- ptr = __va(tbl[i] & PAGE_MASK);
+ ptr = iommu_phys_to_virt(tbl[i] & PAGE_MASK);
free_gcr3_tbl_level1(ptr);
}
@@ -2049,7 +2051,7 @@ static void set_dte_entry(u16 devid, struct protection_domain *domain, bool ats)
u64 flags = 0;
if (domain->mode != PAGE_MODE_NONE)
- pte_root = virt_to_phys(domain->pt_root);
+ pte_root = iommu_virt_to_phys(domain->pt_root);
pte_root |= (domain->mode & DEV_ENTRY_MODE_MASK)
<< DEV_ENTRY_MODE_SHIFT;
@@ -2061,7 +2063,7 @@ static void set_dte_entry(u16 devid, struct protection_domain *domain, bool ats)
flags |= DTE_FLAG_IOTLB;
if (domain->flags & PD_IOMMUV2_MASK) {
- u64 gcr3 = __pa(domain->gcr3_tbl);
+ u64 gcr3 = iommu_virt_to_phys(domain->gcr3_tbl);
u64 glx = domain->glx;
u64 tmp;
@@ -3606,10 +3608,10 @@ static u64 *__get_gcr3_pte(u64 *root, int level, int pasid, bool alloc)
if (root == NULL)
return NULL;
- *pte = __pa(root) | GCR3_VALID;
+ *pte = iommu_virt_to_phys(root) | GCR3_VALID;
}
- root = __va(*pte & PAGE_MASK);
+ root = iommu_phys_to_virt(*pte & PAGE_MASK);
level -= 1;
}
@@ -3788,7 +3790,7 @@ static void set_dte_irq_entry(u16 devid, struct irq_remap_table *table)
dte = amd_iommu_dev_table[devid].data[2];
dte &= ~DTE_IRQ_PHYS_ADDR_MASK;
- dte |= virt_to_phys(table->table);
+ dte |= iommu_virt_to_phys(table->table);
dte |= DTE_IRQ_REMAP_INTCTL;
dte |= DTE_IRQ_TABLE_LEN;
dte |= DTE_IRQ_REMAP_ENABLE;
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c
index 372303700566..2292a6cece76 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include <linux/iommu.h>
#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
#include <linux/crash_dump.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <asm/pci-direct.h>
#include <asm/iommu.h>
#include <asm/gart.h>
@@ -348,7 +349,7 @@ static void iommu_set_device_table(struct amd_iommu *iommu)
BUG_ON(iommu->mmio_base == NULL);
- entry = virt_to_phys(amd_iommu_dev_table);
+ entry = iommu_virt_to_phys(amd_iommu_dev_table);
entry |= (dev_table_size >> 12) - 1;
memcpy_toio(iommu->mmio_base + MMIO_DEV_TABLE_OFFSET,
&entry, sizeof(entry));
@@ -606,7 +607,7 @@ static void iommu_enable_command_buffer(struct amd_iommu *iommu)
BUG_ON(iommu->cmd_buf == NULL);
- entry = (u64)virt_to_phys(iommu->cmd_buf);
+ entry = iommu_virt_to_phys(iommu->cmd_buf);
entry |= MMIO_CMD_SIZE_512;
memcpy_toio(iommu->mmio_base + MMIO_CMD_BUF_OFFSET,
@@ -635,7 +636,7 @@ static void iommu_enable_event_buffer(struct amd_iommu *iommu)
BUG_ON(iommu->evt_buf == NULL);
- entry = (u64)virt_to_phys(iommu->evt_buf) | EVT_LEN_MASK;
+ entry = iommu_virt_to_phys(iommu->evt_buf) | EVT_LEN_MASK;
memcpy_toio(iommu->mmio_base + MMIO_EVT_BUF_OFFSET,
&entry, sizeof(entry));
@@ -668,7 +669,7 @@ static void iommu_enable_ppr_log(struct amd_iommu *iommu)
if (iommu->ppr_log == NULL)
return;
- entry = (u64)virt_to_phys(iommu->ppr_log) | PPR_LOG_SIZE_512;
+ entry = iommu_virt_to_phys(iommu->ppr_log) | PPR_LOG_SIZE_512;
memcpy_toio(iommu->mmio_base + MMIO_PPR_LOG_OFFSET,
&entry, sizeof(entry));
@@ -748,10 +749,10 @@ static int iommu_init_ga_log(struct amd_iommu *iommu)
if (!iommu->ga_log_tail)
goto err_out;
- entry = (u64)virt_to_phys(iommu->ga_log) | GA_LOG_SIZE_512;
+ entry = iommu_virt_to_phys(iommu->ga_log) | GA_LOG_SIZE_512;
memcpy_toio(iommu->mmio_base + MMIO_GA_LOG_BASE_OFFSET,
&entry, sizeof(entry));
- entry = ((u64)virt_to_phys(iommu->ga_log) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) & ~7ULL;
+ entry = (iommu_virt_to_phys(iommu->ga_log) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) & ~7ULL;
