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authorAlan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>2014-01-22 23:44:46 -0800
committerAlan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>2014-12-08 18:09:47 -0800
commite0e11644622a589129a01e11e5d105dc74a098de (patch)
treeb96144fd618c86620e52ef927cad2ba580159e1e
parent97015a07b9e15d8ec5608b95d95ec0eb51202acb (diff)
dix: integer overflow in REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE() [CVE-2014-8092 4/4]
Force use of 64-bit integers when evaluating data provided by clients in 32-bit fields which can overflow when added or multiplied during checks. Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-rw-r--r--include/dix.h3
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/include/dix.h b/include/dix.h
index 991a3ce88..e0c6ed84f 100644
--- a/include/dix.h
+++ b/include/dix.h
@@ -76,7 +76,8 @@ SOFTWARE.
#define REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(req, n)\
if (((sizeof(req) >> 2) > client->req_len) || \
- (((sizeof(req) + (n) + 3) >> 2) != client->req_len)) \
+ ((n >> 2) >= client->req_len) || \
+ ((((uint64_t) sizeof(req) + (n) + 3) >> 2) != (uint64_t) client->req_len)) \
return(BadLength)
#define LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(id,client)\