1 files changed, 16 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/src/libnm-systemd-shared/src/basic/user-util.h b/src/libnm-systemd-shared/src/basic/user-util.h
index 8b829a9ae2..9d07ef31d2 100644
--- a/src/libnm-systemd-shared/src/basic/user-util.h
+++ b/src/libnm-systemd-shared/src/basic/user-util.h
@@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ typedef enum UserCredsFlags {
         USER_CREDS_CLEAN         = 1 << 2,  /* try to clean up shell and home fields with invalid data */
 } UserCredsFlags;
 
-int get_user_creds(const char **username, uid_t *uid, gid_t *gid, const char **home, const char **shell, UserCredsFlags flags);
-int get_group_creds(const char **groupname, gid_t *gid, UserCredsFlags flags);
+int get_user_creds(const char **username, uid_t *ret_uid, gid_t *ret_gid, const char **ret_home, const char **ret_shell, UserCredsFlags flags);
+int get_group_creds(const char **groupname, gid_t *ret_gid, UserCredsFlags flags);
 
 char* uid_to_name(uid_t uid);
 char* gid_to_name(gid_t gid);
@@ -57,7 +57,10 @@ int getgroups_alloc(gid_t** gids);
 int get_home_dir(char **ret);
 int get_shell(char **ret);
 
-int reset_uid_gid(void);
+int fully_set_uid_gid(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, const gid_t supplementary_gids[], size_t n_supplementary_gids);
+static inline int reset_uid_gid(void) {
+        return fully_set_uid_gid(0, 0, NULL, 0);
+}
 
 int take_etc_passwd_lock(const char *root);
 
@@ -69,13 +72,13 @@ int take_etc_passwd_lock(const char *root);
 
 /* If REMOUNT_IDMAPPING_HOST_ROOT is set for remount_idmap() we'll include a mapping here that maps the host
  * root user accessing the idmapped mount to the this user ID on the backing fs. This is the last valid UID in
- * the *signed* 32bit range. You might wonder why precisely use this specific UID for this purpose? Well, we
+ * the *signed* 32-bit range. You might wonder why precisely use this specific UID for this purpose? Well, we
  * definitely cannot use the first 0…65536 UIDs for that, since in most cases that's precisely the file range
  * we intend to map to some high UID range, and since UID mappings have to be bijective we thus cannot use
- * them at all. Furthermore the UID range beyond INT32_MAX (i.e. the range above the signed 32bit range) is
+ * them at all. Furthermore the UID range beyond INT32_MAX (i.e. the range above the signed 32-bit range) is
  * icky, since many APIs cannot use it (example: setfsuid() returns the old UID as signed integer). Following
- * our usual logic of assigning a 16bit UID range to each container, so that the upper 16bit of a 32bit UID
- * value indicate kind of a "container ID" and the lower 16bit map directly to the intended user you can read
+ * our usual logic of assigning a 16-bit UID range to each container, so that the upper 16-bit of a 32-bit UID
+ * value indicate kind of a "container ID" and the lower 16-bit map directly to the intended user you can read
  * this specific UID as the "nobody" user of the container with ID 0x7FFF, which is kinda nice. */
 #define UID_MAPPED_ROOT ((uid_t) (INT32_MAX-1))
 #define GID_MAPPED_ROOT ((gid_t) (INT32_MAX-1))
@@ -155,3 +158,9 @@ static inline bool hashed_password_is_locked_or_invalid(const char *password) {
  * Also see https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/24680#pullrequestreview-1439464325.
  */
 #define PASSWORD_UNPROVISIONED "!unprovisioned"
+
+int getpwuid_malloc(uid_t uid, struct passwd **ret);
+int getpwnam_malloc(const char *name, struct passwd **ret);
+
+int getgrnam_malloc(const char *name, struct group **ret);
+int getgrgid_malloc(gid_t gid, struct group **ret);