memcpy_toio(iommu->mmio_base + MMIO_GA_LOG_TAIL_OFFSET,
&entry, sizeof(entry));
writel(0x00, iommu->mmio_base + MMIO_GA_HEAD_OFFSET);
@@ -2564,6 +2565,24 @@ static int __init amd_iommu_init(void)
return ret;
}
+static bool amd_iommu_sme_check(void)
+{
+ if (!sme_active() || (boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0x17))
+ return true;
+
+ /* For Fam17h, a specific level of support is required */
+ if (boot_cpu_data.microcode >= 0x08001205)
+ return true;
+
+ if ((boot_cpu_data.microcode >= 0x08001126) &&
+ (boot_cpu_data.microcode <= 0x080011ff))
+ return true;
+
+ pr_notice("AMD-Vi: IOMMU not currently supported when SME is active\n");
+
+ return false;
+}
+
/****************************************************************************
*
* Early detect code. This code runs at IOMMU detection time in the DMA
@@ -2578,6 +2597,9 @@ int __init amd_iommu_detect(void)
if (no_iommu || (iommu_detected && !gart_iommu_aperture))
return -ENODEV;
+ if (!amd_iommu_sme_check())
+ return -ENODEV;
+
ret = iommu_go_to_state(IOMMU_IVRS_DETECTED);
if (ret)
return ret;
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_proto.h b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_proto.h
index 466260f8a1df..3f12fb2338ea 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_proto.h
+++ b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_proto.h
@@ -87,4 +87,14 @@ static inline bool iommu_feature(struct amd_iommu *iommu, u64 f)
return !!(iommu->features & f);
}
+static inline u64 iommu_virt_to_phys(void *vaddr)
+{
+ return (u64)__sme_set(virt_to_phys(vaddr));
+}
+
+static inline void *iommu_phys_to_virt(unsigned long paddr)
+{
+ return phys_to_virt(__sme_clr(paddr));
+}
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_AMD_IOMMU_PROTO_H */
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_types.h b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_types.h
index d6b873b57054..8e3a85759242 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_types.h
+++ b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_types.h
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@
#define IOMMU_PAGE_MASK (((1ULL << 52) - 1) & ~0xfffULL)
#define IOMMU_PTE_PRESENT(pte) ((pte) & IOMMU_PTE_P)
-#define IOMMU_PTE_PAGE(pte) (phys_to_virt((pte) & IOMMU_PAGE_MASK))
+#define IOMMU_PTE_PAGE(pte) (iommu_phys_to_virt((pte) & IOMMU_PAGE_MASK))
#define IOMMU_PTE_MODE(pte) (((pte) >> 9) & 0x07)
#define IOMMU_PROT_MASK 0x03
diff --git a/drivers/sfi/sfi_core.c b/drivers/sfi/sfi_core.c
index 296db7a69c27..153b3f3cc795 100644
--- a/drivers/sfi/sfi_core.c
+++ b/drivers/sfi/sfi_core.c
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/sfi.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
#include "sfi_core.h"
@@ -86,13 +87,13 @@ static struct sfi_table_simple *syst_va __read_mostly;
/*
* FW creates and saves the SFI tables in memory. When these tables get
* used, they may need to be mapped to virtual address space, and the mapping
- * can happen before or after the ioremap() is ready, so a flag is needed
+ * can happen before or after the memremap() is ready, so a flag is needed
* to indicating this
*/
-static u32 sfi_use_ioremap __read_mostly;
+static u32 sfi_use_memremap __read_mostly;
/*
- * sfi_un/map_memory calls early_ioremap/iounmap which is a __init function
+ * sfi_un/map_memory calls early_memremap/memunmap which is a __init function
* and introduces section mismatch. So use __ref to make it calm.
