From 2c84c22708b0684b4e1616bf64daf8d9acc7b9e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Caolán McNamara <caolanm@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Apr 2014 09:40:05 +0100
Subject: CVE-2014-0160 heartbeat

Change-Id: I00ee89f69d85010be5d3a537092349fa9eeb71c8
(cherry picked from commit 9af4ecd2b485ae4bba443eb0ec6f958fcc2e3619)
---
 external/openssl/CVE-2014-0160.patch        | 108 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 external/openssl/UnpackedTarball_openssl.mk |   1 +
 2 files changed, 109 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 external/openssl/CVE-2014-0160.patch

(limited to 'external')

diff --git a/external/openssl/CVE-2014-0160.patch b/external/openssl/CVE-2014-0160.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ddf9d9c517ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/external/openssl/CVE-2014-0160.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+From: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
+Date: Sat, 5 Apr 2014 23:51:06 +0000 (+0100)
+Subject: Add heartbeat extension bounds check.
+X-Git-Tag: OpenSSL_1_0_1g~3
+X-Git-Url: http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=96db902
+
+Add heartbeat extension bounds check.
+
+A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
+can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
+server.
+
+Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
+Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
+preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
+---
+
+diff --git a/a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
+index 7a5596a..2e8cf68 100644
+--- a/a/ssl/d1_both.c
++++ a/b/ssl/d1_both.c
+@@ -1459,26 +1459,36 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+ 	unsigned int payload;
+ 	unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+ 
+-	/* Read type and payload length first */
+-	hbtype = *p++;
+-	n2s(p, payload);
+-	pl = p;
+-
+ 	if (s->msg_callback)
+ 		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+ 			&s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
+ 			s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ 
++	/* Read type and payload length first */
++	if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
++		return 0; /* silently discard */
++	hbtype = *p++;
++	n2s(p, payload);
++	if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
++		return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
++	pl = p;
++
+ 	if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
+ 		{
+ 		unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
++		unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ +
++					    2 /* heartbeat length */ +
++					    payload + padding;
+ 		int r;
+ 
++		if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
++			return 0;
++
+ 		/* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte
+ 		 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
+ 		 * payload, plus padding
+ 		 */
+-		buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
++		buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
+ 		bp = buffer;
+ 
+ 		/* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
+@@ -1489,11 +1499,11 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+ 		/* Random padding */
+ 		RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
+ 
+-		r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
++		r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
+ 
+ 		if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
+ 			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+-				buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
++				buffer, write_length,
+ 				s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ 
+ 		OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+index b82fada..bddffd9 100644
+--- a/a/ssl/t1_lib.c
++++ a/b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+@@ -2588,16 +2588,20 @@ tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+ 	unsigned int payload;
+ 	unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+ 
+-	/* Read type and payload length first */
+-	hbtype = *p++;
+-	n2s(p, payload);
+-	pl = p;
+-
+ 	if (s->msg_callback)
+ 		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+ 			&s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
+ 			s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ 
++	/* Read type and payload length first */
++	if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
++		return 0; /* silently discard */
++	hbtype = *p++;
++	n2s(p, payload);
++	if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
++		return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
++	pl = p;
++
+ 	if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
+ 		{
+ 		unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
diff --git a/external/openssl/UnpackedTarball_openssl.mk b/external/openssl/UnpackedTarball_openssl.mk
index cec09d28f5e9..869a74e11b14 100644
--- a/external/openssl/UnpackedTarball_openssl.mk
+++ b/external/openssl/UnpackedTarball_openssl.mk
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ $(eval $(call gb_UnpackedTarball_fix_end_of_line,openssl,\
 ))
 
 $(eval $(call gb_UnpackedTarball_add_patches,openssl,\
+	external/openssl/CVE-2014-0160.patch \
 	$(if $(filter LINUX FREEBSD ANDROID,$(OS)),external/openssl/openssllnx.patch) \
 	$(if $(filter WNTGCC,$(OS)$(COM)),external/openssl/opensslmingw.patch) \
 	$(if $(filter MSC,$(COM)),external/openssl/opensslwnt.patch) \
-- 
cgit v1.2.3