*/
static void __iomem * __ref sfi_map_memory(u64 phys, u32 size)
@@ -100,10 +101,10 @@ static void __iomem * __ref sfi_map_memory(u64 phys, u32 size)
if (!phys || !size)
return NULL;
- if (sfi_use_ioremap)
- return ioremap_cache(phys, size);
+ if (sfi_use_memremap)
+ return memremap(phys, size, MEMREMAP_WB);
else
- return early_ioremap(phys, size);
+ return early_memremap(phys, size);
}
static void __ref sfi_unmap_memory(void __iomem *virt, u32 size)
@@ -111,10 +112,10 @@ static void __ref sfi_unmap_memory(void __iomem *virt, u32 size)
if (!virt || !size)
return;
- if (sfi_use_ioremap)
- iounmap(virt);
+ if (sfi_use_memremap)
+ memunmap(virt);
else
- early_iounmap(virt, size);
+ early_memunmap(virt, size);
}
static void sfi_print_table_header(unsigned long long pa,
@@ -507,8 +508,8 @@ void __init sfi_init_late(void)
length = syst_va->header.len;
sfi_unmap_memory(syst_va, sizeof(struct sfi_table_simple));
- /* Use ioremap now after it is ready */
- sfi_use_ioremap = 1;
+ /* Use memremap now after it is ready */
+ sfi_use_memremap = 1;
syst_va = sfi_map_memory(syst_pa, length);
sfi_acpi_init();
diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c
index 7a42238db446..25e862c487f6 100644
--- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c
+++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <linux/device.h>
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <linux/fb.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <asm/fb.h>
@@ -1396,6 +1397,12 @@ fb_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct * vma)
mutex_lock(&info->mm_lock);
if (fb->fb_mmap) {
int res;
+
+ /*
+ * The framebuffer needs to be accessed decrypted, be sure
+ * SME protection is removed ahead of the call
+ */
+ vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_decrypted(vma->vm_page_prot);
res = fb->fb_mmap(info, vma);
mutex_unlock(&info->mm_lock);
return res;
@@ -1421,6 +1428,11 @@ fb_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct * vma)
mutex_unlock(&info->mm_lock);
vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags);
+ /*
+ * The framebuffer needs to be accessed decrypted, be sure
+ * SME protection is removed
+ */
+ vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_decrypted(vma->vm_page_prot);
fb_pgprotect(file, vma, start);
return vm_iomap_memory(vma, start, len);
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/early_ioremap.h b/include/asm-generic/early_ioremap.h
index 734ad4db388c..2edef8d7fa6b 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/early_ioremap.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/early_ioremap.h
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ extern void *early_memremap(resource_size_t phys_addr,
unsigned long size);
extern void *early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr,
unsigned long size);
+extern void *early_memremap_prot(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size, unsigned long prot_val);
extern void early_iounmap(void __iomem *addr, unsigned long size);
extern void early_memunmap(void *addr, unsigned long size);
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
index 7dfa767dc680..4d7bb98f4134 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
@@ -583,6 +583,18 @@ static inline void ptep_modify_prot_commit(struct mm_struct *mm,
#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */
/*
+ * No-op macros that just return the current protection value. Defined here
+ * because these macros can be used used even if CONFIG_MMU is not defined.
+ */
+#ifndef pgprot_encrypted
+#define pgprot_encrypted(prot) (prot)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef pgprot_decrypted
+#define pgprot_decrypted(prot) (prot)
+#endif
+
+/*
* A facility to provide lazy MMU batching. This allows PTE updates and
* page invalidations to be delayed until a call to leave lazy MMU mode
* is issued. Some architectures may benefit from doing this, and it is
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
index 310f51d42550..16d41de92ee3 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
@@ -166,6 +166,8 @@
#if GCC_VERSION >= 40100
# define __compiletime_object_size(obj) __builtin_object_size(obj, 0)
+
+#define __nostackprotector __attribute__((__optimize__("no-stack-protector")))
#endif
#if GCC_VERSION >= 40300
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler.h b/include/linux/compiler.h
index e786337cf5a7..e95a2631e545 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler.h
@@ -501,6 +501,10 @@ static __always_inline void __write_once_size(volatile void *p, void *res, int s
#define __visible
#endif
+#ifndef __nostackprotector
+# define __nostackprotector
+#endif
+
/*
* Assume alignment of return value.
*/
diff --git a/include/linux/dma-mapping.h b/include/linux/dma-mapping.h
index 03c0196a6f24..2189c79cde5d 100644
--- a/include/linux/dma-mapping.h
+++ b/include/linux/dma-mapping.h
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/kmemcheck.h>
#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
/**
* List of possible attributes associated with a DMA mapping. The semantics
@@ -572,6 +573,12 @@ static inline int dma_mapping_error(struct device *dev, dma_addr_t dma_addr)
return 0;
}
+static inline void dma_check_mask(struct device *dev, u64 mask)
+{
+ if (sme_active() && (mask < (((u64)sme_get_me_mask() << 1) - 1)))
+ dev_warn(dev, "SME is active, device will require DMA bounce buffers\n");
+}
+
static inline int dma_supported(struct device *dev, u64 mask)
{
const struct dma_map_ops *ops = get_dma_ops(dev);
@@ -588,6 +595,9 @@ static inline int dma_set_mask(struct device *dev, u64 mask)
{
if (!dev->dma_mask || !dma_supported(dev, mask))
return -EIO;
+
+ dma_check_mask(dev, mask);
+
*dev->dma_mask = mask;
return 0;
}
@@ -607,6 +617,9 @@ static inline int dma_set_coherent_mask(struct device *dev, u64 mask)
{
if (!dma_supported(dev, mask))
return -EIO;
+
+ dma_check_mask(dev, mask);
+
dev->coherent_dma_mask = mask;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index a686ca9a7e5c..4102b85217d5 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -985,7 +985,7 @@ static inline void efi_esrt_init(void) { }
extern int efi_config_parse_tables(void *config_tables, int count, int sz,
efi_config_table_type_t *arch_tables);
extern u64 efi_get_iobase (void);
-extern u32 efi_mem_type (unsigned long phys_addr);
+extern int efi_mem_type(unsigned long phys_addr);
extern u64 efi_mem_attributes (unsigned long phys_addr);
extern u64 efi_mem_attribute (unsigned long phys_addr, unsigned long size);
extern int __init efi_uart_console_only (void);
@@ -1113,6 +1113,8 @@ static inline bool efi_enabled(int feature)
return test_bit(feature, &efi.flags) != 0;
}
extern void efi_reboot(enum reboot_mode reboot_mode, const char *__unused);
+
+extern bool efi_is_table_address(unsigned long phys_addr);
#else
static inline bool efi_enabled(int feature)
{
@@ -1126,6 +1128,11 @@ efi_capsule_pending(int *reset_type)
{
return false;
}
+
+static inline bool efi_is_table_address(unsigned long phys_addr)
+{
+ return false;
+}
#endif
extern int efi_status_to_err(efi_status_t status);
diff --git a/include/linux/io.h b/include/linux/io.h
index 2195d9ea4aaa..32e30e8fb9db 100644
--- a/include/linux/io.h
+++ b/include/linux/io.h
@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ enum {
MEMREMAP_WB = 1 << 0,
MEMREMAP_WT = 1 << 1,
MEMREMAP_WC = 1 << 2,
+ MEMREMAP_ENC = 1 << 3,
+ MEMREMAP_DEC = 1 << 4,
};
void *memremap(resource_size_t offset, size_t size, unsigned long flags);
diff --git a/include/linux/kexec.h b/include/linux/kexec.h
index dd056fab9e35..2b7590f5483a 100644
--- a/include/linux/kexec.h
+++ b/include/linux/kexec.h
@@ -327,6 +327,14 @@ static inline void *boot_phys_to_virt(unsigned long entry)
return phys_to_virt(boot_phys_to_phys(entry));
}
+#ifndef arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages
+static inline int arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages, gfp_t gfp) { return 0; }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef arch_kexec_pre_free_pages
+static inline void arch_kexec_pre_free_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages) { }
+#endif
+
#else /* !CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE */
struct pt_regs;
struct task_struct;
diff --git a/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h b/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1255f09f5e42
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+/*
+ * AMD Memory Encryption Support
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __MEM_ENCRYPT_H__
+#define __MEM_ENCRYPT_H__
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT
+
+#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
+
+#else /* !CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT */
+
+#define sme_me_mask 0UL
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT */
+
+static inline bool sme_active(void)
+{
+ return !!sme_me_mask;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long sme_get_me_mask(void)
+{
+ return sme_me_mask;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The __sme_set() and __sme_clr() macros are useful for adding or removing
+ * the encryption mask from a value (e.g. when dealing with pagetable
+ * entries).
+ */
+#define __sme_set(x) ((unsigned long)(x) | sme_me_mask)
+#define __sme_clr(x) ((unsigned long)(x) & ~sme_me_mask)
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#endif /* __MEM_ENCRYPT_H__ */
diff --git a/include/linux/mm_inline.h b/include/linux/mm_inline.h
index e030a68ead7e..25438b2b6f22 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm_inline.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm_inline.h
@@ -126,4 +126,10 @@ static __always_inline enum lru_list page_lru(struct page *page)
#define lru_to_page(head) (list_entry((head)->prev, struct page, lru))
+#ifdef arch_unmap_kpfn
+extern void arch_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn);
+#else
+static __always_inline void arch_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn) { }
+#endif
+
#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/swiotlb.h b/include/linux/swiotlb.h
index 4ee479f2f355..15e7160751a8 100644
--- a/include/linux/swiotlb.h
+++ b/include/linux/swiotlb.h
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ int swiotlb_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, unsigned long nslabs, int verbose);
extern unsigned long swiotlb_nr_tbl(void);
unsigned long swiotlb_size_or_default(void);
extern int swiotlb_late_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, unsigned long nslabs);
+extern void __init swiotlb_update_mem_attributes(void);
/*
* Enumeration for sync targets
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index b78f63c30b17..8828fc148670 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -487,6 +487,8 @@ void __init __weak thread_stack_cache_init(void)
}
#endif
+void __init __weak mem_encrypt_init(void) { }
+
/*
* Set up kernel memory allocators
*/
@@ -640,6 +642,14 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
*/
locking_selftest();
+ /*
+ * This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA
+ * operations that might use the SWIOTLB bounce buffers. It will
+ * mark the bounce buffers as decrypted so that their usage will
+ * not cause "plain-text" data to be decrypted when accessed.
+ */
+ mem_encrypt_init();
+
#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD
if (initrd_start && !initrd_below_start_ok &&
page_to_pfn(virt_to_page((void *)initrd_start)) < min_low_pfn) {
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_core.c b/kernel/kexec_core.c
index 1ae7c41c33c1..20fef1a38602 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_core.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_core.c
@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ static struct page *kimage_alloc_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order)
{
struct page *pages;
- pages = alloc_pages(gfp_mask, order);
+ pages = alloc_pages(gfp_mask & ~__GFP_ZERO, order);
if (pages) {
unsigned int count, i;
@@ -310,6 +310,13 @@ static struct page *kimage_alloc_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order)
count = 1 << order;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
SetPageReserved(pages + i);
+
+ arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages(page_address(pages), count,
+ gfp_mask);
+
+ if (gfp_mask & __GFP_ZERO)
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+ clear_highpage(pages + i);
}
return pages;
@@ -321,6 +328,9 @@ static void kimage_free_pages(struct page *page)
order = page_private(page);
count = 1 << order;
+
+ arch_kexec_pre_free_pages(page_address(page), count);
+
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
ClearPageReserved(page + i);
__free_pages(page, order);
diff --git a/kernel/memremap.c b/kernel/memremap.c
index 124bed776532..9afdc434fb49 100644
--- a/kernel/memremap.c
+++ b/kernel/memremap.c
@@ -34,13 +34,24 @@ static void *arch_memremap_wb(resource_size_t offset, unsigned long size)
}
#endif
-static void *try_ram_remap(resource_size_t offset, size_t size)
+#ifndef arch_memremap_can_ram_remap
+static bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t offset, size_t size,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ return true;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void *try_ram_remap(resource_size_t offset, size_t size,
+ unsigned long flags)
{
unsigned long pfn = PHYS_PFN(offset);
/* In the simple case just return the existing linear address */
- if (pfn_valid(pfn) && !PageHighMem(pfn_to_page(pfn)))
+ if (pfn_valid(pfn) && !PageHighMem(pfn_to_page(pfn)) &&
+ arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(offset, size, flags))
return __va(offset);
+
return NULL; /* fallback to arch_memremap_wb */
}
@@ -48,7 +59,8 @@ static void *try_ram_remap(resource_size_t offset, size_t size)
* memremap() - remap an iomem_resource as cacheable memory
* @offset: iomem resource start address
* @size: size of remap
- * @flags: any of MEMREMAP_WB, MEMREMAP_WT and MEMREMAP_WC
+ * @flags: any of MEMREMAP_WB, MEMREMAP_WT, MEMREMAP_WC,
+ * MEMREMAP_ENC, MEMREMAP_DEC
*
* memremap() is "ioremap" for cases where it is known that the resource
* being mapped does not have i/o side effects and the __iomem
@@ -95,7 +107,7 @@ void *memremap(resource_size_t offset, size_t size, unsigned long flags)
* the requested range is potentially in System RAM.
*/
if (is_ram == REGION_INTERSECTS)
- addr = try_ram_remap(offset, size);
+ addr = try_ram_remap(offset, size, flags);
if (!addr)
addr = arch_memremap_wb(offset, size);
}
diff --git a/lib/swiotlb.c b/lib/swiotlb.c
index a8d74a733a38..8c6c83ef57a4 100644
--- a/lib/swiotlb.c
+++ b/lib/swiotlb.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/dma.h>
@@ -155,6 +156,15 @@ unsigned long swiotlb_size_or_default(void)
return size ? size : (IO_TLB_DEFAULT_SIZE);
}
+void __weak swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(void *vaddr, unsigned long size) { }
+
+/* For swiotlb, clear memory encryption mask from dma addresses */
+static dma_addr_t swiotlb_phys_to_dma(struct device *hwdev,
+ phys_addr_t address)
+{
+ return __sme_clr(phys_to_dma(hwdev, address));
+}
+
/* Note that this doesn't work with highmem page */
static dma_addr_t swiotlb_virt_to_bus(struct device *hwdev,
volatile void *address)
@@ -183,6 +193,31 @@ void swiotlb_print_info(void)
bytes >> 20, vstart, vend - 1);
}
+/*
+ * Early SWIOTLB allocation may be too early to allow an architecture to
+ * perform the desired operations. This function allows the architecture to
+ * call SWIOTLB when the operations are possible. It needs to be called
+ * before the SWIOTLB memory is used.
+ */
+void __init swiotlb_update_mem_attributes(void)
+{
+ void *vaddr;
+ unsigned long bytes;
+
+ if (no_iotlb_memory || late_alloc)
+ return;
+
+ vaddr = phys_to_virt(io_tlb_start);
+ bytes = PAGE_ALIGN(io_tlb_nslabs << IO_TLB_SHIFT);
+ swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(vaddr, bytes);
+ memset(vaddr, 0, bytes);
+
+ vaddr = phys_to_virt(io_tlb_overflow_buffer);
+ bytes = PAGE_ALIGN(io_tlb_overflow);
+ swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(vaddr, bytes);
+ memset(vaddr, 0, bytes);
+}
+
int __init swiotlb_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, unsigned long nslabs, int verbose)
{
void *v_overflow_buffer;
@@ -320,6 +355,7 @@ swiotlb_late_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, unsigned long nslabs)
io_tlb_start = virt_to_phys(tlb);
io_tlb_end = io_tlb_start + bytes;
+ swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(tlb, bytes);
memset(tlb, 0, bytes);
/*
@@ -330,6 +366,8 @@ swiotlb_late_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, unsigned long nslabs)
if (!v_overflow_buffer)
goto cleanup2;
+ swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(v_overflow_buffer, io_tlb_overflow);
+ memset(v_overflow_buffer, 0, io_tlb_overflow);
io_tlb_overflow_buffer = virt_to_phys(v_overflow_buffer);
/*
@@ -469,6 +507,9 @@ phys_addr_t swiotlb_tbl_map_single(struct device *hwdev,
if (no_iotlb_memory)
panic("Can not allocate SWIOTLB buffer earlier and can't now provide you with the DMA bounce buffer");
+ if (sme_active())
+ pr_warn_once("SME is active and system is using DMA bounce buffers\n");
+
mask = dma_get_seg_boundary(hwdev);
tbl_dma_addr &= mask;
@@ -581,7 +622,7 @@ map_single(struct device *hwdev, phys_addr_t phys, size_t size,
return SWIOTLB_MAP_ERROR;
}
- start_dma_addr = phys_to_dma(hwdev, io_tlb_start);
+ start_dma_addr = swiotlb_phys_to_dma(hwdev, io_tlb_start);
return swiotlb_tbl_map_single(hwdev, start_dma_addr, phys, size,
dir, attrs);
}
@@ -702,7 +743,7 @@ swiotlb_alloc_coherent(struct device *hwdev, size_t size,
goto err_warn;
ret = phys_to_virt(paddr);
- dev_addr = phys_to_dma(hwdev, paddr);
+ dev_addr = swiotlb_phys_to_dma(hwdev, paddr);
/* Confirm address can be DMA'd by device */
if (dev_addr + size - 1 > dma_mask) {
@@ -812,10 +853,10 @@ dma_addr_t swiotlb_map_page(struct device *dev, struct page *page,
map = map_single(dev, phys, size, dir, attrs);
if (map == SWIOTLB_MAP_ERROR) {
swiotlb_full(dev, size, dir, 1);
- return phys_to_dma(dev, io_tlb_overflow_buffer);
+ return swiotlb_phys_to_dma(dev, io_tlb_overflow_buffer);
}
- dev_addr = phys_to_dma(dev, map);
+ dev_addr = swiotlb_phys_to_dma(dev, map);
/* Ensure that the address returned is DMA'ble */
if (dma_capable(dev, dev_addr, size))
@@ -824,7 +865,7 @@ dma_addr_t swiotlb_map_page(struct device *dev, struct page *page,
attrs |= DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC;
swiotlb_tbl_unmap_single(dev, map, size, dir, attrs);
- return phys_to_dma(dev, io_tlb_overflow_buffer);
+ return swiotlb_phys_to_dma(dev, io_tlb_overflow_buffer);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(swiotlb_map_page);
@@ -958,7 +999,7 @@ swiotlb_map_sg_attrs(struct device *hwdev, struct scatterlist *sgl, int nelems,
sg_dma_len(sgl) = 0;
return 0;
}
- sg->dma_address = phys_to_dma(hwdev, map);
+ sg->dma_address = swiotlb_phys_to_dma(hwdev, map);
} else
sg->dma_address = dev_addr;
sg_dma_len(sg) = sg->length;
@@ -1026,7 +1067,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(swiotlb_sync_sg_for_device);
int
swiotlb_dma_mapping_error(struct device *hwdev, dma_addr_t dma_addr)
{
- return (dma_addr == phys_to_dma(hwdev, io_tlb_overflow_buffer));
+ return (dma_addr == swiotlb_phys_to_dma(hwdev, io_tlb_overflow_buffer));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(swiotlb_dma_mapping_error);
@@ -1039,6 +1080,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(swiotlb_dma_mapping_error);
int
swiotlb_dma_supported(struct device *hwdev, u64 mask)
{
- return phys_to_dma(hwdev, io_tlb_end - 1) <= mask;
+ return swiotlb_phys_to_dma(hwdev, io_tlb_end - 1) <= mask;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(swiotlb_dma_supported);
diff --git a/mm/early_ioremap.c b/mm/early_ioremap.c
index 6d5717bd7197..b1dd4a948fc0 100644
--- a/mm/early_ioremap.c
+++ b/mm/early_ioremap.c
@@ -30,6 +30,13 @@ early_param("early_ioremap_debug", early_ioremap_debug_setup);
static int after_paging_init __initdata;
+pgprot_t __init __weak early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size,
+ pgprot_t prot)
+{
+ return prot;
+}
+
void __init __weak early_ioremap_shutdown(void)
{
}
@@ -215,14 +222,29 @@ early_ioremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
void __init *
early_memremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
{
- return (__force void *)__early_ioremap(phys_addr, size,
- FIXMAP_PAGE_NORMAL);
+ pgprot_t prot = early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(phys_addr, size,
+ FIXMAP_PAGE_NORMAL);
+
+ return (__force void *)__early_ioremap(phys_addr, size, prot);
}
#ifdef FIXMAP_PAGE_RO
void __init *
early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
{
- return (__force void *)__early_ioremap(phys_addr, size, FIXMAP_PAGE_RO);
+ pgprot_t prot = early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(phys_addr, size,
+ FIXMAP_PAGE_RO);
+
+ return (__force void *)__early_ioremap(phys_addr, size, prot);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT
+void __init *
+early_memremap_prot(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
+ unsigned long prot_val)
+{
+ return (__force void *)__early_ioremap(phys_addr, size,
+ __pgprot(prot_val));
}
#endif
diff --git a/mm/memory-failure.c b/mm/memory-failure.c
index 1cd3b3569af8..88366626c0b7 100644
--- a/mm/memory-failure.c
+++ b/mm/memory-failure.c
@@ -1146,6 +1146,8 @@ int memory_failure(unsigned long pfn, int trapno, int flags)
return 0;
}
+ arch_unmap_kpfn(pfn);
+
orig_head = hpage = compound_head(p);
num_poisoned_pages_inc();